# 1AC

### 1AC---Economy

#### Advantage 1 is the Economy:

#### Shipping alliances are exempt from antitrust

Georgieva 20, J.D. candidate 2020, Tulane University Law School. (Ralitsa, 2020, Cracking Down Antitrust Prohibitions: Conferences, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Alliances in the Shipping Industry, 44 Tul. Mar. L. J. 291, Lexis Nexis)

The viable distinction between M&As and alliances is that alliances are often cooperative agreements and their terms are negotiated between the members of the alliance. M&A deals, on the other hand, "tend to be more competitive in nature with market-based prices and associated with more risks." 194 However, M&As could create an excessive concentration of market power. M&As are subject to antitrust regulation under section 7 of the Clayton Act; 195 "the Shipping Act does not provide the [FMC] with authority to review and approve mergers." 196Through M&A activity, a company eliminates a competitive rival and increases market concentration, which is "a potential concern for future anticompetitive market behavior." 197 In contrast, when companies join forces through an alliance, there are just as many sellers of vessel space as there were before, and rate competition continues among the alliance's members. 198Consequently, there is no increase in market concentration, and alliances are not subject to antitrust regulation under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 199 The FMC has the sole authority to oversee agreements among and between ocean common carriers and among and between maritime terminal operators for their compliance with the Shipping Act - general antitrust laws such as the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act are [\*317] inapplicable to those agreements. 200 This antitrust loophole makes alliances a valuable option that is provided for the companies under the Shipping Act. 201 A question arises of whether forming alliances could harm competition. Alliances could raise antitrust law concerns in what has become a concentrated market. In 1998, the top four carriers had a market share of less than 20%. This share increased to almost 60% in 2018. 202The market share of the biggest carrier, Maersk, was 19% in 2018, which is a larger market share than any global liner alliance ever had before 2012. 203These numbers point to a "market situation that could be considered an oligopoly and moderately concentrated." 204 The three major alliances "together represent around 95% of the market share, with limited activity from independent carriers, in particular on the Asia-Europe trade lines." 205Arguably, alliances could represent barriers for independent carriers to enter the market and could function as vehicles for collusion, "as they provide carriers with in-depth insights on the cost structures of their competitors." 206Therefore, container lines that are not members of alliances may find it more difficult to compete in the shipping market. Consequently, they will be either forced to join an alliance in order to survive or leave the market. 207Some commentators argued that smaller container lines could continue to operate in niche markets. 208However, evidence suggests that smaller container lines are already losing ground to mega alliances. 209

#### The exemption artificially inflates shipping rates

Maiorano 21, Senior Competition Expert at OECD, Competition Division. (Frederica, 6-7-2021, “Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation Competition Enforcement and Regulatory Alternatives – Note by the United States,” OECD, https://bit.ly/3mkAzKO)

Ocean shipping 12. The Shipping Act of 1984, as amended by the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 exempts certain agreements among ocean common carriers (i.e., those operating vessels and providing service to the public between the United States and a foreign country) from the antitrust laws and subjects them to oversight by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), an independent regulatory agency. The Act expressly confers an exemption from the antitrust laws for agreements on shipping rates, pooling arrangements, and shipping route allocations, so long as those agreements are first submitted to and reviewed by the FMC. This is the oldest surviving U.S. statutory antitrust exemption, having been originally adopted in 1916. The exemption covers not only agreements that have gone into effect under the Act, but also activities undertaken “with a reasonable basis to conclude” that they were pursuant to an agreement that has gone into effect. The antitrust exemption also covers intermodal through rates incorporating rail, truck, and ocean legs of particular cargo movements. 13. A carrier agreement does not require FMC “approval,” but is subject to several specific statutory conditions and goes into effect—and thereby becomes immunized from the antitrust laws—45 days after it is accepted for filing or submission of any additional information requested by the FMC. Once an agreement has been filed, the only way it can be challenged as anticompetitive is if the FMC successfully seeks to have a court enjoin the agreement on grounds that it is “likely, by a reduction in competition, to produce an unreasonable reduction in transportation service or an unreasonable increase in transportation cost.”8 14. Conduct that does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the antitrust exemption remains subject to the antitrust laws. For example, immunity does not extend to mergers and acquisitions involving ocean carriers. The DOJ has also successfully prosecuted pricefixing cases involving international trade lanes. A recent example involved a world-wide conspiracy involving price fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation in international ocean shipping services for roll-on, roll-off cargo to and from the United States and elsewhere. Roll-on, roll-off cargo is non-containerized cargo that can be both rolled onto and off of an ocean-going vessel; examples include new and used cars and trucks and construction and agricultural equipment. In 2015 and 2016, four companies (Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics AS, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, and Compañia Sud Americana de Vapores S.A.) pled guilty and were sentenced to pay total fines of $234.9 million, and four corporate executives pled guilty and were sentenced to an average of over 16 months in jail.9 15. The DOJ has long advocated that the general antitrust exemption granted by the Shipping Act is no longer justified and should be eliminated.10 In addition, the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section’s monograph on Federal Statutory Antitrust Exemptions11 describes why the arguments traditionally asserted to justify the exemption (i.e., ruinous competition due to overcapacity) are dubious. The ABA Antitrust Law Section concludes that the conferences “typically result in inefficiently high rates” and have at least “some ability to inflate price.”12

#### Special treatment shields foreign shipping alliances and harms domestic ports

---Department of Justice and private parties are barred from litigating maritime alliances

---Alliances divert cargo from United States ports because of unilateral unjust contract terms

O’Shea 17, an attorney who works on transportation and infrastructure issues, (Sean, 10-3-2017, Congress Must Stop Foreign Ocean Carriers From Harming U.S. Economy, Morning Consult, <https://bit.ly/3BxRtu9>)

After years of failing to crack down on big foreign ocean carriers that manipulate U.S. laws to fix prices and impose unilateral service terms on American ports and shippers, Congress is finally considering legislation that would protect the domestic maritime industry. But these reforms will only work if Congress empowers federal regulators and U.S. maritime companies to take legal action against foreign shipping cartels engaging in anti-competitive practices that threaten the economy and hurt American workers. Currently, U.S. ports and shippers are exposed to foreign ocean carrier cartels that band together to protect their financial interests while squashing port profits and stifling competition. Over the past several years, these ocean carriers have largely consolidated into three alliances that represent such a large share of the market that they can threaten to steer substantial amounts of cargo away from U.S. ports that balk at fees the alliance offers. Under normal circumstances, the whole scheme likely would run afoul of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which Congress adopted at the end of the 19th century in response to oil, steel and sugar trusts that attempted this same kind of market manipulation. But in the Shipping Act of 1916, Congress created an exemption from antitrust laws for alliances approved by the Federal Maritime Commission. When Congress revisited the law in 1984, it added a provision that allows a carrier alliance to go into effect automatically, providing antitrust immunity to its member lines, unless the FMC obtains a court injunction within 45 days. Even then, the only acceptable grounds for issuing an injunction are when a proposed alliance will impair shippers. The court cannot consider the potential harm to ports, dock workers or other waterfront service providers. The law further says that only the FMC, and not the Department of Justice, may file such lawsuits, and private parties are expressly barred from intervening in any case the FMC does bring. This special treatment in the current law gives foreign containership lines a virtual antitrust immunity when dealing with U.S. marine terminals, stevedores, tug and towing companies, and other equipment and service providers. This has created an environment in which U.S. laws favor the interests of big foreign vessel operators at the expense of American port terminal companies, shippers and workers. Today, exactly zero U.S. ship owners participate in the three ocean carrier alliances recognized by the FMC. This means our laws now do more to shield foreign carriers from being sued for antitrust violations than it does to promote the domestic shipping industry.

#### Lack of port revenue opens vulnerabilities to terrorism---extinction

Haveman and Schatz 6, Haveman is a research fellow and director of the Economy Program at the Public Policy Institute of California. Shatz is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, where he focuses on California’s interactions with the global economy. (Jon & Howard, 2006, “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost,” Public Policy Institute of California, <https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf>)

The Issue of Port Security The term “port security” serves as shorthand for the broad effort to secure the entire maritime supply chain, from the factory gate in a foreign country to the final destination of the product in the United States. The need to secure ports and the supply chain feeding goods into the ports stems from two concerns. The first is that transporting something from one place to another—the very activity that the ports facilitate—is an important activity for terrorists. Terrorists could use a port as a conduit through which to build an arsenal within the nation’s borders. The second concern is that ports themselves present attractive targets for terrorists. Ports are a significant potential choke point for an enormous amount of economic activity. The 361 U.S. seaports make an immense contribution to U.S. trade and the U.S. economy. They move about 80 percent of all U.S. international trade by weight, and about 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade, excluding trade with Mexico and Canada. By value, $807 billion worth of goods flowed through the seaports in 2003, about 41 percent of all U.S. international goods trade. This value is higher than the value of trade moved by all modes in any single leading industrial country except Germany. Temporarily shutting down a major U.S. port could impose significant economic costs throughout not only the United States but also the world. Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has labeled the destruction of the U.S. economy as one of his goals: “If their economy is finished, they will become too busy to enslave oppressed people. It is very important to concentrate on hitting the U.S. economy with every available means.”1 The potential for a port closure to disrupt economic activity has been made clear several times in recent years. In 2002, the closure of all West Coast ports was clearly responsible for some element of economic disruption, with estimates of lost activity ranging from the hundreds of millions of dollars per day to several billion. In September 2005, Hurricane Katrina further served to reinforce the fact that ports are an integral feature of our goods distribution system. The closure of the Port of New Orleans and many smaller ports along the Gulf Coast is likely to have adversely affected U.S. grain exports, although at the time of this writing, cost estimates were not available. Hurricane Katrina further illustrated the effects of disruptions to the flow of oil, gasoline, and natural gas to the nation’s economy. That a natural disaster can produce such a result implies that an attack on oil terminals at U.S. ports could be both desirable and effective for terrorists. Beyond their economic role, the largest seaports are also near major population centers, so the use of a weapon of mass destruction at a port could injure or kill thousands of people. In addition, a weapon such as a nuclear device could cause vast environmental and social disruption and destroy important non-port infrastructure in these urban areas such as airports and highway networks. How much risk is there for either of these concerns? U.S. law enforcement, academic, and business analysts believe that although the likelihood of an ocean container being used in a terrorist attack is low, the vulnerability of the maritime transportation system is extremely high, and the consequence of a security breach, such as the smuggling of a weapon of mass destruction into the country, would be disastrous.2 Others take issue with the notion that the likelihood of a container attack is low, believing that an increase in global maritime terrorism in 2004 and the reputed appointment late that year of a maritime specialist as head of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia portended a significant maritime attack.3

#### Ports are vital to the domestic stability, failure will wipe out 60 percent of the economy

---Lack of port infrastructure

---Cargo volume

O’Shea 17, an attorney who works on transportation and infrastructure issues, (Sean, 10-3-2017, Congress Must Stop Foreign Ocean Carriers From Harming U.S. Economy, Morning Consult, <https://bit.ly/3BxRtu9>)

It is long past time for Congress to update the Shipping Act to give the FMC the power it needs to bring lawsuits to block foreign carriers from colluding to set unfair prices and service terms. At the same time, lawmakers also must allow U.S. port service providers to demonstrate in court how these anticompetitive practices by the foreign cartels are harming their businesses and workers. Currently, their interests are barred from being considered in antitrust actions against foreign ocean carriers. Absent reform of this outdated regulatory environment, ports will be unable to make critical infrastructure upgrades that will allow the U.S. maritime industry to continue serving as vital economic engine for the country. Ports currently support 23 million jobs and generate more than $320 billion in tax revenue each year. And if current growth projections hold, they will become even more indispensable. By 2030, America’s trade volume is expected to quadruple, including tremendous growth in the amount of freight bound for export. Within 20 years, 60 percent of the U.S. economy is expected to depend upon port-related activity. But America’s maritime industry will not be able to continue to attract private investors and lenders to build infrastructure to meet this future economic demand unless Congress takes action now to end price-fixing and other anticompetitive practices by foreign ocean carriers that stifle industry profits, put jobs at risk and stifle private investment in much-needed port infrastructure upgrades. In particular, carriers immunized from antitrust regulation are also ordering enormous, new 22,000-container ships that will require new cranes and shore facilities, but they will not provide long-term volume guarantees necessary for ports to finance these capital improvements through regular commercial markets. Aside from this obvious legislative restoration of reasonable balance to enable private industry to meet demands, the two equally unacceptable outcomes are to do without the infrastructure and pay the economic penalty when bottlenecks occur, or look to taxpayer-funded solutions. Many lawmakers in Congress have talked about the need for modernizing regulations that constrain U.S. economic and job growth. They now have the perfect opportunity to reform U.S. maritime laws so they protect America’s shipping industry and port workers instead of lining the wallets of foreign competitors. And these reforms must begin with giving the FMC and the American maritime industry the power to take legal action to block unfair, anticompetitive actions by foreign cartels.

#### Anticompetitive shipping behavior has global and long-term economic implications

Cullinane 21, is a professor at the Department of Business Administration at the University of Gothenburg, Hercules Haralambides is a professor at the Department of Maritime Economics at Erasmus University. (Kevin, 7-26-2021, “Global trends in maritime and port economics: the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond,” Nature Public Health Emergency Collection, https://bit.ly/3mlxb2z)

Realizing handsome profits overall, the one sector which did unexpectedly well in 2020 was liner (container) shipping. The market leader, Maersk Line, reported record profits for Q3 of 2020 and again in Q4. The company reported another record pre-tax profit for Q1 of 2021 that was only just below the value achieved for the whole of 2020 (Baker 2021). Anecdotal evidence suggests that North American and European shippers may be presently paying rates five to ten times more than what they would normally pay, and many of them may have to wait for weeks, if not months, to secure a slot on a ship, or find a container to bring their orders from Asia (Attinasi et al. 2021). Judging on the basis of their shipbuilding program, it would appear that the overall positive perspective on 2021 described above is a vision shared by container carriers. As reported by Chambers (2021a), as of 5 March 2021, a total of 147 boxships have been ordered since October 2020 (most of which are in the largest size categories), compared with just 40 ships ordered in the period January to September 2020. The order book as of that date already amounted to more than 360 ships, or 12% of deployed capacity, representing a remarkable level of gross capital formation, and a leading indicator, from an industry which is rather good at adjusting its supply to demand.2 In parallel to this trend, container manufacturers in China are struggling to cope with a very high demand for container production, due to a notable worldwide shortage which is driving up freight rates and the cost of transport (Youd 2021). Liner shipping had been quick to adjust supply to demand in H2 2020. Contrasting starkly with the current trend towards building new containerships, this was achieved with the ‘withdrawal’ of shipping capacity (20–30%) from the main trade lanes, something that has come to be known as blank sailings. By October 2020, blank sailings overall during the year had reached the impressive number of 515. Port calls were thus cancelled; frequency, connectivity and quality of service declined; call sizes increased; and the volume of laid-up tonnage rose as well, reaching record levels in H1 2020; by May 2020, it amounted to 11.6% of the deployed cellular container fleet. To further reduce supply, additional measures were adopted by carriers, such as slower speeds and longer routes, via the Cape of Good Hope rather than the Suez Canal for example; in May 2020, containership transits of the Suez Canal had fallen by 32% year-on-year, to settle at an all-time low of 330 passages (BIMCO 2020). These actions, but particularly blank sailings, allowed carriers to sustain freight rates at impressively profitable levels. As a result, shippers and international transport associations started to publicly express their discontent over carrier behaviour during the COVID-19 crisis. Complaints were naturally addressed to the competition authorities responsible for the regulation of international shipping in the world’s largest trade lanes, i.e. in the EU, USA (Federal Maritime Commission, FMC), China and Australia. The concerns expressed related to capacity management strategies; reduced levels of service; capacity withdrawals (blank sailings), lower schedule reliability; rolled containers; additional surcharges; equipment shortages, etc. Blank sailings, coupled with a burgeoning demand for liner shipping services can easily explain the surging freight rates and carrier profits which have continued to rise at a rapid pace, hitting record levels, as reflected in movements in the value of the Drewry Composite World Container Index (WCI). In the second week of December 2020, for example, a weekly change in the WCI of 23% (USD 793) was registered, or USD 4244 for a 40 ft. container. This was 166.6% higher than that of the same period in 2019. On 31 December, the WCI reached USD 4359, escalating to USD 5221 in the first week of 2021 (an increase of 185% year-on-year). In the same week, the annual changes in the individual freight rates reported to calculate the composite WCI for 40 ft. containers rose by 212% on Shanghai–Genoa (USD 8380); 282% on Shanghai–Rotterdam (USD 8882); 148% on Shanghai–New York (USD 6385); and 134% on Shanghai–Los Angeles (USD 4194). Meanwhile, the Transatlantic route New York–Rotterdam saw an increase of 31% (USD 690), while Rotterdam–New York decreased by 14% (USD 2185). Price inflation continues apace in 2021; at the time of writing (at the end of H1 2021), the WCI stands at a record value of USD 8061 per forty-foot equivalent unit (FEU), representing an increase of 332% above the previous year’s figure (Drewry 2021). The deus ex machina: Global Shipping Alliances Of course, there would be nothing wrong with the ‘capacity management’ strategies of carriers,3 were it not for the ‘coordinated’ manner in which they are implemented, amongst the members of consortia and alliances that, to a large extent, are exempted from antitrust regulation (Tang and Sun 2018). Concentration as well as vertical integration along the supply chain have been remarkable in liner shipping.4 In 1998, five alliances and three large independent shipping companies (MSC, CMA-CGM and Evergreen) co-existed. Ten years later, in 2008, the EU removed the exemption from competition law (effectively, antitrust immunity) which had been granted for years to liner shipping conferences.5 As a direct result of this, and amidst the negative impacts of the financial crisis, MSC and CMA-CGM ceased to remain independent, forming a new alliance in 2009. A few years later, in 2015, Maersk and Evergreen joined their respective alliances (2M and Ocean Alliance). In this way, the process of horizontal integration through alliances evolved to the current situation, whereby the top ten shipping companies, grouped in three alliances, control more than 90% of the transoceanic container traffic. Interestingly, no large independent carrier exists at present, while in the period 2005–2016 the top ten shipping companies controlled only 60% of the total fleet capacity. As such, there is a clear rationale for questioning both the competitiveness and contestability of the market (Hirata 2017). Although regulatory bodies, like the FMC in the USA, under pressure from shippers, have started to take a look at the causes of liner shipping profitability in the midst of a pandemic, it is unlikely that anything of substance will emerge from these inquiries. Indeed, there may be some good reasons for the leniency of the regulator: the shippers’ criticisms of global shipping alliances (GSA) have failed to recognize the crucial point that unfettered competition in declining cost industries (or industries of ‘increasing returns to scale’) pushes prices down to marginal costs – which are always below average costs – and competition under such circumstances will then become destructive. This is the main motivation behind the (conditional) exemption of GSAs from antitrust laws, and it is exactly this same reasoning that has allowed the continued operation of price-fixing liner conferences in countries where they can still operate legitimately (mainly in and around the continent of Asia). The only difference between the two systems, alliances and conferences, is that the former primarily seek to achieve profitability through cost control, while the latter do so through price-fixing. Finally, although blank sailings have helped carriers sustain rates, this is not without costs, given that laid-up ships (or their beneficial owners) still have to pay the bank, or the K/G investors who have to absorb the losses. Go to: Impact on container ports Many major ports with a strong gateway function saw their container throughput plunge in H1 2020. Notable examples included Rotterdam (−7%), Shanghai (−6.8%), Los Angeles (−17.1%), Hamburg (−14.7%), Le Havre (−29%), Barcelona (−20.5%) and Valencia (−9.1%). Only four major ports saw their volumes increase: Gioia Tauro (+52.5%), Tangier Med (+22%), Port Said-SCCT (+23.5%) and Antwerp (+0.4%).6 However, the spectacular revival of demand in H2 2020 translated immediately to increased demand for port services, with many ports reporting record throughput volumes in September, October and November 2020. To a certain extent, the rise in demand related to large-scale restocking, taking place first in North America in Q3 2020, and later in Europe in Q4 2020. As an example of this, the port of Los Angeles registered a historic surge in throughput of nearly 50% in H2 2020, and in the week before Christmas the port handled 94% more throughput than in the same week the year before (Port of Los Angeles 2021). This has been followed by another record period in Q1 2021, where throughput was 122% higher than in the previous year (Watkins 2021). Port and transport networks were caught unprepared for such a fast transition in demand, and as a result, supply chains suffered from shortages in equipment (chassis), truck drivers and dock labour; the latter due to quarantines and constraints on personal mobility due to COVID-19. Congestion and long turnaround times have been the result, with the build-up continuing into 2021. At the time of writing, the situation has improved to some extent but, as of 1 February 2021, there were a record 40 containerships in anchorage in the San Pedro Bay area, waiting to berth at the container terminals of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Miller 2021). Congestion at these two Californian ports has been so severe that, in order to avoid becoming embroiled in it, ships have been known to offload containers, impromptu, at Oakland, 600 km to the north (Chambers 2021b). However, as ships are stowed with a certain ship rotation in mind, such decisions are a stowage planner’s worst nightmare, and they tend to worsen the problem rather than solving it (Chou & Fang 2021).

#### Price gouging affects the entire economy and locks in slow growth---pandemic is priced in

Savvides 21, Reporter for The Loadstar. (Nick, March 18, 2021, More complaints against 'profiteering' carriers expected as shippers' costs soar, <https://theloadstar.com/more-complaints-against-profiteering-carriers-expected-as-shippers-costs-soar/>)

Following its formal complaint to the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) last week, Pennsylvania home décor firm MCS Industries CEO Richard Master (above) has told The Loadstar why the company felt it had no choice, but to speak out. Mr Master said he had been in contact with a number of larger and smaller shippers and there was concern for their businesses as well as anger at the failure of shipping lines to meet their contractual obligations. “Some lines are more co-operative than others, but none has supplied us like we supply our customers,” claimed Mr Master. “When we make a deal we stick to it.” According to MCS, the difficulties caused by poor service levels and high rates will “reverberate throughout the US economy”, and inevitably have very serious economic consequences. Mr Master said with more than 11m containers handled in US supply chains annually and the costs of imported boxes increasing from around $2,700/40ft from Asia to the west coast to $15,000-$20,000/40ft, it has left some companies with little choice but to complain. MCS transports around 3,500 containers a year from suppliers in Asia, the contents on average valued at $20,000-$30,000, so current rates are “like a dagger to the heart” of small and medium-sized shippers, explained Mr Master. It is not that the shippers do not understand that the pandemic has caused disruption, however. And Mr Master pointed out that contract negotiations took place earlier this year, normally in the first quarter, up to a year after the pandemic started, so the lines knew that the issues and disruption it caused had been “in play for some time”. “When we started negotiating the contracts, we accepted that prices would be 70-80% higher than last year, but we thought that was appropriate, it was excessive but it reflected the disruption and market conditions,” he conceded. But, he said, once the contracts were signed, “we didn’t get the containers [agreed to] and the prices spiralled up over a period”. He claimed this wasn’t just price increases due to the pandemic, “they were baked into the negotiations,” he said, which was “price gouging”. And that is what prompted the complaint to the FMC. He continued to allege that the lines were, in effect, profiteering, and asked: “With rates at such inflated levels what is the motivation for the lines to return to normal levels of operation?” MCS’s business from Asia is worth $120m, but the cost of transport increased by $30-40m overnight, which will be passed on to the consumer and will lead to inflation of 20%-40% in the sector MCS operates – inflation is created artificially by the shipping lines, Mr Master said. In a letter to chairman of the FMC Daniel Maffei, Mr Master said he believed it was clear that government and the FMC were aware of the critical nature of the issue “and the havoc that it is wreaking on American businesses and consumers”. He added: “Federal shipping and antitrust laws appear to provide federal regulators with the tools needed to investigate this outrageous conduct by ocean carriers.” He said rapid action was needed to mitigate the worst effects being felt “right now, on a daily basis, by American businesses and consumers”. In effect, Mr Master accuses the carriers of operating a cartel, allowing them to manipulate the market illegally. “The formation of these cartels has allowed foreign shipping interests to co-ordinate pricing and business practices, and take advantage of economic conditions to charge extortionate prices to US customers,” he alleged. Mr Master would like to see reparations to shippers for their losses, and the lines forced to meet their contractual obligations. Furthermore, MCS would like the FMC to ensure that the lines address container shortages and the “dislocation” of containers, with not enough empties in Asia and too many in congested US ports. Finally, the MCS CEO pointed to the “serious co-ordination issues in the operation of the US ports”. He said: “Truckers performing drayage services, delivering full containers to shippers and receivers, must be able to schedule normal appointments to avoid current untenable delays. Steamship lines currently levy penalties on the US shippers for delays which are beyond their control.” Moreover, truckers have been unable to secure appointments to return the empty boxes, which has resulted in more financial penalties. “These penalties, which are ultimately borne by American consumers in the form of consumer price inflation, must stop,” demanded Mr Master.

#### Goes nuclear---unravels interdependence, hastens multipolarity, and invigorates nationalism.

Oppenheimer 21, MA, Clinical Professor and leads the IR Futures concentration @ the Center for Global Affairs, School of Professional Studies, New York University. (Michael F., “The Turbulent Future of International Relations”, *The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction*, pg. 28-42, Palgrave Macmillan)

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates. Illiberal Globalization Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro-Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them. What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18 As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods: We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20 The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre-World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present: Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago. …In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports. …The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable. …the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry. Multipolarity We can define multipolarity as a wide distribution of power among multiple independent states. Exact equivalence of material power is not implied. What is required is the possession by several states of the capacity to coerce others to act in ways they would otherwise not, through kinetic or other means (economic sanctions, political manipulation, denial of access to essential resources, etc.). Such a distribution of power presents inherently graver challenges to peace and stability than do unipolar or bipolar power configurations,22 though of course none are safe or permanent. In brief, the greater the number of consequential actors, the greater the challenge of coordinating actions to avoid, manage, or de-escalate conflicts. Multipolarity also entails a greater potential for sudden changes in the balance of power, as one state may defect to another coalition or opt out, and as a result, the greater the degree of uncertainty experienced by all states, and the greater the plausibility of downside assumptions about the intentions and capabilities of one’s adversaries. This psychology, always present in international politics but particularly powerful in multipolarity, heightens the potential for escalation of minor conflicts, and of states launching preventive or preemptive wars. In multipolarity, states are always on edge, entertaining worst-case scenarios about actual and potential enemies, and acting on these fears—expanding their armies, introducing new weapon systems, altering doctrine to relax constraints on the use of force—in ways that reinforce the worst fears of others. The risks inherent in multipolarity are heightened by the attendant weakening of global institutions. Even in a state-centric system, such institutions can facilitate communication and transparency, helping states to manage conflicts by reducing the potential for misperception and escalation toward war. But, as Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues in his chapter on the United Nations, the influence of multilateral institutions as agent and actor is clearly in decline, a result of bottom-up populist/nationalist pressures experienced in many countries, as well as the coordination problems that increase in a system of multiple great powers. As conflict resolution institutions atrophy, great powers will find themselves in “security dilemmas”23 in which verification of a rival’s intentions is unavailable, and worst-case assumptions fill the gap created by uncertainty. And the supply of conflicts will expand as a result of growing nationalism and populism, which are premised on hostility, paranoia, and isolation, with governments seeking political legitimacy through external conflict, producing a siege mentality that deliberately cuts off communication with other states. Finally, the transition from unipolarity (roughly 1989–2007) to multipolarity is unregulated and hazardous, as the existing superpower fears and resists challenges to its primacy from a rising power or powers, while the rising power entertains new ambitions as entitlements now within its reach. Such a “power transition” and its dangers were identified by Thucydides in explaining the Peloponnesian Wars,24 by Organski (the “rear-end collision”)25 during the Cold War, and recently repopularized and brought up to date by Graham Allison in predicting conflict between the US and China.26 A useful, and consequential illustration of the inherent challenge of conflict management during a power transition toward multipolarity, is the weakening of the arms control regime negotiated by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Despite the existential, global conflict between two nuclear armed superpowers embracing diametrically opposed world views and operating in economic isolation from each other, the two managed to avoid worst-case outcomes. They accomplished this in part by institutionalizing verifiable limits on testing and deployment of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Yet as diplomatically and technically challenging as these achievements were, the introduction of a third great power, China, into this two-country calculus has proven to be a deal breaker. Unconstrained by these bilateral agreements, China has been free to build up its capability, and has taken full advantage in ramping up production and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, thus challenging the US ability to credibly guarantee the security of its allies in Asia, and greatly increasing the costs of maintaining its Asian regional hegemony. As a result, the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty is effectively dead, and the New Start Treaty, covering strategic missiles, is due to expire next year, with no indication of any US–Russian consensus to extend it. The US has with logic indicated its interest in making these agreements trilateral; but China, with its growing power and ambition, has also logically rejected these overtures. Thus, all three great powers are entering a period of nuclear weapons competition unconstrained by the major Cold War arms control regimes. In a period of rapid advances in technology and worsening great power relations, the nuclear competition will be a defining characteristic of the next decade and beyond. This dynamic will also complicate nuclear nonproliferation efforts, as both the demand for nuclear weapons (a consequence of rising regional and global insecurity), and supply of nuclear materials and technology (a result of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and deteriorating great power relations) will increase. Will deterrence prevent war in a world of several nuclear weapons states, (the current nuclear powers plus South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Turkey), as it helped to do during the bipolar Cold War? Some neorealist observers view nuclear weapons proliferation as stabilizing, extending the balance of terror, and the imperative of restraint, to new nuclear weapons states with much to fight over (Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example).27 Others,28 examining issues of command and control of nuclear weapons deployment and use by newly acquiring states, asymmetries in doctrines, force structures, and capabilities between rivals, the perils of variable rates in transition to weapons deployment, problems of communication between states with deep mutual grievances, the heightened risk of transfer of such weapons to non-state actors, have grave doubts about the safety of a multipolar, nuclear-armed world.29 We can at least conclude that prudence dictates heightened efforts to slow the pace of proliferation, while realism requires that we face a proliferated future with eyes wide open. The current distribution of power is not perfectly multipolar. The US still commands the world’s largest economy, and its military power is unrivaled by any state or combination of states. Its population is still growing, despite a recent decline in birth rates. It enjoys extraordinary geographic advantages over its rivals, who are distant and live in far worse neighborhoods. Its economy is less dependent on foreign markets or resources. Its political system has proven—up to now—to be resilient and adaptable. Its global alliance system greatly extends its capacity to defend itself and shape the world to its liking and is still intact, despite growing doubts about America’s reliability as a security guarantor. Based on these mostly material and historical criteria, continued American primacy would seem to be a good bet, if it chooses to use its power in this way.30 So why multipolarity? The clearest and most frequently cited evidence for a widening distribution of global power away from American unipolarity is the narrowing gap in GDP between the US and China. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts a $0.9 trillion increase in US GDP for 2019–2020, and a $1.3 trillion increase for China in the same period.31 Many who support the American primacy case argue that GDP is an imperfect measure of power, that Chinese GDP data is inflated, that its growth rates are in decline while Chinese debt is rapidly increasing, and that China does poorly on other factors that contribute to power—its low per capita GDP, its political succession challenges, its environmental crisis, its absence of any external alliance system. Yet GDP is a good place to start, as the single most useful measure and long-term predictor of power. It is from the overall economy that states extract and apply material power to leverage desired behavior from other states. It is true that robust future Chinese growth is not guaranteed, nor is its capacity to convert its wealth to power, which is a function of how well its political system works over time. But this is equally the case for the US, and considering recent political developments is not a given for either country. As an alternative to measuring inputs—economic size, political legitimacy, technological innovation, population growth—in assessing relative power and the nature of global power distribution, we should consider outputs: what are states doing with their power? The input measures are useful, possibly predictive, but are usually deployed in the course of making a foreign policy argument, sometimes on behalf of a reassertion of American primacy, sometimes on behalf of retrenchment. As such, their objectivity (despite their generous deployment of “data”) is open to question. What is undeniable, to any clear-eyed observer, is a real decline in American influence in the world, and a rise in the influence of other powers, which predates the Trump administration but has accelerated into America’s free fall over the last four years. This has produced a de facto multipolarity, whether explainable in the various measures of power—actual and latent—or not. This decline results in part from policy mistakes: a reckless squandering of material power and legitimacy in Iraq, an overabundance of caution in Syria, and now pure impulsivity. But more fundamentally, it is a product of relative decline in American capacity—political and economic—to which American leadership is adjusting haphazardly, but in the direction of retrenchment/restraint. It is highly revealing that the last two American presidents, polar opposites in intellect, temperament and values, agreed on one fundamental point: the US is overextended, and needs to retrench. The fact that neither Obama nor Trump (up to this point in his presidency) believed they had the power at their disposal to do anything else, tells us far more about the future of American power and policy—and about the emerging shape of international relations—than the power measures and comparisons made by foreign policy advocates. Observation of recent trends in US versus Russian relative influence prompts another question: do we understand the emerging characteristics of power? Rigorously measuring and comparing the wrong parameters will get us nowhere at best and mislead us into misguided policies at worst. How often have we heard, with puzzlement, that Putin punches far above his weight? Could it be that we misunderstand what constitutes “weight” in the contemporary and emerging world? Putin may be on a high wire, and bound to come crashing down; but the fact is that Russian influence, leveraging sophisticated communications/social media/influence operations, a strong military, an agile (Putin-dominated) decision process, and taking advantage of the egregious mistakes by the West, has been advancing for over a decade, shows no sign of slowing down, and has created additional opportunities for itself in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Arctic. It has done this with an economy roughly the size of Italy’s. There are few signs of a domestic political challenge to Putin. His external opponents are in disarray, and Russia’s main adversary is politically disabled from confronting the problem. He has established Russia as the Middle East power broker. He has reached into the internal politics of his Western adversaries and influenced their leadership choices. He has invaded and absorbed the territory of neighboring states. His actions have produced deep divisions within NATO. Again, simple observation suggests multipolarity in fact, and a full explanation for this power shift awaiting future historians able to look with more objectivity at twenty-first-century elements of power. When that history is written, surely it will emphasize the extraordinary polarization in American politics. Was multipolarity a case of others finding leverage in new sources of power, or the US underutilizing its own? The material measures suggest sufficient capacity for sustained American primacy, but with this latent capacity unavailable (as perceived, I believe correctly, by political leadership) by virtue of weakening institutions: two major parties in separate universes; a winner-take-all political mentality; deep polarization between the parties’ popular bases of support; divided government, with the Presidency and the Congress often in separate and antagonistic hands; diminishing trust in the permanent government, and in the knowledge it brings to important decisions, and deepening distrust between the intelligence community and policymakers; and, in Trump’s case, a chaotic policy process that lacks any strategic reference points, mis-communicates the Administration’s intentions, and has proven incapable of sustained, coherent diplomacy on behalf of any explicit and consistent set of policy goals. Rising Nationalism/Populism/Authoritarianism The evidence for these trends is clear. Freedom House, the go-to authority on the state of global democracy, just published its annual assessment for 2020, and recorded the fourteenth consecutive year of global democratic decline and advancing authoritarianism. This dramatic deterioration includes both a weakening in democratic practice within states still deemed on balance democratic, and a shift from weak democracies to authoritarianism in others. Commitment to democratic norms and practices—freedom of speech and of the press, independent judiciaries, protection of minority rights—is in decline. The decline is evident across the global system and encompasses all major powers, from India and China, to Europe, to the US. Right-wing populist parties have assumed power, or constitute a politically significant minority, in a lengthening list of democratic states, including both new (Hungary, Poland) and established (India, the US, the UK) democracies. Nationalism, frequently dismissed by liberal globalization advocates as a weak force when confronted by market democracies’ presumed inherent superiority, has experienced a resurgence in Russia, China, the Middle East, and at home. Given the breadth and depth of right-wing populism, the raw power that promotes it—mainly Russian and American—and the disarray of its liberal opponents, this factor will weigh heavily on the future. The major factors contributing to right-wing populism and its global spread is the subject of much discussion.32 The most straightforward explanation is rising inequality and diminished intergenerational mobility, particularly in developed countries whose labor-intensive manufacturing has been hit hardest by the globalization of capital combined with the immobility of labor. Jobs, wages, economic security, a reasonable hope that one’s offspring has a shot at a better life than one’s own, the erosion of social capital within economically marginalized communities, government failure to provide a decent safety net and job retraining for those battered by globalization: all have contributed to a sense of desperation and raw anger in the hollowed-out communities of formerly prosperous industrial areas. The declining life expectancy numbers33 tell a story of immiseration: drug addition, suicide, poor health care, and gun violence. The political expression of such conditions of life should not be surprising. Simple, extremist “solutions” become irresistible. Sectarian, racial, regional divides are strengthened, and exclusive identities are sharpened. Political entrepreneurs offering to blow up the system blamed for such conditions become credible. Those who are perceived as having benefited from the corrupt system—long-standing institutions of government, foreign countries and populations, immigrants, minorities getting a “free ride,” elites—become targets of recrimination and violence. The simple solutions of course, don’t work, deepening the underlying crisis, but in the process politics is poisoned. If this sounds like the US, it should, but it also describes major European countries (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), and could be an indication of things to come for non-Western democracies like India. We have emphasized throughout this chapter the interaction of four structural forces in shaping the future, and this interaction is evident here as well. Is it merely coincidence that the period of democratic decline documented by Freedom House, coincides precisely with the global financial and economic crisis? Lower growth, increasing joblessness, wage stagnation, superimposed on longer-term widening of inequality and declining mobility, constitute a forbidding stress test for democratic systems, and many continue to fail. And if we are correct about secular stagnation, the stress will continue, and authoritarianism’s fourteen-year run will not be over for some time. The antidemocratic trend will gain additional impetus from the illiberal direction of globalization, with its growth suppressing protectionism, weaponization of global economic exchange, and weakening global economic institutions. Multipolarity also contributes, in several ways. The former hegemon and author of globalization’s liberal structure has lost its appetite, and arguably its capacity, for leadership, and indeed has become part of the problem, succumbing to and promoting the global right-wing populist surge. It is suffering an unprecedented decline in life expectancy, and recently a decline in the birth rate, signaling a degree of rot commonly associated with a collapsing Soviet Union. While American politics may once again cohere around its liberal values and interests, the time when American leadership had the self-confidence to shape the global system in its liberal image is gone. It may build coalitions of the like-minded to launch liberal projects, but there will be too much power outside these coalitions to permit liberal globalization of the sort imagined at the end of the Cold War. In multipolarity, the values around which global politics revolve will reflect the diversity of major powers, their interests, and the norms they embrace. Convergence of norms, practices, policies is out of the question. Global collective action, even in the face of global crises, will be a long shot. To expect anything else is fantasy. Unbrave New World and Future Challenges At the outset of this chapter we described these structural forces as interacting to produce more conflict and diminished prosperity. We also predicted a world with shrinking collective capacity to address new challenges as they arise. What specifically will such a world look like? We address below three principal challenges to global problem solving over the next decade. Interstate Conflict In the world experienced by most readers of this volume, conflict is observed within weak states, sometimes promoted by regional competitors, by terrorist groups, or by great powers, acting through surrogates or by indirect means. Sometimes, as in Syria, this conflict spills over to contiguous states and contributes to regional instability, and challenges other regions to respond effectively, a challenge that Europe has not met. Much of this will continue, but the global significance of such local conflicts will be greatly magnified by increasing great power conflict, which will feed—rather than manage or resolve—local instabilities and will in turn be exacerbated by them. Great powers will jockey for advantage, support their local partners, escalate preemptively. Conflicts initially confined to failing states or unstable regions will be redefined by great powers as global in scope and significance. This tendency of states to view local conflicts in the context of a zero-sum, global struggle for power is familiar to students of the Cold War, but now with the additional challenges to collective action, expanded uncertainty and worst-case thinking associated with the power transition to multipolarity. We can easily observe increased conflict in US-China relations, as we will in US-Russia relations as future US administrations try to make up for ground lost during the Trump presidency, especially in the Middle East. We can observe it among powerful states with mutual historical grievances, now with a weakening presence of the hegemonic security guarantor and having to consider the renationalization of their defense: Japan-South Korea, Germany-France. We can observe it among historical rivals operating in rapidly changing security landscapes: India-China. We can observe it within the Middle East, as internal rivalries are appropriated by regional powers in a contest for regional dominance. We can observe it clearly in Syria, where the regime’s violent suppression of Arab Spring resistance led to all-out civil war, attracted outside support to proxy forces by aspiring regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, enabled the rise of ISIS, and eventually to great power intervention, principally by Russia. In a world of effective great power collaboration or American primacy, the Syrian civil war might have been settled through power sharing or partition, or if not, contained within Syria. The collapse of Yugoslavia, occurring during a period of US “unipolarity” and managed effectively, demonstrates the possibilities. Instead, with the US retrenching, Middle East rivals unconstrained by great powers, and great power competition rising, the Syria civil war was fed by outside powers, then metastasized into the region, and—in the form of refugee flows—into Europe, fundamentally altering European politics. Libya may be at the early stages of this scenario. This is not the end of the Syria story. Russia has established itself as a major player in Syria and the Middle East’s power broker, the indispensable country with leverage throughout the region. China is poised to reap the financial and power benefits of Syrian reconstruction. The US has just demonstrated, in its act of war against the Iranian regime, its willingness, without consultation, to put its allies’ security in further jeopardy, accentuating the risks of security ties with Washington and generating added opportunities for Russia and China. The purpose here is not to critique US policy, but to point out the dramatically shifting power balance in a critical region, toward multipolarity. The dangers of such a shift will become apparent as some future US president attempts to reassert US influence in the region and finds a crowded playing field. Can a multipolar distribution of power among several states whose interests, values, and political practices are divergent, all experiencing bottom-up nationalist pressures, all seeking advantages in the oversupply of regional instability, be made to work? I think not. Will this more dangerous world descend into direct military confrontation between great powers, and could such confrontation lead to use of nuclear weapons? Here the question becomes, what will this more dangerous world actually look like; what instruments of coercion will be available to states as technology change accelerates; how will states employ these instruments; how will deterrence work (if at all) among several states with large but unequal levels of destructive capacity, weak command, and control, disparate— or opaque—strategies and simmering rivalries; can conflict management work in a world of weak institutions? The collapse of the Cold War era nuclear arms control regime, the threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented by the demise of the JCPOA, and multiple indications of an accelerating nuclear arms race among the three principle powers, augurs badly. Given the structural forces at play, and without predicting the worst, we are indeed entering perilous times. Global Poverty and Inequality Despite the challenges of volatility and disruptive change inherent in globalization, the world under American liberal leadership has managed a dramatic reduction of extreme poverty. According to World Bank estimates, in 2015, 10 percent of the world’s population lived on less than $1.90 a day, down from nearly 36 percent in 1990.34 In fact, as of September 2018, half the world is now middle class or wealthier.35 The uneven success of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) exemplifies this achievement, and demonstrates what is possible when open markets are managed through strong global institutions, effective leadership and interstate collaboration. What this liberal hegemonic system did not achieve, however, was a fair distribution of the gains from globalization within states, and among those states that for various reasons were not full participants in this system. This record of partial achievement leaves us with a full agenda for the next fifteen years, but without the hegemonic leadership, strong institutions, ascendant liberalism or robust global growth that enabled previous gains. There are powerful reasons to question the sustainability of these poverty reduction gains, leading to doubts about the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, which have replaced the MDGs as global development targets.36 (See Jens Rudbeck’s chapter and Sidhu’s UN chapter for SDGs). Skeptics have pointed to slowing global growth, specifically in China, whose demand for imported commodities was a major factor in developing country growth and job creation; growing protectionism in developed country markets, fueled by bottom-up forces of nationalism, and from top-down by a weakened global trading regime and increased geopolitical rivalry; the effects of accelerating climate change on agriculture, migration and communal conflict in poor countries; and the growth burst among poor countries from the rapid transition to more efficient use of resources, a transition that is now slowing down.37 Perhaps the greatest concern in this scenario is a general deterioration in the developing country foreign investment climate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major contributor to growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation among poor countries. It has incentivized growth=friendly policies, reduced corruption, introduced technology and effective management practices, and linked poor countries to foreign markets through global supply chains.38 It has stimulated growth of indigenous manufacturing and service companies to supply new foreign investments. It has been the major cause of economic convergence between rich and poor countries. From 2000 to 2009, developing economies’ growth rates were more than four percentage points higher than those of rich countries, pushing their share of global output from just over a third to nearly half.39 However, FDI flows into poor countries are imperiled by the structural forces discussed here. Political instability arising from slower growth and environmental stress will increase investors’ perception of higher risk, reinforcing their developed country bias. Protectionism among developed countries will threaten the global market access upon which manufacturing investment in developing countries is premised, causing firms to pare back their global supply chains. As companies retrench from direct investment in poor countries, the appeal to those countries of Chinese debt financed infrastructure projects, under the Belt-Road Initiative with little or no conditionality, but at the risk of “debt traps,” will increase. Global Warming The question posed at the beginning of this section is whether the international system, evolving toward multipolarity and rising nationalism, will find the collective political capital to confront challenges as they arise. Global warming is the mother of all challenges, and the weakness in the system’s capacity to respond is clear. With the two major political/economic powers and greenhouse gas emitters locked in deepening geopolitical conflict (and with one of them locked in climate change denial, possibly through 2024), the chances of significantly slowing global warming or even ameliorating its effects are very slim. We are reduced to the default option, nation-specific adaptation to climate change, which will impose rising human, political and economic costs on all, and will widen the gap between rich countries with adaptive capacity (of varying degrees), and the poor, who will suffer deteriorating economic, political, and social conditions. (For a contrary, optimistic view see Michael Shank’s chapter, which credits new actors—like cities—as playing a more constructive role in climate mitigation.) This would bring to a close liberal globalization’s greatest achievement; the raising of 1.1 billion people out of extreme poverty since 1990,40 with all its associated gains in quality of life (in the WHO Africa region, for example, life expectancy rose by 10.3 years between 2000 and 2016, driven mainly by improvements in child survival and expanded access to antiretrovirals for treatment of HIV).41 Several forces are at work here. The problem itself is graver—in magnitude and in rate of worsening—than predicted by climate scientists. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the major source of information on global warming, has consistently underpredicted the rate of climate deterioration. This holds true even for its “worst-case scenarios,” meaning that what was meant as a wake-up call has in fact reinforced complacency.42 (see Michael Shank’s chapter for further discussion of climate change). The IPCC, in its 2019 report, has tried to undo the damage by emphasizing the acceleration in the rate of warming and its effects, the only partially understood dynamic of climate change, and—given wide uncertainty—the possibility of unpleasant surprises yet to come. This strengthens the scientific case for urgency—to both severely limit greenhouse gas emissions, and to increase investment in ameliorating the effects. Unfortunately, the crisis comes at a moment when the climate for collective action is ice cold. Geopolitical competition incentivizes states to out produce each other, regardless of the environmental effects. Multipolarity complicates collective action. Economic stagnation mandates job creation, making regulation politically toxic. Bottom-up nationalism/populism causes states to pursue “relative gains,” meaning that if the nation is seen as gaining in a no-holds-barred economic competition with others, the negative environmental effects can be tolerated. A post-Trump presidency would help, with the US rejoining the Paris Agreement, and lending its weight to tighter regulation, increased R and D, and stronger economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions. Keep in mind, however, that President Obama was fully behind such efforts, but in a deeply polarized America was unable to implement measures needed to fulfill the Paris obligations through legislation, and his executive orders to do this were swiftly overturned by Trump.

#### Pursuit of growth is inevitable, and economic collapse causes extinction---trade, disease, technology, climate change, oppression, and disinformation

Posen 21, is the president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, PhD at Harvard University. (Adam, February 2021, “Rebuilding the Global Economy,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, https://bit.ly/3jLZZ2n)

The world economy is experiencing a corrosion of globalization. The web of economic and commercial ties across the world is fraying, with more frequent and larger gaps in it—even as trade in goods, services, and technology shifts locations and in some places grows. For globalization is multidimensional, encompassing much more than international trade, though panic about trade gets most of the political and press attention. What matters for human welfare is the quality, not the quantity, of globalization. As global economic integration deteriorates, its benefits for everyone are eroding. Worldwide, people want to be left in peace, make a decent living, educate their children, look after their families, and, if possible, save for the future. For decades that simple but profound state of economic safety and freedom became ever more widely attained, largely hand-in-hand with increased international openness. But we have been going mostly in the wrong direction on both counts since at least 2008, well before COVID-19. The economic and social impact of the pandemic has not just accelerated the corrosion of commerce and relationships across borders but also made undeniable the extreme vulnerability of the world’s population to disease, economic insecurity, and exclusion. As a result, the risks of the most genuinely existential threats—climate change, technological slowdown, racial and gender-based oppression, digital disinformation and removal of privacy, aging populations, and the likely recurrence of epidemics—have risen. All of these threats are global, in that they are common to all humanity, and can be lastingly reduced only by global cooperative action. All of these threats are economic, in that beyond their direct human toll, their causes and lasting impact are meaningfully changed by our economic activities and policies. Both markets and international institutions have failed to deliver economic safety in the absence of global engagement by governments. Successful economic cooperation needs specific constructive policies with tangible deliverable results. That is why we at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) have provided work plans for Rebuilding the Global Economy. At the start of a new US presidential term, we are telling policymakers what needs to be repaired by defining critical and practical priorities and solutions. Our series, featuring memoranda to policymakers and virtual events with experts, were published on a rolling basis in November and December 2020, accompanied by online public meetings. This PIIE Briefing republishes their papers to guide policymakers in 2021. Rebuilding is a very deliberate and, we believe, apt verb for the task at hand. The global economy continues to exist, and it is necessary for the future well-being of all people, whether or not governments decide to withdraw from it. People and nations need a safe structure in which to conduct their economic lives, to join communities, and to be left in privacy. The building, however, has been allowed to sink into disrepair and, in some ways, has ceased to be fit for purpose. The architecture of the 1940s, updated on the fly in the early 1970s and again after 1989, does not meet today’s standards of inclusion and accessibility, does not have room enough for many growing (and some already grown) economies, and is inadequate shelter against the environmental threats we now face. But the global economy is repairable. What is needed now are actionable plans setting out clear priorities for economic policymakers. These plans must reject the status quo and must be objective and specific in their assessment of what can be salvaged and repaired as opposed to what should be torn down and replaced. These plans must not, however, be grandiose architectural fantasies—we all have to continue living and working in the global economy even while substantial renovation is underway, and there are limits to how far people want to be disrupted. This is where the Peterson Institute can make a meaningful contribution. The starting point for our Rebuilding the Global Economy program is a set of 39 memos targeted at specific senior policymakers in the US government, the European Union, and international organizations. In these memos we have specified what the policymaker and their agency or department should prioritize to rebuild the global economy in their remit, what critical things they should stop doing or reverse immediately, and what institutional relationship they need to change or repair.

#### Prevents war with China---geopolitical tensions, interdependence, and decline

Nye 21, is a professor of political science at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government, recently ranked as the most influential scholar on American Foreign Policy among international relations scholars. (Joseph, 3-3-2021, “The factors that could lead to war between the US and China,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-factors-that-could-lead-to-war-between-the-us-and-china/)

When China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, recently called for a reset of bilateral relations with the United States, a White House spokesperson replied that the US saw the relationship as one of strong competition that required a position of strength. It’s clear that President Joe Biden’s administration is not simply reversing Donald Trump’s policies. Some analysts, citing Thucydides’ attribution of the Peloponnesian War to Sparta’s fear of a rising Athens, believe the US–China relationship is entering a period of conflict pitting an established hegemon against an increasingly powerful challenger. I am not that pessimistic. In my view, economic and ecological interdependence reduces the probability of a real cold war, much less a hot one, because both countries have an incentive to cooperate in a number of areas. At the same time, miscalculation is always possible and some see the danger of ‘sleepwalking’ into catastrophe, as happened with World War I. History is replete with cases of misperception about changing power balances. For example, when US President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, he wanted to balance what he saw as a growing Soviet threat to a declining America. But what Nixon interpreted as decline was really the return to normal of America’s artificially high share of global output after World War II. Nixon proclaimed multipolarity, but what followed was the end of the Soviet Union and America’s unipolar moment two decades later. Today, some Chinese analysts underestimate America’s resilience and predict Chinese dominance but this, too, could turn out to be a dangerous miscalculation. It is equally dangerous for Americans to over- or underestimate Chinese power, and the US contains groups with economic and political incentives to do both. Measured in dollars, China’s economy is about two-thirds the size of that of the US, but many economists expect China to surpass the US sometime in the 2030s, depending on what one assumes about Chinese and American growth rates. Will American leaders acknowledge this change in a way that permits a constructive relationship, or will they succumb to fear? Will Chinese leaders take more risks, or will Chinese and Americans learn to cooperate in producing global public goods under a changing distribution of power? Recall that Thucydides attributed the war that ripped apart the ancient Greek world to two causes: the rise of a new power and the fear that this created in the established power. The second cause is as important as the first. The US and China must avoid exaggerated fears that could create a new cold or hot war. Even if China surpasses the US to become the world’s largest economy, national income is not the only measure of geopolitical power. China ranks well behind the US in soft power and US military expenditure is nearly four times that of China. While Chinese military capabilities have been increasing in recent years, analysts who look carefully at the military balance conclude that China will not, say, be able to exclude the US from the Western Pacific. On the other hand, the US was once the world’s largest trading economy and its largest bilateral lender. Today, nearly 100 countries count China as their largest trading partner, compared to 57 for the US. China plans to lend more than US$1 trillion for infrastructure projects with its Belt and Road Initiative over the next decade, while the US has cut back aid. China will gain economic power from the sheer size of its market as well as its overseas investments and development assistance. China’s overall power relative to the US is likely to increase. Nonetheless, balances of power are hard to judge. The US will retain some long-term power advantages that contrast with areas of Chinese vulnerability. One is geography. The US is surrounded by oceans and neighbours that are likely to remain friendly. China has borders with 14 countries, and territorial disputes with India, Japan and Vietnam set limits on its hard and soft power. Energy is another area where America has an advantage. A decade ago, the US was dependent on imported energy, but the shale revolution transformed North America from energy importer to exporter. At the same time, China became more dependent on energy imports from the Middle East, which it must transport along sea routes that highlight its problematic relations with India and other countries. The US also has demographic advantages. It is the only major developed country that is projected to hold its global ranking (third) in terms of population. While the rate of US population growth has slowed in recent years, it will not turn negative, as in Russia, Europe, and Japan. China, meanwhile, rightly fears ‘growing old before it grows rich.’ China’s labour force peaked in 2015 and India will soon overtake it as the world’s most populous country. America also remains at the forefront in key technologies (bio, nano and information) that are central to 21st-century economic growth. China is investing heavily in research and development, and competes well in some fields. But 15 of the world’s top 20 research universities are in the US; none is in China. Those who proclaim Pax Sinica and American decline fail to take account of the full range of power resources. American hubris is always a danger but so is exaggerated fear, which can lead to overreaction. Equally dangerous is rising Chinese nationalism, which, combined with a belief in American decline, leads China to take greater risks. Both sides must beware of miscalculation. After all, more often than not, the greatest risk we face is our own capacity for error.

#### Taiwan goes nuclear

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to.As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to ~~disable~~ or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, ~~disable~~, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

#### Coordinated “container management” is causing global food shortages

Murray et al 21, reporters for Bloomberg. (Brendon, with Isis Almeida, Ann Koh and Michael Hirtzer, Feb 3, 2021, Container crunch upends global food trade while ships queue at U.S. ports, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/02/03/world/food-shipping-global-economy-covid-19-u-s-china/)

Food is piling up in all the wrong places, thanks to carriers hauling empty shipping containers. Global competition for the ribbed steel containers means that Thailand can’t ship its rice, Canada is stuck with peas and India can’t offload its mountain of sugar. Shipping empty boxes back to China has become so profitable that even some American soybean shippers are having to fight for containers to supply hungry Asian buyers. Strikes in Argentina have also boosted Asian demand for U.S. agriculture products, adding to competition for boxes. “People aren’t getting their goods where they need them,” said Steve Kranig, director of logistics at IM-EX Global Inc., a freight forwarder that handles cargoes including rice, bananas and dumplings from Asia to the U.S. “One of my customers ships 8 to 10 containers of rice every week from Thailand to Los Angeles. But he can only ship 2 to 3 containers a week right now.” China has recovered faster from COVID-19, so has revved up its export economy and is paying huge premiums for containers---making it far more profitable to send them back empty than to refill them. There are also signs the soaring freight rates are boosting the cost of some foods. White sugar prices surged to a three-year high last month, and delays in food-grade soybean shipments from the U.S. could mean higher tofu and soy milk costs for consumers in Asia, said Eric Wenberg, executive director of the Specialty Soya and Grains Alliance. While it’s not entirely uncommon for containers to transit back empty after a voyage, carriers usually try to backfill them to profit from shipping rates in both directions. But the cost of carrying goods from China to the U.S. is almost 10 times higher than the opposite journey, prompting liners to favor empty boxes instead of loading them, Freightos data showed. ‘Shortage of everything’ At the port of Los Angeles, the U.S.’s biggest for container cargo, three in every four boxes going back to Asia are traveling empty compared with the normal 50% rate, said Executive Director Gene Seroka. In Vancouver, terminals have shortened the time to transport the stuffed boxes onto ships from three days to as little as seven hours, said Jordan Atkins, vice president of WTC Group. “It’s not possible to get the amount of volume we have here in Vancouver to return containers in those tight windows,” said Atkins. “Pulses in general are struggling getting on the ships,” he said, referring to crops like peas and lentils. Canada is the world’s second-largest producer of pulses. India, the world’s second-largest sugar producer, exported only 70,000 metric tons in January, less than a fifth of the volume shipped a year earlier, said Ravi Gupta, president of Shree Renuka Sugars Ltd., the nation’s top refiner. Vietnam, the largest producer of the robusta coffee beans used to make instant drinks and espresso, is also struggling to export. Shipments dropped more than 20% in November and December, said Le Tien Hung, chairman of Simexco Dak Lak, Vietnam’s No. 2 exporter. Around the world, some foodstuff buyers are waiting while others have halted purchases altogether, traders say. “It’s been like that since December,” said Kranig of IM-EX Global. “You’re going to get not only a shortage of food but a shortage of everything. I would not be surprised to hear some beneficial cargo owners’ freight rates for 2021-2022 shipping season double from previous years.” If that prediction bears out, once the bulk of North Americans and Europeans are vaccinated, some of those high freight rates could be passed on to them as they return to cafes, restaurants and office towers. The container crunch comes just as American shippers are trying to boost exports of everything from soybeans to grain meals to Asia. China is scooping up American crops to feed a hog herd that’s recovering from a deadly pig disease faster than most expected. The situation is so dire that some buyers are canceling contracts, opting for bulk shipping methods, the most common for feed products, or delaying purchases to avoid high freight costs.

#### Food shortages cause extinction

FDI 12, is a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests, citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment (Future Directions International, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers & Potential Conflict Points,” <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html>)

There is a **growing appreciation** that the conflicts in the next century will **most likely** be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, **Germany’s World War Two** efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be **significantly greater** as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. . He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, **the state is not stable** – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then **wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow**.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for **World War 3** is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a **festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts**.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A **study** by **the I**nternational **P**eace **R**esearch **I**nstitute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. **Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans** experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US **C**enter for **S**trategic and **I**nternational **S**tudies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, **all identify** famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even **nuclear war**.

### 1AC---Ports

#### Advantage 2 is Ports:

#### Shipping Alliances undermine all efforts to reduce container ship pollution

Alger et al 21, global environmental politics scholar at the University of British Columbia. (Justin, with Jane Lister a Senior Research Fellow and Associate Director of the Centre for Transportation Studies at the Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia, and Peter Dauvergne is Professor of International Relations at the University of British Columbia, Feb 18, 2021, Corporate Governance and the Environmental Politics of Shipping, https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/27/1/article-p144\_7.xml?language=en

. Of course, the problem is that any gains in efficiency are more than offset by the industry’s rapid growth. As projected, shipping emissions roughly doubled from 1970 to 2018.15 The IMO also projects that shipping carbon emissions will rise between 50 and 250 percent by 2050 under a business-as-usual scenario.16 Fuel efficiency matters for minimizing the environmental impact of shipping, but any gains risk being overshadowed by rising aggregate emissions. There is a similar challenge with emissions reduction efforts in ports. Despite regulatory efforts in many cities to reduce air pollution from ports, the IMO projects that port emissions are still likely to quadruple by 2050.17 The 100 most polluted ports alone affect approximately 230 million people.18 Building larger, more fuel-efficient ships is not enough to address these threats to the environment and human health. Focusing strictly on carbon emissions also risks neglecting the myriad of other environmental impacts of the shipping industry. As ships burn the lowest-grade heavy fuel oil (bunker fuel), the emissions include not just carbon but also sulfur dioxide, hydrocarbons, and various forms of nitrogen oxide, all of which have substantial environmental and human health effects. Low-grade marine fuel contains, for example, 3,500 times more sulfur than road diesel.19 According to one study, 30 percent of atmospheric sulfur aerosol around major shipping routes is directly attributable to shipping, contributing to the occurrence of acid rain and more intense storms.20 Other threats include oil spills, invasive species, disposal of hazardous material, and noise, among others. These environmental threats from global shipping have all grown since the 1970s despite progress in reducing emission rates. These trends point to a global shipping industry that looks much different today than it did in the 1970s. Transnational regulation and governance are an increasingly pervasive feature of both world affairs and scholarly analysis. An analysis of global shipping in the twenty-first century needs to account for the growing influence of corporations in global governance. Corporations, in many ways, now exert greater influence than states over global issues of stability, equity, and efficiency. This is especially true within the shipping industry. 3 The Roots of Industry Authority The shipping industry is the oldest transnational business and the transmission belt of the global economy. Historically, shipping and geopolitical power have gone hand in hand. In the past, it has been in the interest of states to limit regulations on the high seas to facilitate open competition and economies of scale in trade. The prevailing norm for high seas governance has been freedom of the seas—a norm that shipping companies have worked to reinforce in their efforts to avoid state regulation and consolidate their position. The industry’s privileged position in the global economy has made it especially effective in influencing its own governance. The freedom of the seas norm is central to why the shipping industry continues to be so difficult for states to regulate.21 This difficulty is partly the result of state design. Historically, states have advocated for minimal regulations at sea in pursuit of their strategic and economic interests. The legal justification for freedom of the seas dates back to 1609, when Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius made the case that shipping routes and ocean resources were inexhaustible resources and therefore should be available to all states equally—an important geostrategic priority for the then Dutch Republic.22 Grotius naturally could not predict the scale of extractive activity centuries later, but his legal basis for freedom of access to shipping routes largely endures today. The norm featured prominently throughout the ten-year negotiations for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) adopted in 1982. As the world’s preeminent maritime powers throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United Kingdom and United States viewed freedom of the seas as essential to the health of their economies. They used their collective power to enshrine it in international law. The evolution of the shipping regime since—around issues such as jurisdictional rights, damage control, and technical barriers—similarly reflects the prerogative of states to ensure free movement of ships and commerce. The historical state-based governance of shipping has, in short, worked toward enhancing industry autonomy in the name of geopolitics and commerce. States actively promoting industry autonomy gave major industry players a lot of leeway over how to organize, through their own banks and insurance companies, and most notably through loosely regulated industry “conferences” (essentially cartels).23 These conferences coordinated on maintaining control over certain shipping routes, often deliberately deploying ships on the same schedules as non-members to push them out of the market.24 Pushing smaller competitors out of the market allowed these conferences to fix prices at a higher rate, among other predatory business practices. The conference system would not endure, however. The emergence of containerization in the latter half of the twentieth century reduced shipping costs, making the market more competitive for smaller companies.25 New antitrust laws targeting conferences in Europe and the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century followed, further undermining their viability. These regulations were intended to break up what was increasingly an unfair, oligopolistic market, but they had the unanticipated effect of providing the impetus for the further centralization of authority in the industry. This centralization of power has taken two forms: an increase in mergers and acquisitions, and the formation of shipping alliances. The high fixed-variable cost ratio of the shipping industry makes consolidation an imperative for major shipping countries.26 With the benefits of coordinating routes and prices through conferences increasingly restricted by governments, major industry players have resorted to strategic mergers and acquisitions to achieve greater economies of scale. Figure 2 depicts the sharp rise in these mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s that has continued steadily since. Some of these mergers reflect a dramatic shift in industry composition. For example, the merger of COSCO and China Shipping in 2016—China’s two largest state-owned shipping conglomerates—made COSCO Shipping the world’s fourth-largest shipping company at the time (it has since risen to third). Strategic alliances also emerged to replace conferences, and these now dominate the shipping landscape. The market share of the major alliances leaped from 30 percent in 2011 to 80 percent in 2018, depicted in Figure 3. Just three alliances—Ocean Alliance, The Alliance, and 2M Alliance—now account for 80 percent of global capacity. Formed in 2017 following a reshuffling, these three alliances allow major carriers to coordinate to enhance their global service coverage and optimize operational costs by sharing resources. The major distinction between these alliances and the conferences of old is that alliance partners do not share commercial information, including pricing. But in practice, these alliances allow a select few large shipping companies to dominate the industry even further. Minimal government antitrust efforts and lingering liner shipping block exemptions from competition policy have enabled the ongoing formation of an oligopoly in global shipping—driven by the advent of megaships and by the steady increase in industry consolidation through mergers, acquisitions, and alliances that began in the 1990s.27 The industry has, in short, been highly effective in avoiding regulation or in finding creative ways to limit its efficacy. There is perhaps no clearer instance of this than the “flags of convenience” model, by which ships can choose which country’s flag to fly. This model allows ships to fly the flag of a country of its choice, including those with minimal safety and environmental regulatory requirements. Countries that ignore IMO resolutions have an outsized ability to undermine new standards. Rather than adhering to new rules—environmental or otherwise—ships often can simply switch flags and ignore them altogether. This system has endured because it benefits all parties: flag states get more traffic, non-flag states get cheaper shipping costs, and shipping companies get increased profits.28 One possible solution is for governments to adopt an exclusion model that prohibits port access to ships that fly flags of convenience.29 But progress has been slow. In 2017, the five largest shipping fleets by flag of registration were Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore.30 This model continues to allow ships to pick and choose which country’s regulations to adhere to, vastly undermining the ability of the IMO and national governments to set standards.31 The freedom of the seas norm that states have long sought to reinforce has had perverse effects on global shipping governance. Mergers and acquisitions, conferences, alliances, and flags of convenience all contribute to an industry structure that has systematically reinforced the power of major corporations. For their part, states have struggled to identify the right balance between the geopolitical and commercial importance of freedom of the seas and the need to regulate the industry (environmental or otherwise). Even when states do introduce new rules, they tend to have unintended consequences. Antitrust efforts helped break up shipping conferences, but led to today’s structure of powerful alliances. From price fixing to alliances to regulatory evasion, major corporations have significantly enhanced their market dominance and, by extension, their political power over global shipping—an outcome with perhaps unexpected consequences for the environmental governance of the industry. 4 Environmental Governance of Global Shipping The consolidation of the industry since the 1970s and the freedom of the seas approach to shipping governance have allowed major companies to exert substantial influence over their environmental governance. Consolidation can benefit states looking to better regulate industry by, most notably, making it easier to design and target regulations in an industry with fewer larger firms. But consolidation also means a few firms have substantial market power that they can leverage to shape the content of state regulation, or oppose it outright. The industry has used that leverage in tangible ways to shape the environmental governance of shipping. Historically, that influence has translated into efforts to avoid environmental regulation. The shipping industry was one of only two industries exempted from emissions cuts in the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change—a trend that continues its similar exemption from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Shipping is responsible for approximately 3 percent of global carbon emissions, which would put it in the top ten global emitters if considered a country, so its exemption is a major blow to the climate regime. Environmentalists lamented the shipping exception, decrying the “corporate capture” of the IMO and UN by shipping and air transport lobbyists. But the global shipping industry has been nigh untouchable for states looking to curb the sector’s climate change impact. This untouchable status is partly by design. In addition to an embedded freedom of the seas norm, the industry further benefits from the norm of liberal environmentalism, which emerged out of the negotiations and compromises leading up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), often referred to as the Rio Earth Summit.32 In Rio, states confirmed the need to better protect the global environment, but with the major caveat that efforts should not interfere with economic growth and development. Ever since, this compromise has defined the state-led governance of environmental issues from climate change to deforestation to biodiversity loss. The maritime industry agreed to support the Rio agenda only as long as it could set its own regulatory agenda.33 As the transmission belt of the global economy, it was simply too essential to all countries to risk disruption. Exemptions in Paris and Kyoto, and the so-called corporate capture of the IMO, therefore merely reflect the application of this norm to global shipping and its centrality in the global economy. That is not to say that state-led governance of shipping has not been strong and successful at times. For example, states took action on oil spills by imposing stricter spill prevention standards on the industry. Oil spills can seriously damage corporate reputation, much more so than diffuse, long-term environmental impacts such as emissions. They have a lasting, visible impact, and generate public outcry. The industry has therefore been responsive to tougher IMO resolutions and technical guidelines for oil spill prevention.34 Despite the cost of implementing stricter safety standards in ship design, the industry sees the value in ceding authority on certain issues to external organizations such as the IMO. Adhering to best practices, as defined by outside governance bodies, has led to a sharp reduction in spills since the 1970s, as depicted in Figure 4. But it also provides the industry with a scapegoat in the event of a spill. Rather than a focus on internal malpractice, many oil spills become a lightning rod for reviewing the international standards set by the IMO. Oil spills can be reduced in number and their impact mitigated, but they are an inevitability of ship bunkering (refueling) and oil transport. By ceding authority on oil spills, the industry has effectively deflected the burden of responsibility to governments and international bodies on a high-profile, potentially market-damaging issue. Similarly, in 2008 the IMO adopted a sulfur cap of 0.5 percent of fuel composition to come into effect on 1 January 2020—a sizable decrease from the previous 3.5 percent limit. This regulation applies to all new and existing ships, generally requiring that ships substitute cleaner, more expensive fuel, but also requiring retrofitting of tanks and engines in many older ships. Individual flag states are still responsible for sanctions in the event of noncompliance, but the IMO has adopted a particularly aggressive stance on sulfur emissions, raising its profile as an environmental priority and effectively ratcheting up pressure on industry. Given the pressure, major industry players are expected to comply, with a projected cost for the container shipping industry of between $ 5 billion and $ 30 billion, depending on market rates for fuel.35 Regulations such as those for oil spills and the sulfur cap demonstrate that state-led governance of shipping can be effective with industry buy-in, often gained through political pressure. States can and have put limitations on certain activities with real consequences for the industry. But new safety designs, ship retrofitting, and cleaner fuels are costly. Given the potential cost of new regulations, major shipping companies have not sat idly by, instead taking the initiative to better shape the environmental governance of their industry through self-regulation. 5 Environmental Self-Governance Following the lead of their big brand customers like Coca-Cola, IKEA, Walmart, and countless others, the major shipping companies are seeking to control their regulatory fate through self-governance and CSR initiatives. By voluntarily committing to sustainability, these companies can simultaneously reduce the impetus for government-led regulation, while setting the terms of debate for future regulation.36 When companies environmentally self-regulate, even with unambitious goals, they tend to dissuade voters, activists, and government officials alike from supporting more robust regulations.37 They also create benchmarks for the rest of the industry to follow and they influence the agenda for state-led governance. In doing so, the companies enhance their autonomy from government-imposed regulation, allowing them to shape the future of the industry and protect their profitability. Put simply, through CSR major shipping companies gain political authority to decide which environmental issues to address, and how to address them in a way that will not have an oversized effect on their bottom line. The cost of these self-imposed initiatives is a price well worth paying to avoid the potential losses associated with a rigorous state-led regulatory regime. One such example was the approach that the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) took to IMO-imposed greenhouse gas emissions reductions. Just as the IMO was advancing with a 2017–2023 road map for reducing greenhouse gases, the ICS submitted an alternative proposal to the IMO that voluntarily permitted the organization to impose reductions beginning in 2023. The ICS proposal did not specify any reduction targets. The IMO accepted the industry proposal, feeling that industry buy-in was important for compliance. But the cost of this buy-in was high. The proposal marginalized and delayed action, with the IMO ultimately setting an intensity target for 2030 while pushing back the absolute emission reduction target to 2050—letting industry off the hook in the short term. The ICS effectively co-opted the IMO reductions targets. Their watered-down proposal was representative of many CSR initiatives—weak, voluntary industry commitments that fail to adequately address the environmental problem in question.38 In this case and others, the industry used its bargaining power to supplant a more ambitious, IMO-driven plan. To the IMO—an organization that struggles with compliance—having industry on board was more important than rigorous emissions targets. In this instance, small and large firms unified through the ICS to undermine the IMO plan but, increasingly, just a few firms are able to go it alone to similar result. More recently, major industry players are moving toward greater environmental self-governance, as exemplified by green ship certification schemes. Spearheaded by industry leaders, these voluntary CSR programs, such as RightShip, Clean Cargo, Green Award, Green Ship of the Future, Environmental Ship Index, and the Clean Shipping Index, establish benchmark criteria to assess vessels on their environmental performance. They mainly measure carbon emissions and fuel efficiency. Ships that pass the mark receive a positive ranking and green seal of approval that qualifies the vessel for market incentives such as reduced port fees and better slot allocation at port. These ratings also bestow a market advantage to companies with certified vessels by allowing them to appeal to cargo customers seeking more environmentally responsible transport. More importantly, the voluntary standards are providing the industry with the opportunity to shape environmental rules. Container shipping companies representing approximately 85 percent of the world’s ocean container shipping volume, for example, participate in the Clean Cargo Program, which includes a business Climate Call to Action agenda. 6 Environmental Self-Governance at Maersk Beyond industry-led certification, there are a select few companies that are proactively pushing for better environmental regulation, most notably Maersk (or what is more formally known as A.P. Møller—Mærsk A/S). Maersk’s sustainability initiatives and its advocacy for better environmental performance by the industry have earned it a positive reputation, even among industry critics. InfluenceMap’s report on corporate capture of the IMO, for example, specifically lauds Maersk for its transparency and progressive voice in an otherwise scathing report.39 As Maersk CEO Søren Skou puts it, “Companies can no longer stay on the sidelines when it comes to global issues.”40 Maersk has been proactive on environmental governance, and its efforts are transforming not only the company but the industry itself. Other companies and associations concentrated in Northern European countries are already starting to follow suit and support environmental action such as through the Trident Alliance lobby for strong sulfur fuel regulation and enforcement. Beyond gaining political influence, there is a powerful business case for Maersk’s support for stronger environmental governance. The business value, we argue, goes beyond the standard CSR “eco-business” from enhancing environmental efficiencies, reducing waste, and gaining more control of supply chains.41 Given the nature of the global shipping industry, higher environmental standards are giving Maersk a significant competitive advantage. New environmental regulations tend to raise the costs of shipping in an industry with already low profit margins, especially for smaller carriers that cannot take advantage of economies of scale. Companies such as Maersk that benefit from the cost savings of megaships and alliances are much better positioned to absorb these kinds of financial shocks than smaller companies. Maersk wields substantial power as the market leader in an increasingly centralized industry, allowing it to pressure governments and ports to make new environmental standards compulsory and ensure “level-playing-field” enforcement to guard their competitive margins. The inevitable outcome of rising operating costs is further industry consolidation through mergers and acquisitions, smaller companies put out of business, and rising barriers to entry for aspiring companies. By escalating environmental requirements and, therefore, risks and costs on its competitors, Maersk solidifies its industry dominance. Maersk’s position on sulfur emission limits in the Port of Hong Kong exemplifies how a powerful company exerts its influence to push for stronger environmental regulations to give it a competitive advantage. In 2012, the Port of Hong Kong cut port fees in half for ships that used fuel with no more than 0.5 percent sulfur content. Maersk, along with seventeen other companies, took advantage of the program. But in 2013 Maersk threatened to switch back to cheaper, dirtier fuel if the port did not make the cleaner fuel mandatory for all. Maersk claimed the cleaner fuel cost an additional $ 2 million per year, only 40 percent of which was made up by cost savings from reduced port fees. This increased cost, Maersk argued, put it at a competitive disadvantage relative to its major competitors in East Asia.42 Maersk, however, was already using low-sulfur content fuel on its ships in part because it needed to abide by European standards. Its threat to switch to dirtier fuel was therefore somewhat hollow, as was its calculation of the additional cost to Maersk. Maersk’s incentive was certainly to level the playing field and it did so by pushing the Port of Hong Kong to adopt the same standards Maersk was already using internally. Bowing to Maersk, its largest customer, the Port of Hong Kong made the reduced-sulfur content fuel mandatory on all ships in 2015. Maersk is used here as an illustrative example, but Nordic shipping companies in particular are increasingly employing tactics similar to Maersk’s pressuring of the Port of Hong Kong. While the majority of shipping companies, often represented by the International Chamber of Shipping, remain silent on environmental issues, some of the largest shipping companies have been anything but. There are two key reasons why some of the major players like Maersk are becoming more environmentally conscious.43 The first is that they are more inclined to long-term planning. They see competitive advantage in being ahead of the curve on environmental performance, allowing them to attract environmentally conscious customers. As IKEA, Nike, Walmart, and others commit to sustainable supply chains, their public image increasingly depends on reducing the environmental cost of shipping. The CEO s of companies like Amazon, Cargill, and Walmart consistently rank in the top 100—and frequently the top 20—in lists of the most influential people in global shipping. Transnational retailers are increasingly looking to shipping emissions as one way of reducing their environmental footprints and enhancing their sustainability credentials. Large shipping companies are therefore using their strong market positions to capitalize on this growing demand for green shipping. Maersk, for example, has established “carbon pacts” with its major suppliers, notably Tetra Pak, BMW, and AkzoNobel, to meet the growing demand for greener ocean transport. Such pacts are also, however, a highly strategic means to lock customers into a long-term business relationship. The second reason is that companies such as Maersk tend to be more technologically advanced than their competition. The better environmental performance of these companies is due in large part to this technological prowess. This prowess not only includes their ability to design and build more fuel-efficient megaships, but also to conduct industry-leading research and development into the low- or zero-emissions vessels of the future. Many of these vessels will use cleaner fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and hydrogen, while others use advanced battery, fuel cell, wind, and solar technology. Whereas most shipping companies focus on operational measures such as improved maintenance and slow steaming for better fuel efficiency to address sustainability, the major industry sustainability leaders are pursuing fundamentally new ship designs. Being ahead of the curve with these advancements gives the big players an incentive to push for stricter environmental standards. Any new environmental regulations would have a greater impact on competitors lagging behind on these technologies. While the main target of these tactics may be major competitors (i.e., large Chinese shipping companies), the increased costs to smaller shipping companies are, at best, collateral damage. At worst, they represent systematic efforts by the world’s largest shipping companies to force their smaller competitors out of the market. The efforts of Maersk to use sustainability to enhance its market position is increasingly common in environmental governance. Corporations regularly look to co-opt environmental governance to set the terms for it.44 But as Strange noted in 1976, global shipping is unique in its geopolitical and commercial importance in the international system. The industry’s Paris exemption, as noted above, is perhaps the clearest indication of its exceptional status. The source of Maersk’s power is not just market dominance, but specifically market dominance in an industry that is essential to the majority of global commerce. The ongoing trend toward greater industry consolidation, particularly over the past decade, has only heightened the influence of major players. Put simply, major players such as Maersk are leveraging the industry’s status as well as their market dominance to dictate the direction and scope of environmental governance, significantly enhancing their competitiveness along the way. 7 Conclusion: The Path to Sustainability? The elephant in the room is whether, on balance, industry-driven governance is an effective mechanism for improving the overall environmental performance of the container shipping industry. It certainly is leading to short-term incremental improvements, but the answer is murkier with respect to strategic long-run advances. The progressive stance of companies such as Maersk on reducing greenhouse gas emissions is an important normative shift within the industry. It is certainly desirable that some of the largest companies in the world’s oldest transnational industry are acknowledging their environmental impacts. Such efforts are certainly better than avoidance and obfuscation, as has been common in the past. In addition, many of the technological advances in shipping are helping to decrease environmental consequences. The shipping industry is not going anywhere, so these advances are necessary if it is to become more sustainable. Yet we need to keep in mind that corporate self-governance of environmental matters is further consolidating power and authority within the shipping industry. Concentration is happening on two fronts. First, industry self-governance is co-opting governance from state-led processes. Industry increasingly decides which problems to address and how to address them. These decisions tend to lead to marginal, incremental steps that benefit business by minimizing any impact on profitability. Fuel efficiency gains, for example, do not compensate for rapid growth in global shipping. On aggregate, the environmental impact of the industry is rising despite better efficiency. As noted, international shipping currently accounts for 3 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. One European Union study predicts that this percentage will rise to 17 percent by 2050, if left unregulated.45 Private governance alone is not enough to reduce this impact meaningfully. The problem is compounded because shipping is a derived demand industry, so its impact also depends on unregulated global consumption levels and supply chains.46 The current industry-led approach nonetheless risks being a linear solution to an exponential problem. Second, major industry players in container shipping are using environmental regulation as a tool to enhance their market dominance, leading to even greater consolidation of the industry. It is not necessarily problematic for industry leaders like Maersk to raise the bar of environmental performance and force laggards to follow suit. But as noted above, this could be problematic for global shipping because smaller companies cannot keep up in an already centralized industry with low profit margins, aggravating already existing inequities common across the international political economy. Sustainability has become, in part, a competitive tool for some corporate players to make the industry even less democratic. It can raise costs that are more easily absorbed by large companies, put a premium on economies of scale, and increase barriers to entry: all further enhancing the power and authority of major companies to dictate governance. Industry sustainability initiatives are, unexpectedly, hastening global shipping’s march toward becoming a global oligopoly, if it is not already there. We could arguably consider this trade-off between consolidation and a commitment to environmental self-governance a good thing for the industry’s performance. If it meant sustainability in global shipping, then perhaps the case could be made that a less democratic industry is an acceptable cost. The prevailing question is whether a few large container shipping companies, increasingly self-regulating, will be willing to make greater sacrifices for sustainability to prevent the bleaker projections of the industry’s environmental impact from becoming reality.

#### Ports are hotspots for future climate investment

UNEP 21, United Nations Environmental Programme (August 5, 2021, 5 EXAMPLES OF BEST PRACTICE TO SUSTAINABLY FINANCE THE PORT SECTOR, <https://www.unepfi.org/news/themes/ecosystems/5-examples-of-best-practice-to-sustainably-finance-the-port-sector/>

The blue (ocean) economy offers many opportunities for private finance to lend and invest in a sustainable and nature-positive way. Here we look at some of the leading examples of best practice in social and environmental sustainability across the port sector which banks, insurers and investors can seek out. Ports are gateways for development, global trade and maritime innovation, and being located at sea level, they are on the front lines of climate change. Ports are also clusters of companies and hubs of economic activity. With strong scale and scope advantages they are ideal hubs for sustainable maritime innovation and have become a key part of development strategies employed by many nations (Rodrigue and Notteboom 2020). To further encourage the sustainable development of the sector, we have listed 5 examples of innovative best practice in ports that you might not know about. Check out Turning the Tide, UNEP FI’s detailed guidance on financing for the sustainable blue economy for more examples and how they may be material to your institution. The guide also includes an overview of activities to challenge or to avoid financing altogether, based on their sustainability credentials and overall risk. The recommendation may be to challenge certain activities, even where best practice is present in other areas. 1. Green transport Ports are the gateways between land and sea, and can offer opportunities for linking the blue economy with the green economy. Seek out ports or companies that provide green port-hinterland connections that are less reliant on additional travel or offer alternatives like rail terminal development. 2. Green technology Ports can be a hub for sustainable innovation and a centre for spinning off new business opportunities. Seek out ports that have skills and systems available to support green port technologies, for example in funding green technology development, as in the case of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore’s Maritime Decarbonisation Centre. Another green port initiative in Singapore is led by ship management company Eastern Pacific Shipping (EPS) and entrepreneur network Techstars. The duo announced a joint-venture project to launch a global start-up accelerator, the “EPS MaritimeTech Accelerator Powered by Techstars”. Digital technology is transforming the maritime space, making it possible to advance and monitor sustainability goals in everything from port operations to fuel efficiency and sustainable fishing. A shortlist of start-up companies was chosen for an intensive three-month programme of research and development, mentorship, and collaboration. The companies then pitched their business to an audience of venture capitalists, corporate innovation leaders and industry experts (Port Technology 2019). “The maritime world has traditionally lagged behind other sectors when it comes to embracing and leveraging the power of digital solutions and new technology,” says Dhritiman Hui, the new managing director of the mentorship-driven Techstars accelerator program. “Now, the confluence of new regulation, an influx of tech-savvy entrepreneurs interested in the space, and large, deep-pocketed VC funds, intrigued by the size and the possibilities of the maritime sector, are threatening to shift that paradigm.” 3. Spatial management Ports are heavily trafficked areas with vessels arriving and departing throughout the day. This can cause impacts on wildlife and habitats. Seek out ports with policies and practices in place that protect vulnerable species and habitats and adapt to known animal aggregation migration routes – for example along the California coast annual incentives are offered for vessels to reduce speed in and around ports to avoid fatal collisions with whales and reduce noise pollution. 4. Supply chains How ports are powered and supplied carries significant environmental impacts, and when done sustainably can set an example for their hinterlands and associated ecosystem of businesses. Focusing on renewable energy, utilising waste heat, carbon capture and storage as well as improving energy efficiency are all steps that can be taken, as demonstrated by the Port of Rotterdam. Seek out ports or associated companies using green supply chains for renewable energy, waste management, and sustainable sourcing. 5. Emissions incentives Ports can incentivise their visiting ships to move towards best practice on e.g. carbon emissions, for example by offering incentives for good emission ratings through discounted port fees as done by a number of ports worldwide through the Environmental Ship Index. Seek out ports that offer lower fees or other incentives to attract ships with good emissions ratings.

#### Container ships are unregulated detriments to the environment

Hureau 21, research and writer at Grover, M.A. in sustainable development at Uppsala University. (Alexandre, 2-8-2021, “Big cargo ships, big pollution,” Medium, https://medium.com/age-of-awareness/big-cargo-ships-big-pollution-834a525d7b7f)

Have you ever asked yourself how things get to where you are? Bananas from Ecuador? No problem. A computer from China? It’s waiting for you. Clothes from Bangladesh? Of course. Sure, there’s a lot of buzz going around about Amazon’s supply chain, but that’s usually the end of the journey for a given product. Before it gets to the merchant or the warehouse that will dispatch it to you, it has to be grown or manufactured. And, since many products originate from abroad, it has to be shipped. Often overlooked, the shipping industry serves as the bloodstream of our modern, globalized world. It also represents 10% of all global transport GHG emissions, a number which could rise by up to 250% by 2050. In addition, a single cargo ship may cause the same health issues as 50 million cars due to the use of low-quality bunker fuel. This is in addition to other issues such as the movement of species through the ballast water (pumped to keep the ships more stable), and the occasional oil spill or loss of cargo. Despite this, the industry has managed to continue operating with very little oversight, having been left out of international treaties such as the Paris Agreement. To this day, even though the public and governments are starting to demand change, there is very little public information about what the world’s largest shipping companies are up to when it comes to the environment. The shipping industry is in need of reform and innovation, and this change needs to happen now. Cargo ships are big It’s hard to imagine how large cargo ships are because most of us don’t hang around cargo ports on a regular basis. Common factors that dictate the maximum size of a ship include Suezmax and New Panamax. These are essentially standards dictating the maximum size a ship can have and still cross the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. The former has a limit of 400 meters long, while the latter stops at 366 meters. Unsurprisingly, many ships aim for these upper limits, allowing them to transport vast amounts of cargo while reducing transit time as much as possible. Of course, these extremely large ships need extremely large engines to power them, and as the size of freighters continues to expand, so does the size of their powertrain. It’s not uncommon to find engines that stand multiple stories tall and can deliver over 100,000 horsepower. As you might expect, the fuel consumption that goes along with it is equally impressive. A somewhat efficient engine may consume as much as 1,660 gallons (7,547 litres) of bunker fuel per hour. Now imagine the cumulative impact of these ships going around the world. Emissions are also big The thing is, bunker fuel is nothing like the oil you use in your car. Most commonly, it is diesel of such low quality that it is almost a waste when looking at oil refining. Of course, along with making it extremely cheap to run, it also makes it extremely polluting. While the global warming impact is certainly high, the other pollutants emitted by cargo ships are also very alarming. A study estimated that global maritime shipping was responsible for up to 250,000 deaths annually due to air pollution, and up to 6.4 million childhood asthma cases. While there are restrictions when close to shore, these ships spend most of their time in international water, where there is little supervision and the level of enforcement is low. In fact, penalties for non-compliance with environmental rules have been a large point of debate in the creation of international agreements. The maritime industry is slow to adopt new environmental standards on its own, and as all is tradition in international affairs, governments have a hard time coming to an enforceable agreement. There are other environmental impacts Of course, air pollution is but one negative environmental impact that maritime shipping has. It would take a very long time to cover them all, but these include the aforementioned movement of species through water ballasts and the spills that periodically occur. Ships the size of those found in the maritime shipping industry often carry large amounts of water as ballast which they collect near the coast of one country and dump near another. In turn, they carry animals and plants from one place to the next, potentially introducing invasive species. A convention was adopted in 2004 to try and deal with this problem, but many countries still haven’t signed on, including large actors such as the United States. Fun fact, the International Maritime Organization apparently doesn’t have a page for the convention either. Spills and cargo losses need no introduction. Every few years, a large oil spill makes the news, but only if it’s large enough. Meanwhile, some beaches have become famous for the peculiar things that wash up on them because of cargo that was lost at sea. Cool tech and innovation Thankfully, the world is not completely asleep when it comes to the future of the maritime industry, and there is a constant flux of innovation that has been happening over the past few years. Though whether or not some of these reach a large enough scale to make an impact will likely depend on the price of oil and pressure from investors and governments. Some of these innovations involve going back to previous technologies. Cargill, for instance, wants to add large sails to its cargo ships in a bid to reduce their emissions by up to 30%. There is also at least one company that aims to use modern technologies to make highly efficient cargo ships powered by sails, though at a much smaller scale than used in the current industry. There is also a lot of research happening to find alternative energy sources. Ranging from biofuels to synthetically produced fuels powered by renewable energy, there are many options out there. The problem remains that these will only truly be adopted if they have an economic benefit for the shipping companies, or if they are incentivized or forced to innovate. Most of the things in your life have been shipped by cargo---from the food you eat, to the clothes you wear. Even if a product is manufactured locally, the odds are that parts and materials were shipped. Our globalized world trives on this interconnectedness, and, for better or worse, the maritime industry will keep getting bigger to meet the growing demand. The pressure is mounting for change to happen, but it’s still too slow. We need people to start demanding stricter environmental regulation, governments to get on board existing regulations while pushing for new ones, and companies to step up and bring innovation to a sector that is so desperately in need of it.

#### Warming causes extinction

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” *Futures*, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

#### Alliances manipulate and destroy ports

Merk et al 18, Associate Professor at the Urban School of the Institute for Political Science (Sciences Po) in Paris and leader of port and shipping work at the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (Olaf, with Lucie Kirstein and Filip Salamitov, 2018, The Impact of Alliances in Container Shipping, <https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/impact-alliances-container-shipping.pdf>.)

Whereas alliances might create value for some carriers, Chapter 2 illustrated that they likely destroy value for ports, terminals and port services, by undermining their return on investment. This is public investment for most port authorities, and private investment for terminal operators and port service providers, such as towage companies. Most ports depend on one or two alliances and the risk of losing the alliance calls provides these with huge leverage over ports to reduce rates and invest in additional infrastructure. Within ports, alliances have frequently resulted in simultaneous over-utilisation and under-utilisation of terminals, related to a “winner takes all” dynamic related to the dominance of the three global alliances. Rationalisation of alliance networks has reduced the number of direct port connections. Alliances and consolidation of the industry have contributed to the disappearance of smaller container ports, various independent terminal operators and drive consolidation in the towage sector.

#### Strong ports promote naval readiness

EPA 21, Environmental Protection Agency (Ports Primer: 2.1 The Role of Ports, <https://www.epa.gov/community-port-collaboration/ports-primer-21-role-ports>)

In addition to serving as economic drivers and transportation hubs, ports play an important role in national defense. Fifteen of our commercial seaports have been named Strategic Seaports by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) (see the map at right). These ports can help to support military deployments because of their large staging areas, connections to rail infrastructure and ability to load non-containerized cargo. Ports can also use these capabilities to support emergency relief activities, such as from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for natural disasters. The DOD is particularly reliant on Strategic Seaports during military surge operations. For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DOD used these ports to load combat vehicles and aircraft. These operations require Strategic Seaports to have adequate rail infrastructure, significant staging areas for military cargo and workers skilled in handling non-containerized military equipment. As our commercial seaports continue to experience increasing levels of commercial containerized shipping, port staging areas and rail capacity to support military operations may be strained.

#### Readiness prevents global conflict

Cropsey and McGrath 18 is Director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute, is former Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute and naval officer former assistant to the Secretary of Defense and naval officer. (Seth and Bryan, January 2018, “Maritime Strategy in a New Era of Great Power Competition,” , Hudson Institute, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/HudsonMaritimeStrategy.pdf>]

Introduction As a maritime nation, naval power is the U.S.’s most useful means of responding to distant crises, preventing them from harming our security or that of our allies and partners, and keeping geographically remote threats from metastasizing into conflicts that could approach our borders. A maritime defense demands a maritime strategy. As national resources are increasingly strained the need exists for a strategy that makes deliberate choices to connect ends (security) with means (money and the fleet it builds). This paper examines the need for a maritime strategy, discusses options, and offers recommendations for policy makers. After several decades of unchallenged world leadership, the United States once again faces great power competition, this time featuring two other world powers. China and Russia increasingly bristle under the constraints of the post-World War II systems of global trade, finance, and governance largely created by the United States and its allies, systems that the United States has protected and sustained to the economic and security benefit of its citizens and the citizens of other nations. Both China and Russia are demonstrably improving the quality of their armed forces while simultaneously acting aggressively toward neighboring countries, some of which are US treaty allies. Additionally, both nations are turning their attention to naval operations far from their own coasts, operations designed to advance national interests that are often in tension with those of the United States.1 For the past several decades, US national security strategy has not had to contend with great powers. Instead, it has concerned itself primarily with building alliances designed to manage regional security more efficiently by proxy, while devoting increasingly more resources to homeland defense and intelligence aimed at stemming acts of terror by Islamic radical organizations and their followers. To the extent that the US position of leadership in the world was not threatened, this strategy was reasonable, if imperfectly pursued. Such a strategy will no longer suffice in a world of great power competition, especially one in which powers of considerable—but unequal—strength are opposed. Unbalanced multi-polarity is an especially unstable condition, and the United States is not effectively postured to manage that instability. Henry Kissinger divides the concept of world order into two parts: a normative system that defines acceptable action, and a ‘balance of power’ arrangement that punishes the breach of such conventions2. As the underlying balance of forces shifts, states with different ideas of international order gain the power to reshape the system. Thucydides’ ancient insight holds true – the rise in power of one actor threatens all others. Where such threat exists and if the balance of power between states or coalitions approaches equilibrium, a “Cold War” between competing ideological camps occurs.

### 1AC---Plan

#### Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase prohibitions on private sector anticompetitive business practices by removing the Shipping Act antitrust exemption.

#### The plan allows FMC (Federal Maritime Commission) enforcement and litigation against alliances

NITL 21, National Industrial Transportation League, a trade association whose mission is to advance the views of shippers on industrial freight transportation issues and advance their professional development (May 19, 2021, NITL Urges Congress to Adopt Shipping Act Reforms in Response to Unprecedented Disruption to the Ocean Shipping Network, https://www.nitl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/NITL-release-Shipping-Act-Revisions-May-19-2021-final.pdf)

The National Industrial Transportation League (NITL), the nation’s oldest trade association representing industrial freight transportation shippers, is calling on Congress to modernize the Shipping Act of 1984 after months of congestion at U.S. seaports and unprecedented disruption to the ocean shipping network. The ongoing ocean shipping turmoil has wreaked havoc on US exporters and importers, costing them billions in higher shipping costs, demurrage and detention charges, and lost business, with still no clear end in sight. The inability of US companies to timely access marine containers and chassis and secure sufficient vessel bookings to meet their business requirements has upended the ocean cargo shipping and delivery network. These unprecedented challenges have exposed gaps in the law governing ocean carrier services that warrant immediate action. A proposal drafted by NITL recommends modifications to address these challenges. The proposal is designed to provide remedies for importers and exporters who are experiencing unprecedented shipping costs, are unable to obtain adequate ocean transportation service to meet their cargo delivery needs and are concerned about unfair business practices. The NITL proposal provides four main recommendations to modify The Shipping Act, including: • Establishing rules prohibiting common carriers and marine terminal operators from adopting and applying unjust and unreasonable demurrage and detention rules and practices by codifying the industry guidance issued by the Federal Maritime Commission in the Spring of 2020, and shifting the burden of proof for complaints onto the service providers to show that their practices are reasonable and comply with the rules. • Clarifying the obligations of common carriers with respect to equipment and vessel space allocations and contract performance by requiring them to adhere to minimum service standards that meet the public interest. Ocean carriers would also be required to develop contingency service plans during periods of port congestion to mitigate supply chain disruptions. • Modifying the prohibited acts to address unfair business practices related to the instrumentalities required to perform the transportation services, including access to, allocation of, and interchange of equipment, and any unreasonable allocations of vessel space by ocean common carriers considering foreseeable import and export demand. Expanding the FMC’s authority to act upon complaints filed against anticompetitive agreements

between ocean carriers that operate with antitrust immunity, such as alliances, and allowing third-party intervenors to participate in court proceedings initiated by the FMC against such agreements. “While ocean transportation costs are rising to unprecedented levels, we have seen a substantial deterioration in service by the ocean carriers. The lack of timely access to marine equipment and vessel sailings has caused adverse ripple effects throughout US companies’ supply chains leading to material shortages, empty store shelves, and business interruption,” said NITL Director and Ocean Committee Chair Lori Fellmer. “NITL believes that the inability of exporters and importers to effectively address these challenges commercially means the time has come to update the Shipping Act to reflect current day circumstances. “The NITL proposal addresses many of the problems faced by the shipping community and seeks to address gaps in the current law. While the League strongly commends the regulatory efforts in recent years initiated by the FMC, we believe the agency and shipping industry would benefit greatly from these proposed reforms that are targeted to address present day challenges,” said Fellmer. The League was instrumental in the efforts leading up to the 1998 amendments to the Shipping Act and looks forward to working with the Congress, the FMC, and all industry stakeholders to address the critical challenges faced by importers and exporters and others by updating this important federal law.

#### Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) decisions aren’t currently under antitrust

Young-Bascom 11, is a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin. (George, 2011, “Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: The Potential for a “Robust Business Review Clearance,” Oregon Law Review, Vol. 89 1059-1106, https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Carstensen.pdf)

4. Some Tentative Conclusions

The great bulk of agreements and combinations that benefit from antitrust immunity have no absolute need for such an entitlement. Despite the concerns about the specifics of a few ventures, a majority of the joint venture agreements seem to present little risk of any antitrust liability. The relatively few standard-setting agreements are somewhat more problematic because they reflect a collective agreement among competitors that restricts the ways they compete. Because these agreements are subject to agency review and approval, the agreements could easily be transformed into formal agency orders based on an administrative proceeding in which all interested parties could participate as the STB has suggested. Thus, even if such agreements were characterized as unlawful under antitrust law, they can easily be converted into a formal regulatory requirement. With few exceptions, the current body of exempted agreements is not consistent with a clear cartel motivation. Two more troubling observations point toward the need for reform. First, especially in ocean shipping, some explicit cartel agreements remain. There seems, however, to be little justification for such agreements. Indeed, as the STB has stated in connection with the trucking agreements, such agreements are now contrary to declared public policy. Second, the present systems for land and air transportation immunities fail to provide a sufficiently rigorous check on the potentially adverse competitive effects that can and do flow from unnecessarily restrictive or unduly inclusive ventures. Worse, the FMC lacks any authority even to review the merits of submitted agreements that result in immunity. Overall, then, the present system has a strong tendency to undermine competition. The results are diminished efficiency and a loss of dynamic innovation. Moreover, given the changes in the underlying market contexts that result from both technological and legal changes, there is no continuing policy reason for the current system of an agency’s unilateral grant of immunity. This is not to argue that the agencies serve no function. First, the agencies provide a forum for establishing rules and regulations to govern aspects of these markets that are beyond the capacity of antitrust law and courts’ enforcing that law. Second, the agencies establish important reporting requirements to obtain information necessary in evaluating the services being offered by transportation providers. Third, the agencies provide continuing oversight, monitoring, and investigative capacity beyond the authorization or institutional capacity of the DOJ. Thus, the question is not whether the agencies should be removed from the process but whether agency approval alone should warrant immunity from antitrust law.

#### Private litigation and class action is necessary to deter international alliances

Lande 16, Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law, Director of the American Antitrust Institute. {Robert; Spring 2016; Antitrust, “Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential for Compensation and Deterrence,” <https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2019&context=all_fac>)

OUR RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES demonstrate five reasons why antitrust class action cases are essential: (1) class actions are virtually the only way for most victims of antitrust violations to receive compensation; (2) most successful class actions involve collusion that was anticompetitive; (3) class victims’ compensation has been modest, generally less than their damages; (4) class actions deter significant amounts of collusion and other anticompetitive behavior; and (5) anticompetitive collusion is underdeterred, a problem that would be exacerbated without class actions. Recent court decisions undermine class action cases, thus preventing much effective and important antitrust enforcement.1 Class Actions Are Virtually the Only Way for Most Victims of Federal Antitrust Violations to Receive Compensation The antitrust statutes provide that violations result in automatic treble damages for the victims.2 The legislative history 3 and case law indicate that compensation of victims is a goal, perhaps the dominant goal, of antitrust law’s damages remedy.4 Class actions play an essential role in ensuring that the treble damages remedy serves its intended function of “protecting consumers from overcharges resulting from price fixing.”5 As the Supreme Court noted, “[C]lass actions . . . may enhance the efficacy of private [antitrust] actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture.”6 Accordingly, “courts have repeatedly found antitrust claims to be particularly well suited for class actions . . . .”7 Without class actions, cartels and other antitrust violators that inflict widespread economic harm would have little to fear from the treble damages remedy. This is because, as a practical matter, class action cases are virtually the only way for most victims of anticompetitive behavior to receive compensation.8 A 2013 study that Professor Joshua Davis and I conducted documents the benefits of private enforcement by analyzing 60 of the largest recent successful private U.S. antitrust cases (defined as suits resolved since 1990 that recovered at least $50 million in cash for the victims9 ). These actions returned a total of $33.8–$35.8 billion in cash to victims of anticompetitive behavior.10 These figures do not include products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive relief or precedent—only cash.11 Consequently, these totals significantly understate the actual benefits of this litigation to the victims involved. And, of course, this study covered only 60 suits (albeit 60 of the largest private recoveries) out of the many hundreds of private cases filed in the United States during this period. Of these 60 large private cases, 49 were class action suits.12 These cases recovered a total of $19.4–$21.0 billion—the majority of the amount analyzed in our study.13 Since these were among the largest private actions ever filed, specific conclusions based upon these results may not generalize perfectly to all class action cases. They do suggest, however, that without class action cases, effective and significant victim compensation would be reduced dramatically. Most Successful Class Actions Involve Collusion that Was Anticompetitive Almost every private antitrust case that results in a remedy does so through a settlement,14 so the underlying merits of the plaintiffs’ claims usually have not been definitively assessed by a court or jury. Critics sometimes use this fact to support assertions that class actions usually are meritless, that plaintiffs often receive huge sums from cases not involving anticompetitive conduct, and that private antitrust actions often amount to legalized blackmail or extortion.15 Antitrust class actions arise in widely varied market and factual settings, and views about the merits of specific cases and the litigation risks involved vary as well. This makes it extremely difficult to draw objective conclusions about the merits of settlements. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that the vast majority of class action cases in the Davis/Lande study involved legitimate claims. Forty-one of the 49 class actions involved allegations of collusion,16 and the same conduct supporting the settlements gave rise to criminal penalties in 20 cases; to civil relief by the FTC or DOJ in 8 cases; to civil relief by a state or other governmental unit in 9 cases; to a trial that the defendants lost and that was not overturned on appeal in 7 cases; to a class being certified in 22 cases; and to plaintiffs surviving or prevailing at summary judgment in 12 cases.17 Overall, 44 of the 49 class action suits (90 percent) exhibited at least one of these forms of legal validation as to their merits. (The 5 actions that did not have at least one of these indicia settled too early for a substantive evaluation of their merits).18 These results are broadly consistent with a finding that Professor John Connor derived from an analysis of 130 private recoveries worldwide in international cartel cases for which he could obtain the necessary data.19 He found that of the 50 largest worldwide settlements, measured by their monetary recoveries in constant dollars, 49 had been filed against international cartels.20 Of these, 51 percent were follow-ups to successful DOJ prosecutions, and another 8 percent were filed after fines by the EC or other non-U.S. antitrust authorities.21 Using a different data set, Connor and I found that 36 of 71 (also 51 percent) successful U.S. class action recoveries followed successful DOJ criminal cases.22 This data does not prove that these or any other specific class action cases involved anticompetitive conduct. But critics who assert that most antitrust class actions are little more than legalized blackmail rely only on anecdotes, hypotheticals, and opinions (often of defendants in the cases), without support from studies, and with no reliable empirical evidence that the actions lack merit or that settlement amounts are excessive compared to the anticompetitive harm.23 To be fair, one should compare the above indicia of validity to the absence of any systematic evidence underpinning the critics’ charges. Critics also sometimes assert that remedies typically secured in class action settlements are at best dubious and often are completely worthless, consisting of useless coupons, meaningless discounts, and obsolete products. They argue with regard to cash payments (without providing even a single anecdote) that “issuing [class members] a check is often so expensive that administrative costs swallow the entire recovery.”24 According to many critics the only ones to benefit from private enforcement are the attorneys involved.25 The critics who make these charges, however, never offer evidence beyond opinions, hypotheticals, and occasional anecdotes. Indeed, for the 49 antitrust class action cases that Davis and I studied, the data show that, overall, only a total of approximately 20 percent of the recoveries went for attorney fees (14.3 percent) or claims administration expenses (4.1 percent).26 The rest was returned to the victims. This result is consistent with older estimates of legal fees in antitrust class action cases in the 6.5 to 21 percent range.27 Critics also sometimes examine what happened in other areas of law and assert that these outcomes occur in contemporary antitrust class action suits as well. But they never offer systematic evidence from antitrust cases to support their opinions.28 Interestingly, only one of the lawsuits in the Davis/Lande study involved a coupon remedy—the Auction Houses cases. However, those coupons were fully redeemable for cash if they were not used for five years.29 The actions Davis and I studied were among the largest antitrust class actions ever brought and therefore might not be representative of class action cases in general. Abuses surely occur from time to time in class action cases, as they do almost everywhere in the legal system. But a majority of the critics’ most egregious examples are from other areas of law or are quite old.30 No one has ever presented reliable evidence showing that such examples occur frequently or are typical of contemporary antitrust class action cases.31 Class Victims’ Compensation Has Been Modest, Generally Less than Their Damages Even though the $19.4–$21.0 billion that Davis and I showed had been returned to victims in 49 class action cases is a significant figure when viewed in absolute terms, it probably was not nearly enough to fully compensate all of the victims involved. To ascertain “Recovery Ratios” (the percentage of the illegal overcharges that was obtained in the form of monetary payments to victims in private actions), Professor Connor and I assembled a sample consisting of every completed private case against cartels discovered from 1990 to mid-2014 for which we could find the necessary information. For each of these 71 cases we assembled neutral scholarly estimates of affected commerce and overcharges and compared these estimates to the damages secured in the private actions filed against these cartels.32 The victims of only 14 of the 71 cartels (20 percent) recovered their damages (or more) in settlement. Only seven (10 percent) received more than double damages. The rest— the victims in 57 cases—received less than their damages. In four cases, the victims received less than 1 percent of damages, and in 12 cases they received less than 10 percent of damages. Overall, the median average settlement was 37 percent of single damages. The unweighted mean settlement (a figure that gives equal weights to the cartels that operated in large and small markets) was 66 percent. The mean and median average Recovery Ratios are higher (81 percent and 52 percent, respectively), for the 36 cases that were follow-ups to DOJ prosecutions that imposed criminal sanctions.33 Because these Recovery Ratios do not include any valuations of products, discounts, coupons, or the value of injunctive relief or precedent, the actual worth of these remedies to the victims is greater than the figures reported above. Nevertheless, it fairly can be concluded that antitrust class action cases often return important recoveries to victims that are significant in absolute terms, but usually are modest when measured against the sizes of the overcharges involved. Class Actions Deter Significant Amounts of Collusion and Other Anticompetitive Behavior Private class action cases serve to deter a substantial amount of anticompetitive activity, perhaps even more than the highly acclaimed anti-cartel program of the U.S. Department of Justice, which often results in prison sentences for cartel participants.34 Virtually every contemporary analysis of antitrust enforcement assumes that deterrence is an important purpose of the private treble damages remedy provision.35 The Supreme Court has underscored this point. For example, in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., the Court explained: Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.36 The government, however, cannot be expected to do all of the necessary enforcement for a number of reasons, including budgetary constraints, “undue fear of losing cases; lack of awareness of industry conditions; overly suspicious views about complaints by ‘losers’ that they were in fact victims of anticompetitive behavior; higher turnover among government attorneys; and the unfortunate, but undeniable, reality that government enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions are, at times, politically motivated.”37 A recent study highlights the deterrence benefits of private enforcement by comparing the likely deterrent effects of private antitrust enforcement to that of criminal anti-cartel enforcement by the Antitrust Division.38The surprising result is that private enforcement—and even just antitrust class action cases considered separately—probably deters more anticompetitive behavior. From 1990 through 2011 the total of DOJ corporate antitrust fines, individual fines, and restitution payments totaled $8.2 billion. (Dis)valuing a year of prison or house arrest at $6 million39 adds another $3.6 billion in total deterrence from the DOJ’s anti-cartel cases, yielding a total of approximately $11.8 billion. This is a substantial figure, and the possibility of incurring such sanctions surely has deterred a significant number of would-be antitrust violators.40 Nevertheless, these penalties amount to approximately 50 percent of the $19.4–$21.0 billion in cash alone (not including products, etc.) secured by just the 49 studied class cases that were completed during the same period.41 These private cases were only a portion of the hundreds of successful class action cases completed during this period (albeit they were many of the largest).42 The total amount of payouts in class action cases is so high that it probably deters more anticompetitive conduct than even the DOJ’s anti-cartel enforcement efforts.

# 2AC

## ADV---Economy

### 2AC---AT: Turn

#### Unilateral application causes global market stability

Leonardo 16, is J.D. candidate at Depaul University College of Law. (Lizl, 2016, ““A Proposal to the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Split: Expand the Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to Extraterritorial Conduct that Impacts U.S. Commerce,” Depaul Law Review, vol. 66, https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4008&context=law-review)

C. The Ninth Circuit Must Prevail: Apply the Broad Rule International supply chains have benefits in today’s modern world. Raw materials, parts, and labor costs are generally cheaper in Asia.291 Companies have more flexibility to look for other companies to transact with, given the advancement in technology and the volatility of the marketplace.292 Efficiency and effectiveness increase over time as these companies collaborate and integrate their efforts to achieve optimal returns.293 Customers, generally, want cheap but quality-made products.294 When companies meet these demands, customers are more likely to buy the products, and as a result, other companies enter the market with the intention of delivering the same goods at a lower price.295 Companies, then, both cooperate and compete against each other, finding ways to come up with final products that are more efficient, eventually leading to market growth.296 However, despite these described benefits, price-fixing cartels still find a way to impose higher costs of products to consumers.297 A price-fixing cartel considers the product flow among regions in order to establish the price it will charge for a particular product.298 The conspiracy, generally, will not work if the price of the product is only increased in one region because market forces will essentially reallocate the sales to other regions that sell the product at lower prices.299 For example, if the LCD conspirators focused their price increase on regions outside of the United States, U.S. companies would have a strong inclination towards limiting their purchases to LCD panels sold in the United States at lower prices and then exporting these panels to foreign subsidiaries themselves, thus effectively avoiding the cartel’s products.300 However, conspirators are savvy enough to avoid being cut out of certain markets, particularly as the United States is one of the largest consumer markets in the world.301 To avoid this problem, the LCD conspirators (or any international cartel) have an incentive to raise the prices of the products in all regions that have multinational operations, including the United States.302 This action will disrupt the efficient and organized processes that help lower production costs, primarily because the United States has higher than usual labor costs compared to other countries.303 With insufficient rules curtailing price-fixing cartels, U.S. companies could limit the use of international supply chains.304 Moreover, they will be discouraged from conducting business or moving some businesses offshore where it will be more beneficial.305 As a result, the total price of U.S. consumer goods will be higher than it would have been had they been created in countries that have lower production and labor costs.306 This kind of uncertainty makes it difficult for both producers and consumers to manage the volatility of the market. In light of the increasing demand for international business transactions, it is more important than ever that U.S. consumers are continuously protected from companies’ wrongful conduct, whether or not these companies engage in these transactions while outside of the United States’ jurisdiction.307 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling undermines this protection. It focused its analysis on technicalities of the statute, and it placed more weight on international comity concerns than on the protection of U.S. consumers, whom the legislators intended to protect when it enacted the statute.308 On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FTAIA is aligned more closely with the canons of statutory interpretation. The Seventh Circuit’s holding that “it was Motorola, rather than the defendants, that imported these panels into the United States”309 is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the FTAIA.310 Congress plainly intended to read the import-commerce exclusion broadly when it enacted the FTAIA.311 In Hartford Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the “FTAIA was intended to exempt from the Sherman Act [1] export transactions that [2] did not injure the United States economy.”312 The court reiterated this in Empagran when it held that the “FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters . . . that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into business arrangements . . . , however anticompetitive, as long as those arrangements adversely affect only foreign markets.”313 The language of the Sherman Act neither implies nor explicitly states that it should only be applied when commercial transactions occurred in the United States, and not abroad.314 This is a strained interpretation of the Act given that Congress could have explicitly stated such a rule.315 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, correctly dismissed the defendants’ suggestion that because they were not the importers, they should not be held liable.316 Other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have held in accordance with the Ninth Circuit, suggesting that some federal courts are in agreement with this reading of the FTAIA’s legislative intent. In Animal Science, the Third Circuit held that in order to find liability, the anticompetitive behavior of the defendant must have been “directed at an import market.”317 Thus, in holding this, the defendants needed only to “function as the physical importers of goods.”318 This meant that there was not a “necessary prerequisite” that the defendants are the importers per se before antitrust laws could apply;319 “[f]unctioning as a physical importer” will be sufficient.320 Here, even though the defendants did not import the LCD panels into the United States per se, the panels’ incorporation into the electronics that were subsequently imported into the United States was sufficient to pass the test.321 The defendants knew that these panels could not stand alone, but rather must be combined with other parts to manufacture a final product.322 That knowledge, the foreseeability of the effect to the United States, and the intentional inflation of the price to an artificially high level meant that the defendants “functioned as a physical importer,” falling squarely under the Sherman Act.323 With regard to the first requirement of the FTAIA, Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit, wrote that the domestic effect was too “remote” to satisfy the “direct effects” test because the conduct occurred abroad and then passed through a multi-step process before causing “a few ripples in the United States.”324 However, this reasoning assumes the presence of a complicated process to import the LCDs when, in fact, there was none.325 The LCDs were purchased at a high price, incorporated into electronics, and almost instantly shipped to the United States.326 The process was limited to purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution,327 and the LCD panels have no utility without being incorporated in various consumer products, such as mobile phones.328 The artificially high price of the panels was the exclusive factor that adversely impacted U.S. commerce.329 Assuming relatively flat labor costs, the price of the final product would not have increased had it not been for the defendants’ anticompetitive conspiracy to increase the panels’ price. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “direct effects” is therefore proper. The United States market was directly impacted as a result of the “immediate consequence” of the defendants’ price-fixing conspiracy.330 With regard to the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion was sparse, despite consensus among the other circuits.331 The Seventh Circuit relied on the argument that Motorola could not recover because the injury “occurred entirely in foreign commerce.”332 By concluding that the defendants’ conduct did not give rise to Motorola’s claim, the court misread the holding in Empagran, 333 in which the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the importance of our nation’s “ability . . . to regulate its own commercial affairs.”334 However, it also held that antitrust laws may be applied to foreign anticompetitive conduct so long as it is “reasonable” and it reflects “legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.”335 That is exactly the issue in Motorola. The Seventh Circuit held that Motorola’s overcharge claims as a result of defendants’ inflated price did not give rise to those claims.336 It reasoned that the harm happened abroad when Motorola purchased the price-fixed panels, independent of the increased cell phone prices.337 But as stated above, the artificially high price of the LCD panels was the reason Motorola was seeking a remedy.338 Had the defendants not conspired to fix the price of these components, the final product price of the mobile phones would not have increased; Motorola would not have been forced to pass on the artificial price increase to U.S. consumers.339 Instead of focusing on the linguistics the U.S. Supreme Court employed in Empagran, the Seventh Circuit should have applied a “more natural” reading by focusing on the basic purpose of the FTAIA and the Sherman Act— protection of U.S. consumers.340 After all, it has been widely recognized that, in a global economy, anticompetitive conduct can negatively impact domestic markets by inflating prices paid by U.S. commerce.341 This is an outcome that U.S. antitrust laws were created to combat.342

### 2AC---!---Terrorism

### 2AC---!---Economy

### 2AC---!---Taiwan

### 2AC---!---Food Shortage

## ADV---Ports

### 2AC---!---Warming

### 2AC---!---Readiness

## AT: T---Subs

### 2AC---AT: Private Sector

#### Counter-interpretation---the private sector includes an industry.

The Law Dictionary N.D., (The Law Dictionary: Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed. “Private Sector” , <https://thelawdictionary.org/private-sector/> , date accessed 9/11/21)

What is PRIVATE SECTOR? An industry that is composed of private companies. The corporate sector and the personal sector are encompassed in the private sector and they are responsible for the allocation of the majority of resources within the economy.

#### The private sector includes subsets---refers to many different actors.

Waler and Hofstetter 16 (Katharina Walker is Advisor for vocational skills development and Helvetas’ youth focal person. Sonja Hofstetter joined Swisscontact in Cambodia in July 2016. She is the Quality Assurance Manager and Deputy Team Leader of the Skills Development Programme. “ Study on Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and Training (ATVET) in Developing Countries” Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC, Global Programme Food Security, 25.1.2016, <https://www.shareweb.ch/site/Agriculture-and-Food-Security/focusareas/Documents/ras_capex_ATVET_Study_2016.pdf> , date accessed 7/19/21)

In many developing countries, the private sector1 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 1]] 1 The private sector is not perceived as a homogenous mass even though the terminology might suggest this to be the case. In this study, the term “private sector” is used to circumscribe the various actors such as small and medium sized companies, large companies, sectorial associations, business associations, chambers of commerce, etc.[[END FOOTNOTE 1]] faces challenges in finding adequately skilled employees. This also holds true for sectors linked to agriculture, e.g. processing, distribution, marketing, etc. The development of ATVET from a purely productivity-oriented approach to provide broader and more specialised skills sets along agricultural value chains is likely to raise the interest of private sector actors. This incentive can result in a stronger and more sustainable financial and conceptual engagement of employers in ATVET.

#### ‘By’ only requires anticompetitive practices resulting from private sector action.

Michigan Court of Appeals 10 (SAWYER, J. Opinion in DEQ. v. Worth Twp., 808 N.W.2d 260, 289 Mich. App. 414 (Ct. App. 2010). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/23/21).

Second, we look to the meaning of the phrase "by the municipality." This phrase is key because it answers plaintiffs' contention that MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility for a discharge on a municipality without regard to the source of the discharge. That is, plaintiffs argue that any discharge of raw sewage within a municipality constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation by the municipality even if the municipality is not the source of the discharge. We disagree. The word "by" has many meanings. For its meaning as a nonlegal term, we look to a layman's dictionary rather than a legal one. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). We find these definitions from the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) to be particularly helpful: "10. through the agency of" and "12. as a result or on the basis of[.]" Thus, MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility on the municipality not when the violation merely occurs within the boundaries 264\*264 of the municipality, but when the violation occurs "through the agency of" the municipality or "as a result" of the municipality, that is to say, when it is the actions of the municipality that lead to the discharge.

## AT: CP---States

### 2AC---Permutations

### 2AC---Deficit---Preemption

#### State efforts are preempted

Longstreth and Bachman 15, Longsreth is a partner focusing on antitrust in transportation at K&L Gates, J.D. at Harvard Law School. Bachman is a partner focusing on competition law at K&L Gates. (John & Allen, 9-10-2015, “Shipping Act Antitrust Exemption Held for the First Time to Preempt State Antitrust Laws,” K&L Gates, https://files.klgates.com/files/105702\_antitrust\_alert\_09102015.pdf)

For the first time, a federal court has held that the Shipping Act of 1984, 46 U.S.C. §§ 40101–41309 (Shipping Act), preempts state-law antitrust claims. The federal district court in New Jersey applied conflict preemption principles to hold that a challenge to a price fixing and capacity reduction agreement among international shipping companies was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), and that the Shipping Act preempts state law antitrust claims that would apply to such conduct. In re Vehicle Carrier Services Antitrust Litigation, No. 13-3306 (ES)(MDL No. 2471) (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2015). The decision is important not only as the first case to address this issue under the Shipping Act, but also as a confirmation that federal preemption remains a viable defense to state-law antitrust claims, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) declining to find state antitrust claims preempted by the Natural Gas Act. The scope of the Shipping Act’s antitrust exemption Agreements that are filed with the FMC and become effective under the Shipping Act, or that are exempt from filing under the Act, are expressly exempted from federal antitrust laws. 46 U.S.C. §§ 40307(a)(1), (2). Conduct may also fall outside of the specific authority granted in an effective agreement but still be immune if there is a reasonable basis to believe it was authorized, and if the conduct falls within the scope of the Act. 46 U.S.C. § 40307(a)(3). “[A]ll activity permitted or prohibited by the Act enjoys immunity from antitrust coverage if undertaken with a reasonable belief that it was being done under an effective agreement filed with the FMC.” A&E Pac. Constr. Co. v. Saipan Stevedore Co., 888 F.2d 68, 72 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989)(emphasis added). The Shipping Act and its antitrust exemption apply to agreements among vessel-operating common carriers in the U.S.-foreign trades, or with or among one or more marine terminal operators serving such carriers. See 46 U.S.C. § 40102(6), (14), § 40301(a), (b). The Shipping Act and its exemption do not apply to the U.S. domestic or offshore trades, sometimes known as the “coastwise” or “Jones Act” trades. Nor do they apply to noncommon carriers, such as many bulk or tanker operators, or to agreements between carriers and entities that are not marine terminal operators, such as shippers or non-vessel-operating carriers. Id. See generally ABA Transportation Antitrust Handbook, at 270–73 (2014). At issue in Vehicle Carrier Services were alleged price fixing and capacity reduction agreements between carriers that had not been filed with the FMC. Because this activity was not undertaken pursuant to an effective agreement, or with reason to believe it was under an effective agreement, it was not immune from criminal enforcement by the Justice Department or civil penalties imposed by the FMC. Both agencies, in fact, took enforcement September 10, 2015 Practice Groups: Antitrust, Competition & Trade Regulation Maritime Shipping Act Antiturst Exemption Held for the First Time to Preempt State Antitrust Laws 2 actions against the cartel. See, e.g, United States v. Compania Sud Americana de Vapores S.A., No. 1:14-cr-100 (D. Md.) However, conduct that is prohibited by the Shipping Act cannot be the subject of a private civil antitrust suit under any circumstances. 46 U.S.C. § 40307(d).

### 2AC---Deficit---Extraterritoriality

#### States get squashed by foreign laws

Dodge 19, is a leading expert on international law, international transactions, and international dispute resolution, currently a member of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on International Law and an Adviser to the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Conflict of Laws, J.D. at Yale. (William, 2020, “Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law,” University of California Davis Law Review, https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/53/3/53-3\_Dodge.pdf)

I. THE FEDERAL PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY For the past three decades, the federal presumption against extraterritoriality has been the principal tool that the U.S. Supreme Court has used to determine the geographic scope of federal statutes.18 The current version of the federal presumption is significantly more flexible than at least some versions that the Supreme Court used in the past.19 Courts may also rely on other principles of interpretation in determining the geographic scope of federal statutes, including a principle of reasonableness in interpretation, deference to administrative agencies, and the Charming Betsy canon of avoiding violations of international law.20 At the outer margins, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may also constrain the extraterritorial application of federal statutes.21 But in contrast to state law, there are no conflict-of-laws rules at the federal level that give priority to foreign law in cases of conflicting regulation.22 A. An Overview of the Federal Presumption In 1909, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”23 Consistent with this general rule, the Court articulated a presumption that “in case of doubt,” a federal statute should be construed “as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”24 The Supreme Court applied this presumption inconsistently between 1909 and 1949 and then abandoned it for four decades.25 In 1991, however, the Supreme Court resurrected a strong version of the federal presumption against extraterritoriality in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),26 suggesting that the presumption should be applied as a clear statement rule and (like the traditional presumption) should turn on the location of the regulated conduct.27

## AT: CP---WTO

### 2AC---Permutations

**“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty.**

Webster’s 9---Merriam Webster, 2009 (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1: to become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult, deliberate

**“Should” means desirable or recommended, not mandatory.**

**Words and Phrases 2** (“Words and Phrases: Permanent Edition” Vol. 39 Set to Signed. Pub. By Thomson West. P. 372-373)

Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory. ORS 654.005 et seq. – -Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556. – Labor & Emp. 2857

### 2AC---Theory---Textual + Functional

### 2AC---Deficits

### 2AC---Theory---International Fiat

## AT: CP---Regulation

### 2AC---Permutations

#### Permutations:

#### 1---do both---requires rates to be lowered.

#### 2---do the cp---regulations expands the scope of core antitrust laws by increasing prohibitions.

Bradford and Chilton 18 (Anu Bradford, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School. Adam S. Chilton, Assistant Professor of Law and Walter Mander Research Scholar @ the University of Chicago. “Competition Law Around the World from 1889 to 2010: The Competition Law Index” , Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship, <https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3519&context=faculty_scholarship> , 2018, date accessed 9/5/21)

The Scope Index is the closest to the CLI in that it also measures the law in the books, treating prohibitions as elements that increase the scope (or stringency) of the law and defenses as elements that reduce the scope (or stringency) of the law. Basic categories in the Scope Index and our CLI are also the same, even if somewhat differently labeled. For example, we refer to “anticompetitive agreements” where the Scope Index refers to “restrictive trade practices.”

### 2AC---Conditionality---Short

### 2AC---Deficit---Extraterritoriality

#### Regulation is strictly domestic, antitrust isn’t.

Hovenkamp 03, Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa. (Herbert, Fall 2003, “Antitrust as Extraterritorial Regulatory Policy”, 48 Antitrust BULL. 629, pg. 632-633, https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/antibull48&i=637)

This change from government agency control to antitrust control is beginning to have one consequence that was not foreseen. While regulatory regimes in the United States could be state, federal, or local, they were for the most part quite strictly territorial. For example, residents of Minneapolis might have their retail electricity regulated intraterritorially by the federal government, the State of Minnesota, or perhaps even the city. But it is unlikely that retail electricity in Minneapolis would be regulated by the State of Illinois or the government of Canada. The antitrust laws do not exercise the same territorial circumspection. Under traditional ideas about regulatory control it would be almost unthinkable that the United States would attempt to apply its law to a Mexican telephone company's rate structure or customer selection policies; under modern conceptions of antitrust law it is not. The global reach of antitrust extends very far. Actions that occur abroad can be condemned under the Sherman Act if they have an intended, substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce. 5 Appellate courts have even approved criminal indictments under United States antitrust law for activity that took place entirely abroad.6

#### Shipping is a global industry, antitrust is essential for coordination with foreign markets

Merk 18, leads the work on ports and shipping at the International Transport Forum (ITF) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Director of Maritime Transport and Ports Sector. Other contributors from the International Transport Forum. (Olaf, 2018, “The Impact of Alliances in Container Shipping,” International Transport Forum, https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/impact-alliances-container-shipping.pdf)

Co-existence of different regulatory regimes As noted above, there is a wide range of regulatory regimes for competition in international shipping. These approaches range from no shipping-specific exemptions on one end of the scale to specific exemptions for shipping conferences at the other. Despite this divergence in approaches, it is clear that repeal of the EU consortia block exemption would be in line with a growing trend in countries to limit special treatment of shipping. There is a risk that the current regulatory heterogeneity will leave the door open to collusion. Braakman (2017) has suggested that there might be “hub-and-spoke cartels” in the container shipping industry, defined as the exchange of strategically sensitive information between competitors through a third party that facilitates the cartelistic behaviour of the competitors involved. An example of such a hub could be Singapore, where carriers are allowed to cooperate on prices. The idea is that exchange of strategically sensitive information on the intra-Asia leg of a voyage could aim to align the market conduct of lines with regards to the contingents of cargo that remain on board and are destined for ports in Europe. Such a hub-and-spoke-cartel might be facilitated by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange that on a weekly basis publishes the freight rates and surcharges in which the rates and surcharges for the intra-Asia trade are incorporated and that could have the effect of policing the agreed rates and surcharges. Competition law in various countries has extra-territorial application, but one could wonder if this currently is enforced. Extra-territorial application means that anti-competitive conduct directed at foreign markets – e.g. markets outside the EU - may come within the jurisdiction of the European Commission, even when the conduct would be permitted under the foreign jurisdictions. What is relevant is the effect of that conduct on other undertakings inside the EU; not the location of that conduct (Braakman, 2014). The EU leaves it to firms to conduct a self-assessment of the extraterritorial application of its competition laws, but has not formulated specific guidelines for this self-assessment. Considering the global nature of the liner shipping sector and the heterogeneity of competition regimes for shipping, one wonders how shipping companies could carry out such a selfassessment. The sector would be provided with more legal certainty if such specific guidance were provided. The main relevant competition authorities have initiated coordination of their activities that might help to address these issues. Regulators from the EU, United States and China have met several times since 2013, spurred by their divergent approaches to the proposed P3 alliance, to discuss market developments and competition law. Such coordination has become increasingly important with consolidation and market concentration, and might benefit from the participation of regulators from other major maritime countries such as Singapore

### 2AC---Deficit---Deterrence

#### Deterrence deficit---regulations can’t deter anticompetitive conduct.

Dogan 08, \*Stacey L. Dogan, Professor of Law, Northeastern University; \*Mark Lemley, William H. Neukom Professor, Stanford Law School; of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP; (October 2008, “Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming”, https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1873&context=faculty\_scholarship)

Our goal in this paper is not to persuade the reader that these particular examples of regulatory gaming violate the antitrust laws (though we think they do) or that other examples, such as regulatory price squeezes, do not violate the antitrust laws. Rather, our point is that whether or not particular acts of regulatory gaming harm competition is and should be an antitrust question, not merely one that involves interpreting statutes or agency regulations. Regulatory agencies and even Congress cannot prevent gaming ex ante. Experience with the pharmaceutical industry suggests that if Congress acts to squelch one form of gaming, companies will find other ways to game the system. And even if Congress or the regulating body can surgically fix a particular type of exclusionary behavior, such an ex post response (unlike the threat of antitrust treble damages) does nothing to compensate for past harm or to deter future gaming behavior. Some level of antitrust enforcement – with appropriate deference to firm decisions about product design and affirmative regulatory decisions that affect market conditions – provides a necessary check on behavior, such as product hopping, that has no purpose but to exclude competition.

## AT: DA---Politics

### 2AC---Won’t Pass

#### Won’t pass---inflation concerns and CBO report

Antle 11-11-2021 (James, “Biden's big spending plans could sink if centrists jump ship,” *The Gazette*, https://gazette.com/news/bidens-big-spending-plans-could-sink-if-centrists-jump-ship/article\_c585a441-72ff-55b1-b3d7-e482c8c75631.html)

But if Sen. Joe Manchin of West Virginia and other centrists are looking for a reason to break with their party on the big spending bill, Wednesday's inflation numbers gave them yet another. "By all accounts, the threat posed by record inflation to the American people is not ‘transitory' and is instead getting worse," Manchin tweeted in response to the Labor Department's report. "From the grocery store to the gas pump, Americans know the inflation tax is real and DC can no longer ignore the economic pain Americans feel every day." The 6.2% spike in consumer prices for the year ending in October could enhance concerns that excessive federal spending is already overheating the economy before Democrats advance Biden's reconciliation measure. It is not, however, the only factor giving wary centrist lawmakers pause. Republicans swept the statewide offices in Virginia and made gains in the Legislature despite the fact Biden won the commonwealth by 10 points a year ago. The GOP also came close to upsetting Democratic New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy and ousted the state Senate president, a Democrat, with a lightly funded challenger. These election results appear to confirm a raft of polling showing the president and the administration are unpopular. A USA Today/Suffolk University poll found Biden with a 38% job approval rating. Vice President Kamala Harris was even worse off at 28%. And Republicans led in the generic congressional ballot. Next year's midterm elections were always likely to be a struggle for Democrats. The president's party has lost seats in all but two midterm elections since 1938. Republicans gained 52 House seats and their first majority in 40 years in 1994, former President Bill Clinton's first midterm election. They picked up 63 House seats and another majority during former President Barack Obama's in 2010. Democrats don't need losses on that scale for Republicans to regain the majority next year. They hold just 222 seats in the House and the Senate is split 50-50, with Democratic control hinging on Harris's tiebreaking vote. In each of the previous elections, centrists were among the hardest hit. The 2022 contests figure to be no different because these Democrats tend to be the ones representing the reddest states and most competitive districts. Demonstrations of independence from Biden, Schumer, and Pelosi could save some of these Democrats, though it is not always enough. There is little evidence that the nearly $2 trillion American Rescue Plan Biden already signed into law after it was passed exclusively with Democratic votes through the reconciliation process helped the party at the polls. Manchin is more popular in West Virginia than Biden is. The same is true for Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, the other centrist holdout in the upper chamber, in Arizona. They have little incentive to capitulate to Biden unless they want to help his presidency succeed. Liberals worried that once the bipartisan infrastructure bill was passed, this would prove true of the party's centrists as a whole. But in the House, the surviving Blue Dogs agreed to vote on the bigger spending bill pending a Congressional Budget Office score. The CBO analysis could easily provide centrists with yet another reason to balk at Build Back Better, given some indications that the price tag will be scored as bigger than advertised. The most liberal Democrats in the House have always feared that whatever the CBO found, centrists would move the goalposts and find another reason to vote no. The same accusation has been leveled against Manchin and Sinema in the Senate, though Biden has attempted to assure Democrats they will both be there with them in the end. If this proves true, the centrists may already have all the ammunition they need to sink the bill. Unlike with infrastructure, no Republican defections are expected. Democrats can afford to lose no more than three votes in the House and zero in the Senate.

### 2AC---Thumpers

#### Biden recently issued and XO targeting shipping alliances

Leonard 7-9, is a reporter at Supply Chain Dive. (Matt, 7-9-2021, “Biden takes aim at consolidation in ocean, rail with new executive order on increasing competition,” Supply Chain Drive, https://www.supplychaindive.com/news/biden-executive-order-ocean-rail-consolidation/603078/)

UPDATE: July 13, 2021: The FMC and DOJ Antitrust Division signed a Memorandum of Understanding Monday as the two agencies begin to work more closely on oversight and enforcement in the ocean freight market, according to an announcement from the FMC. "This memorandum between the Commission and the Department of Justice supplements and strengthens the FMC’s ability to detect, address, and pursue violations of the law or anticompetitive behavior by those we regulate," FMC Chairman Daniel B. Maffei said in a Monday statement. President Joe Biden will sign an executive order Friday that takes aim at corporate consolidation with the goal of increasing competition among businesses, according to a release from the White House. The wide-ranging order includes 72 initiatives and enlists more than a dozen agencies to fulfill its goals. It specifically calls on the Surface Transportation Board and Federal Maritime Commission to use their regulatory power to encourage changes within the heavily consolidated carrier market. When it comes to rail, the executive order points out railroads tend to own their tracks and prioritize their own freight. The order calls on the STB to require track owners to provide rights of way to passenger trains and strengthen requirements for fair treatment of freight companies. Separately, it orders the FMC to ensure that U.S. exporters aren't being charged "exorbitant" fees by carriers. Press Secretary Jen Psaki said Thursday it would have the FMC work alongside the Justice Department "to crack down on unjust and unreasonable fees" and anticompetitive behavior by carriers. The effort by the Biden administration to tamp down on the power of heavily consolidated transportation industries comes at a time when the international supply chain has been heavily strained by increased demand and myriad disruptions. In talking about the order, Psaki said that carriers have often used the power of their consolidation to force higher prices on shippers. "On domestic freight railroad, the executive order urges the Surface Transportation Board to ... allow shippers to more easily challenge inflated rates when there is no competition between routes," Psaki said. The order specifically calls out the practice of detention and demurrage. These fees charged by ocean carriers have levied controversy for years, leading to the FMC releasing guidance for the industry last year. But the supply chain has become increasingly congested over the last 16 months, leading to increased dwell time in ports, which exacerbates the issue of detention and demurrage fees for shippers, experts have said. And while increased dwell time means that the fees are becoming more common, a recent report from Container xChange found they're also getting more expensive. The FMC is already investigating reports that carriers aren't following the guidance issued last year. "In recent months, we have increased our scrutiny of the ocean carrier alliances to identify evidence of anticompetitive behavior regarding rates and capacity, and we will continue to do so as the COVID-19 and import surge crisis continues. We welcome the assistance and cooperation from other agencies, including the Department of Justice," FMC Chairman Daniel B. Maffei said in an emailed statement Friday. On detention and demurrage, Maffei said, "it remains a top priority of the agency to identify and take action against those who flout the Commission’s recent interpretive rule on reasonable regulations and practices." Gerald A. Morrissey, a partner at Holland & Knight, said the order likely won't provide any new powers to the FMC or STB, but have the agencies work with the regulatory frameworks they already operate under. Morrissey pointed out that the agencies are given their powers by Congress. He noted that the order outlines support for the STB and FMC "to do all that they can." "And I would expect that that means, you know, all that they can under existing authority," Morrissey said. Psaki pointed out that the ocean shipping industry has become increasingly consolidated within three major alliances. While not named in the order the alliances are 2M, THE Alliance, and Ocean Alliance. And none of the carriers that operate in them are U.S. companies. But Morrissey said the U.S. government is still able to regulate their business under the Shipping Act. This act requires carriers to act with reasonable practices and prevented them from boycotting, he said. "​So there are a number of protections," he said. "It does apply to them, despite that they may be located or headquartered in other countries." One aspect of the trade that the U.S. can't regulate is rates. The government once had this power, but deregulation of the industry changed that, Mo1Arrissey said.

#### Thumpers---agenda failure, slow growth, gas prices.

Collinson 10-29 (Stephen, CNN analyst, “Democrats fight one another in Washington as Americans struggle,” 10-29-2021, <https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/29/politics/congress-spending-bill-president-joe-biden-italy-g20-democrats/index.html>, DOA: 10-29-2021) //Snowball

(CNN) As Democrats battle one another in Washington, cost-of-living spikes and a slowing economy are putting growing pressures on Americans and worsening the political environment that will decide the party's fate in the midterm elections.

Another day of busted deadlines, political malpractice and drained presidential authority on Capitol Hill ended with Joe Biden's one-two-punch on infrastructure and social spending stalled yet again. Even after Biden said his presidency was on the line and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi warned lawmakers not to "embarrass" him as he left on a big foreign trip, progressives still refused to back a bipartisan infrastructure bill they are using as leverage to secure the best possible terms in a watered down but still huge social spending plan.

While the President whom Americans elected to fix their problems struggles to squeeze a massive agenda through minuscule governing majorities, the challenging situation out in the country -- which contributed to a drop in his approval ratings over the summer -- continues to deteriorate.

New official data released Thursday showed that the recovery has hit a major roadblock, with growth stuck at an annualized rate of only 2% in the third quarter. The pandemic surge fueled by the Delta variant, along with supply chain crunches, worker shortages, slow job growth and rising inflation hampered an economy that Biden had hoped would now be roaring in a post-Covid-19 boom.

Gasoline prices, one of the most visceral indicators of prosperity for Americans, hit an average of $3.40 a gallon, according to the American Automobile Association, and are much higher in some states. Not all of these problems are Biden's fault and some are brought on by unique factors germane to the pandemic and its impact on the global economy. But there are few signs the President has quick answers for these chronic economic problems as he struggles to enact a more fundamental overhaul of the economy to help working people.

At a CNN town hall last week, for instance, Biden admitted that high gas prices wouldn't start easing off until next year. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg recently told CNN the supply chain problems that could spoil Christmas shopping and are prodding prices higher will also linger into 2022.

This split screen moment threatens to give Republicans an opening -- and an opportunity to shape a political message that can get them off the defensive over ex-President Donald's Trump's bellyaching about the 2020 election.

"You'd think the President and congressional Democrats would avoid sabotaging America's economy further. But that's exactly what this proposal does," GOP Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas said Thursday, lashing out at a spending bill that he styles as a huge Democratic tax and spending spree.

### 2AC---AT: Link

#### 2---Plan is a win for Biden---restores PC

Overly 10-25, is a writer for Politico. (Steven, 10-25-2021, “Frustration builds over stalled China competition bill,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-trade/2021/10/25/frustration-builds-over-stalled-china-competition-bill-798425)

CHINA COMPETITION BILL STALLED IN CONGRESS: There’s no shortage of legislation struggling to eke its way through a narrowly divided Congress at the moment. But there’s growing frustration that Congress has yet to approve a bipartisan package that aims to make the U.S. economy more competitive against China and address crippling supply chain challenges, POLITICO’s Andrew Desiderio and Gavin Bade report. The U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (S. 1260 (117)) got the green light from the Senate back in June, but its companion legislation has been sitting idle in the House. It’s a sweeping measure that lawmakers contend will bolster domestic investment in manufacturing and technology, including the production of hard-to-obtain semiconductors. All about chips: The legislation contains $52 billion to fund the CHIPS for America Act, which would provide incentives to companies that make high-end microchips in the U.S. The global semiconductor shortage has snarled a wide range of industries, from automobiles to electronics, and exposed U.S. dependence on foreign producers in Taiwan and South Korea. Some lawmakers have suggested that the semiconductor funding could be cleaved off and passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. But doing so would be risky: As one of the broader package’s bipartisan provisions, it serves as a carrot to move the full bill along. “There’s some urgency to that part,” Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) said of the semiconductor funding. “I don’t object to [CHIPS] moving on a faster track, so long as it doesn’t jeopardize the chances of the overall package.” Bridging the bills: House trade policy leaders are still hopeful they can pass their legislation before the end of the year. But they have yet to decide how to deal with a host of broadly supported Senate provisions that aren’t yet in their version of the bill. Those include the reauthorization of three expired tariff exemption programs put in the Senate bill to prevent a GOP filibuster, as well as corporate-friendly changes to how Customs and Border Protection enforces trade blockades. Domestic politics: Democrats say the legislation would attract bipartisan support and give the party a much-needed political win, especially as consumers grow increasingly concerned about rising prices and supply chain challenges.

#### 3---Not controversial

Tirschwell 21, is vice president within the Maritime & Trade division of IHS Markit, publisher of The Journal of Commerce. (Peter, July 18, 21, Draft of bill reveals scope of US shipping act overhaul effort <https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/shipping-act-draft-bill-promises-regulatory-overhaul_20210718.html?page=1>)

Others will point out the bill’s implicit prioritizing of exports over imports. Ocean carriers’ refusal to carry certain export cargoes over the past year can be seen both as an effort to free up capacity for import cargoes moving at several times the freight rate of export cargos, helping carriers **achieve** record profits, but also an effort to ensure capacity for consumer products, including many necessarily consumer staples, that dominate import volumes. But none of that is slowing down the momentum for legislation on Capitol Hill, which was hardly hurt by the Biden administration including shipping in its July 9 executive order on competition, pointing out ocean carrier consolidation and their foreign ownership and urging the FMC to enforce existing prohibitions of unjust and unreasonable practices in detention and demurrage. Nor does the reform effort face the gauntlet of powerful US-flag carriers that earlier shipping act revisions had to accommodate, leading to consensus on issues like confidential contracting; today’s container shipping industry is dominated by carriers based in Europe and Asia, including China, who in the current environment find themselves with few allies in Washington. If the reform movement results in legislation being passed and signed that will happen despite the adamant opposition of the carriers.

### 2AC---AT: Warming

#### Conceded that infrastructure solves warming, they have read cards that cap solves warming for us.

#### But, the bill isn’t enough!

Sirota and Perez 10-29-21, editor-at-large at Jacobin. He edits the Daily Poster newsletter and previously served as a senior adviser and speechwriter on Bernie Sanders’s 2020 presidential campaign. (David, Andrew, “The Reconciliation Bill’s Gutting Is What Happens When Your Party Is Addicted to Corporate Money,” <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/build-back-better-corporate-democrats-biden>)

Democratic Party leaders on Thursday united around a plan to halve their economic agenda, which had already been nearly halved a few months ago. The full loaf is really a quarter loaf, but at this point, it’s actually less than that, because they also slashed promised regulatory and tax provisions that might have reduced medicine prices, provided workers some paid leave, and made billionaires start paying taxes. In the coming days, we will learn more of the granular details in the 1,600-plus-page bill — but the overall agreement amid a flood of industry campaign cash is an illuminating moment: it reveals the outer limits of possibility for corporate politics, and the human costs of those politics. In general, the reason the Democratic Party always sounds so helplessly incoherent is because its lawmakers are trying to simultaneously appease their corporate donors and look like they are fulfilling their public promises to fix problems created by those corporate donors. In most cases, this is impossible. You cannot protect pharmaceutical and fossil fuel industry donors and also reduce the price of medicine and solve the climate crisis. If you try to pretend you can do both, the donors always eventually win out. So you end up talking in circles, complaining accurately about the problems while doing nothing to solve them, and then portraying marginal victories as huge wins to voters who must wonder why their lives aren’t improving. The so-called Build Back Better legislation embodies this conundrum. There are laudable provisions in the framework released by the White House, such as an expansion of Medicaid, universal pre-K, subsidized child care, the extension of the child tax credit, tougher penalties for employers who violate labor laws, and spending on clean energy programs. These are significant steps beyond the incrementalism and corporatism of the Obama presidency. However, the deal also seems designed to honor the one campaign promise that President Joe Biden appears most intent on fulfilling: the pledge to his donors that “nothing would fundamentally change” in our economy when he is president. Ultimately, Democrats’ reconciliation bill was stripped of most provisions to alter the structure of the economy to try to make it more fair and less ecocidal. While there are certainly a few decent tax measures in the legislation, business donors and their lobbyists convinced Democrats to remove more far-reaching proposals to force the rich and corporate America to significantly sacrifice or pitch in more. Gone from the current bill is paid family leave, free community college, and a plan to allow Medicare to negotiate lower prices for prescription drugs — the latter of which polls showed was the single most popular proposal in the entire bill. They also limited a robust expansion of Medicare benefits, while funneling more money into subsidies that prop up the corporate health insurance industry (and, obviously, there’s no longer even scant mention of Biden’s promised public health insurance option or lowering the Medicare age). Oh, and they excised the truly vital climate measures at the very moment that scientists are warning of an impending ecological disaster — and even after Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer said passing a full climate agenda was absolutely necessary for the survival of future generations.

## AT: K---Capitalism

### 2AC---Framework

### 2AC---Theory---Perfcon

### 2AC---Permutations

### 2AC---AT: Sustainability [Short]

#### Innovation dematerializes growth---capitalism is sustainable

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

There is no shortage of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are: We do want more all the time, but not more resources. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources does not. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops. Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is technological change. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total demand for coal in the United States went down even though its price decreased. With the help of innovation and new technologies, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become decoupled from resource consumption. This is a recent development and a profound one. Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather not spend. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and boring: resources cost money. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the incentive is for a company in a contested market to reduce its spending on resources (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned. Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into competition and cost cutting and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that competition spurs dematerialization. There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use less of a given material. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply. Second, it often becomes possible to substitute one resource for another. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel. Third, companies can use fewer molecules overall by making better use of the materials they already own. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018. Finally, some materials get replaced by nothing at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film. If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with photons from the sun (solar power) and the movement of air (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s champions, since they use up essentially no resources once they’re up and running. I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle. Innovation is hard to foresee. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia. Innovation is not steady and predictable like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and random. It’s also combinatorial, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements. The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation. Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as building blocks that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have confidence that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of interactions among complex and interlocking social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us. As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization accelerates. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to computing is allowing us to overcome the limitations of our mental power and is transformative in a different way: it’s allowing us to reverse the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking more and more from the earth every year.

### 2AC---AT: Link

#### Antitrust is key to sustainability.

Rebecca M. Henderson 20, Harvard’s John and Natty McArthur University Professor, based at Harvard Business School, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, “Reimagining Capitalism in the Shadow of the Pandemic,” Harvard Business Review, 7/28/2020, https://hbr.org/2020/07/reimagining-capitalism-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic, kyujin

The Pandemic’s Challenges — and Opportunities Capitalism is one of the great inventions of the human race — an unparalleled source of prosperity, opportunity and innovation. We won’t solve the problems that we face without it. To solve inequality, we need good jobs — and lots of them. To solve climate change, we need (among other things) to transform the world’s energy, transportation, and agricultural systems. Only the relentless pressure of the free market can drive this kind of transformative innovation at scale. In this context, the pandemic is both a massive challenge and an opportunity. A challenge because more than a half a million people have died, the global economy has been massively disrupted, and tens of millions of people have lost their jobs. A challenge because the combination of deep economic disadvantage — at the beginning of May nearly 61% percent of Hispanic and 44% of Black households had experienced a job or wage loss due to the corona virus, for example, compared with 38% percent of whites — and the killings of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breona Taylor and countless others have brought anger and calls for justice to our streets. The world will almost certainly be poorer, more divided, and more fearful in 2021 than it was in 2019. It’s an opportunity because it has also shown us so vividly what is wrong. Inequality is no longer simply an abstract idea. It’s a reality that many “essential” workers must show up even when they’re sick because they have no savings and no paid leave. That racism is not something that was solved by the civil rights movement. As the skies clear and early research suggests that the reduction in fossil fuel pollution is saving lives, the costs of continuing to rely on dirty energy have become much more tangible. Watching states bid against each other for vital medical equipment while the federal government fumbles its response to the virus has made the reality of our broken politics very clear. The pandemic has reminded us that we stand and fall as a society and that the welfare of the poorest among us is integral to everyone’s welfare. It has shown us that planning for the future is essential and that, when the chips are down, a capable, responsive government is a necessity, not a dirty word. We’ve learned that when we must do something, we can: Fundamental change no longer seems impossibly out of the reach. We can do better. We already have the resources and the knowledge we need to build a more equitable, sustainable capitalism. But to get there, business will have to change how it understands its role in the world (and in the U.S. in particular) — and how it thinks about government. A New Path Forward While free markets are an unparalleled source of prosperity and freedom, the free market can only take us where we need to go if externalities such as carbon pollution are properly priced, if there is genuine freedom of opportunity, and if the rules of the game are such that competition is free and fair. Markets do not police themselves; they must be balanced by transparent, capable, democratically accountable governments. Today — in large part due to the rise of shareholder primacy, the increasing role of money in politics, and the systematic attack on government as a necessary or effective institution — that balance is largely absent. As a result, one of the fastest routes to profitability is often to persuade politicians to write the rules in your favor. Firms feel free to dump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, for example, while spending hundreds of millions of dollars to lobby against carbon regulation. We’re even seeing this dynamic in the U.S. government’s response to the pandemic: It’s increasingly clear that an uncomfortably large share of the benefits from the recent stimulus has gone to very large firms and to very wealthy individuals. I’m not suggesting that firms neglect their duty to their shareholders. Focusing on profitability is essential if a company is to thrive in today’s brutally competitive market. But profit maximization has always been a means to an end, justified by the idea that when markets are genuinely free and fair, there’s good reason to believe they lead to both prosperity and freedom. But when markets are no longer held in check by governments that can police the rules of the game, appropriately control externalities, or provide the public goods necessary to support real opportunity, they become too powerful for their own good. The chaotic and uneven pandemic response we are experiencing today flows directly from 30 years of treating government as something that should be “drowned in the bathtub.” Now more than ever, I believe firms have not just a moral duty to contribute to the health of the institutions that keep our society strong and our capitalism genuinely free and genuinely fair, but also an economic interest in doing so. We need to rebuild our democracy, strengthen our public conversation so that it’s firmly based on facts and mutual respect, commit with everything we have to building an inclusive society for everyone, and yes, find ways to rediscover the importance of democratically accountable, capable, responsive government. Why? We cannot decarbonize the world’s energy supply without government regulating fossil fuel emissions and providing positive incentives to embrace low carbon solutions. Yes, individual firms can provide better jobs — paying employees a decent wage and providing ongoing training, among other necessary steps — but we’ll only successfully address inequality and racism at scale through structural reform, if we can do things like: provide quality education and health care to everyone, no matter their parents’ income; raise the minimum wage; and find ways to give employees more power as they negotiate with increasingly powerful firms. Most fundamentally, we’ll only rebuild trust in the political system, and with it a government that is genuinely responsive to ordinary people, if we can get money out of politics and stop tolerating business’s attacks on government. These attacks are often framed in terms of defending the free market, but too often are simply attempts to block the action we need to build a more equitable society. Collective action — a sustained effort by coalitions of firms — could make a huge difference in helping to drive this kind of institutional change. Firms are already working together to solve some of the world’s toughest problems. A third of the world’s invested capital is already committed to insisting that the firms in their portfolios plan for the challenge of climate change. Businesses across the world are increasingly coming to realize that democratically accountable, freely elected, capable governments are critical to long term economic health — and are willing to say so in public. But they need to do more. A “Kodak Moment” for the World I can feel your skepticism as I write. Can business really change — and help government change along with it? Can it embrace a version of capitalism that focuses on the longer term and the common good? Can it help to rebuild the power of the very institutions that are needed to keep it in check? I believe it can. We already know that it is possible to make money by addressing the world’s social and environmental problems. Walmart saved a billion dollars in fuel costs by increasing the efficiency of their trucking fleet. Elon Musk has revolutionized the automotive business and built a company worth more than GM and Ford combined in the process. The most successful $200M+ IPO of the last 20 years was a company that promised to replace beef with a burger made largely from soy. At Unilever, so called “purpose-driven” brands are growing 69% faster than the rest of the portfolio as consumers increasingly vote with their wallets. Change on a broader scale will be much harder. But not impossible. Think of this as a “Kodak moment” for the world. I spent the first 20 years of my career at MIT as a professor of innovation and strategy. For much of it I was quite literally the Eastman Kodak professor of management. My title was a coincidence — but a deeply ironic one, since I spent most of my time trying to understand why large, successful firms like Kodak had so much trouble responding effectively when the world around them changed. By now the company’s story is well-known: Kodak was once one of the world’s most successful firms. The firm invented classic film-based commercial photography and used it to build one of the world’s most iconic brands. As one senior vice president and director of Kodak research noted in a 1985 Wall Street Journal article, “We’re moving into an information-based company…[but] it’s very hard to find anything [with profit margins] like color photography that is legal.” But Kodak went bankrupt in 2012, having failed to master the transition to digital photography. The business community now faces a similar transition. As the Business Roundtable’s historic decision last year to “lead their companies for the benefits of all stakeholders” suggested, the vast majority of the world’s leading firms know that we must tackle the challenge of climate change, that we must find a way to ensure that everyone has a chance to share in the world’s wealth, and that it’s vital that we not let democracy lose out to either oligarchy or tyranny. We know that we need to change. But too often it’s tempting to emulate Kodak, claiming that change will come — but not now. Insisting that it’s more profitable to stick with the old ways, that if it’s really important we’ll get around to doing something new — later. Change is hard. It’s not surprising that we’re struggling to adopt new ways of thinking about the world and business’s role in it. But I am hopeful. Not optimistic, in the sense that I’m sure everything will work out just fine — I’m not sure of that at all. But hopeful. As a species, we have a gift for problem solving. Kodak failed to manage the digital transition, but Nikon, Canon and Fujifilm continue to be billion-dollar companies. Thousands of firms and millions of people are even now exploring ways to solve our common problems — for example, firms are partnering with each other and with governments to search for vaccines and to bring people back to work safely. This kind of cooperation must continue beyond the pandemic. As recent data shows, trust in business has fallen during the pandemic, but trust in government has risen dramatically. There is no better time for business to see government as a partner, not an adversary, in helping to make society work everyone — not just the lucky few. We can learn from the horrors of the pandemic. We must. We don’t need to go back to “normal” — we need to reimagine capitalism instead. We need to find a way to balance the energy of the free market with the power of competent, responsive government. Together, they can help us build a more just and sustainable world.

### 2AC---AT: Alternative

#### The alt’s anarchy Fails; our ev cites case studies

<<case studies: Occupy, English Housing Cooperatives, Social Centres, and international law>>

Tamblyn 19, Associate Professor of the Common Law (Nathan Tamblyn, 4-30-2019, "The Common Ground of Law and Anarchism," Liverpool Law Review, pp. 65-78, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10991-019-09223-1)

Anarchist Case Studies

1. In 2011 there was a worldwide protest movement called Occupy, for example with makeshift camps at Wall Street in New York and outside St Paul’s Cathedral in London. There were perhaps hundreds of people who camped, and thousands more who participated in the demonstrations. All this occurred during the aftermath of a global financial crisis largely caused by reckless banking practices which saw the imposition of austerity measures by governments even while the banks were bailed out with public money. The movement had a number of major themes, including protest against stark wealth inequality, undemocratic institutions which represent the interests of the privileged few, and environmental degradation.Footnote21

The Occupy camps tended to be run on anarchist principles.Footnote22 Decisions were made, and censured meted out, only at the General Assembly. This moved to a system of super-majority voting, seemingly in order to be able to reach any decision at all, the unanimity of consensus proving unachievable. Censure could include denial of access to camp facilities. People who were disruptive or difficult might be shunned or systematically ignored—or more ominously:Footnote23

[T]here has to be some way to get rid of them – though usually this has to happen outside the meeting.

There are a number of criticisms we can make here.

First, if decisions are to be taken by the General Assembly, then removing members by a procedure outside that structure, for lawyers, immediately sets alarm bells ringing, not least for a lack of due process.Footnote24 Further, although the point is left unsaid, it is difficult to see how this expulsion is achieved if not by force. As Newman says, anarchists cannot rest assured that having removed law they have not created a different form of domination.Footnote25

Second, we might object that the General Assembly was itself a dominating power. After all, it was seemingly the General Assembly which gave itself the power to act as sovereign. There may well be people who refused to grant it that power, or to legitimise it by participating in its original self-constitution. As Wilson says, anarchism must resist becoming what is has so relentlessly critiqued, recreating its own forms of absolutist or dogmatic politics.Footnote26

Even those who did participate in the General Assembly are still entitled to call foul. Now, in response to that assertion, Chartier seems to suggest that an anarchist who participates in a process of rule-making or dispute resolution cannot later withdraw their consent if the end result is adverse to them. He says that the regime can enforce its decision against such a person ‘without aggression’.Footnote27 This is unpersuasive. For a start, a rule or process might turn out to be misapplied or misinterpreted, and there is no reason to assume that an initially willing participant consented to that. Further, the person might simply change their mind about the merits of the rule or the process. In that regard, consent is an on-going state of affairs, and when it ends, it ends. Just because someone consented at the beginning, it does not follow that they cannot withdraw that consent, or that they are bound to all things subsequently. (This is, for example, a very important point when it comes to sexual offences.)

Third, when moving to super-majority voting, what is supposed to happen to the minority? A frequent response is that a disappointed minority might secede to form their own community. However, that choice only works if the minority have somewhere else to go. What is more, there is no necessary reason why the minority should leave, rather than the majority; it takes matters no further forward simply to say that there are more of the majority without an explanation for why numbers should matter. Also, if the minority refuse to leave, once again we are confronted with the question of whether they can be forced to leave, or if they stay, whether they can be forced to conform their behaviour. In other words, super-majority voting does not eliminate the spectre of force being used against the unwilling.

Further, Halling suggests that if a community secedes from an anarchist federation, it would still have to share its natural resources.Footnote28 After all, the anarchist abhors private property, summed up in the aphorism ‘Property is theft!’Footnote29 This is because ownership is seen as another hierarchical relationship. However, if the seceding community refuses to share, we are back once more to the question of whether it can be forced. Further, to the extent that the seceding community must share its resources, presumably it is also entitled to share in the natural resources of the original community, at which point it looks less and less like a secession after all. The difficulties of sharing can be thrown into sharper relief with the following thought experiment. Along comes an invading force. What is the anarchist society to do? If they truly believe in consensus, then the anarchist could not fight the invaders without the consent of the invaders. Nor could the anarchist simply say that they are defending their freedom. Yes, the anarchist might value their freedom, but the invader might not, and if the anarchist simply says that freedom does matter after all, and that they are right, and uses force to uphold that claim, that is the same pattern of behaviour for which the anarchist criticises the law. Similarly, without risking moral hypocrisy, the anarchist community cannot say that consensus is morally essential, but only to their society, which otherwise may freely dominate others.

1. Our second case study is taken from research on English housing cooperatives. Typically, a housing cooperative might be where residents in houses are members of an organisation which collectively owns or manages the houses. Residents might pay rent to the organisation to fund the provision or up-keep of the houses. Through its members, the organisation will formulate its own rules, and in this way residents retain a democratic control over the organisation and thus the terms on which housing is provided.Footnote30 Great store is put on individual equality, but not all cooperatives need be overtly anarchist. Nevertheless, they face similar challenges when it comes to resolving disputes.

Henry recounts an example from one cooperative where those who did not pay their rent were subjected to unannounced visits by a group of people, the purpose being to collect the rent through the technique of ‘invading members’ privacy and subjecting them to intimidation’.Footnote31 Again, this sounds like coercion. After all, censure which does not coerce will not assist in upholding a rule which a party has not previously been persuaded to abide by. Indeed, there was also talk of seemingly forcible expulsions from the cooperative. Even then, Henry notes, that system was ‘sufficiently stressful and insufficiently rewarding’ that the cooperative switched to the use of state law as the ultimate sanction, because it was predictable, effective, rational and objective, and so not derailed by emotions and personal relations.

1. Finchett-Maddock provides another case study on a collective in a social centre. Social centres are communally run buildings which might be occupied as a squat or rented or owned. They tend to be run on a voluntary and democratic basis, founded upon anarchist principles, and they provide a range of services or facilities, such as a library, or in this case, bicycle repair by a group of people:Footnote32

There was one scenario where an individual had stolen £1700 from the bike repair shop money, claiming that it was rightfully [theirs] ~~his~~ as ~~he~~ had given his time without having been paid (although the whole ethos there is around voluntarism and mutual aid). They were in a quandary as whether to punish him through their own collective parameters, or have the state law involved – which would mean the taking of a crime reference number in order to get the money back somehow. Thus, there was the moral and the legal dilemma of (a) trying to right the situation within their means; and (b) needing the money to be reported in some way as they obviously needed it. The reason of course is that an anarchist view sees no role for prisons or the police and therefore they were arbitrary and yet necessary. The eye for an eye feeling that he encountered he portrayed as more masculine revenge, and the collective are pretty balanced, and therefore all that was done was that they named and shamed him in an article on Indymedia. There are a number of interesting points we might note about this incident. First is the notion that the accused had ‘stolen’ money. This implies property, and the claim that the money was proper to the collective, rather than the accused. Again this sits awkwardly with the anarchist creed that property is theft. Second, the collective ‘named and shamed’ the accused. Admittedly it is a non-violent response. However, there is no suggestion that the accused consented to this. No justification is offered as to why the collective were entitled unilaterally to impose their preferred outcome and tarnish his reputation, nor was there any due process to test whether the collective’s assessment of the situation was correct. Third, the collective never recovered the money. The victims went without. The only sure way of recovery was acknowledged to be recourse to the police. Perhaps this is less of a problem for £1700. However, in other circumstances, the amount stolen might be greater, or the problem might not be theft but physical or sexual violence—as occurred in some Occupy camps.Footnote33 Naming and shaming will not likely prevent repeat incidents of violence. It may be true to principle for a non-violent consensus-seeking anarchist that they suffer whatever gets done to them if they cannot convince the other party to agree to their point of view. However, a persistent submission would seem to risk denying a person’s dignity, even agency. Indeed, if the correct response to any conflict is to yield, the result is the anarchist living under the rule of another’s domination after all. Instead of recourse to state law, Rothbard proposes an anarchic vision of society without a centralised system of justice. Instead, he suggests a system of private courts and enforcement agencies, which succeed or not according to market forces.Footnote34 However, this is no less repressive than state law when the person on the receiving end does not recognise the authority or rules of those private companies.

1. A final case study might be international law, that is, those rules which govern the relationship between nation states. Some authors point to this as an actual example of an anarchist legal system, on the basis that there is no world government to enforce international law against errant states.Footnote35 In other words, these are rules which have not been imposed upon states, but have been agreed or recognised by them in their horizontal dealings with each other. The claim is that most states obey most agreed rules of international law most of the time.Footnote36 This may well be true—and it might similarly be said that most anarchists behave well in their communities, and most citizens in a society governed by the rule of law are happy with that state of affairs. However, that is the easy part; if there are only a few disagreements, the difficult question is how to resolve them. What is noticeable about international relations is how often states revert to force or the threat of force after all, whether through economic sanctions designed to coerce (for example, against Iran or Russia or North Korea),Footnote37 or outright military intervention (for example, in Afghanistan or Iraq or Libya or Syria or Crimea).

To summarise, what these case studies reveal is that the peaceful anarchist has not yet identified a system for resolving disputes successfully, nor a system which eliminates altogether the occurrence of one side unilaterally imposing its solution supported by some form of intimidation or threat of force. Perhaps the use of force is relegated to a matter of last resort, but the same could be said of the law as well. To the extent that both anarchy and the law have resort to force, anarchy cannot claim to be superior to the law in that regard. So let us take a different tack and say something now in defence of law, because anarchists might be surprised to find familiar values being instantiated here.

#### Elites crush the alternative

Peck and Theodore, 19 - Jamie Peck is Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography at the University of British Columbia, Canada. He is the Managing Editor of Environment and Planning A and the convenor of the Summer Institute in Economic Geography. Nik Theodore is a Professor, Urban Planning and Policy, Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs and Research, CUPPA. “Still Neoliberalism?” The South Atlantic Quarterly, 118, April 2019

Neoliberal, Neoliberalism, Neoliberalization: What’s in a Name? That neoliberalism remains a circulating if contestable term, after decades of fitful and fickle usage, might be considered an achievement of sorts. Repeatedly disowned, denigrated, and dismissed, it nevertheless refuses to go away— at least circumstantial evidence, perhaps, that there is indeed “some there there.” This is not the place to revisit the extended genealogy of this troubled signifier and its contested historical geography (see Peck 2010; Cahill et al. 2018), except to observe that its turbulent fortunes, perhaps especially in the period since the Wall Street crash of 2008, have been revealing, while at the same time adding new layers of mystification and puzzlement to what has been a never-less-than-checkered history. What was to be a particularly heavyhanded reboot of this history began in the thick of that last crisis, a little over a decade ago. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Wall Street crash was at the time widely interpreted as both a comprehensive repudiation and a system failure of neoliberalism by key figures on the left, from Eric Hobsbawm to Naomi Klein, who read the moment as terminal for the rolling project of financial deregulation and for the small-state consensus more generally, a view that was echoed by center-left economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and, although not in so many words, by the likes of Paul Krugman. Rather more surprisingly, there were also some mainstream politicians on the right and left flanks of the center ground, from France’s Nicolas Sarkozy to Australia’s Kevin Rudd, who in this uniquely disorientating context were moved to utter the hitherto unspeakable term, albeit only to declare its graceless exit (see Erlanger 2008; Rudd 2009). A common refrain across much of the commentary at the time, when real economies around the world and the credibility of those charged with their stewardship were both in freefall, was that the much-maligned state would be (had to be) making a comeback—in its own way echoing the arch-neoliberal conceits of governmental withdrawal and free-market governance, as if the state had ever really gone away. Projects of neoliberalization, it has been fairly clear all along to those willing to see, have never been synonymous with a simple diminution, or withdrawal, of the state, but instead have been variously concerned with its capture and reuse, albeit in the context of a generalized assault on social-welfarist or leftarm functions, coupled with an expansion of right-arm roles and capacities in areas like policing and surveillance, incarceration and social control, and the military. Nevertheless, this kind of state project was widely believed to have met its end a decade ago in the Wall Street meltdown. What followed certainly did not align with the script of a terminal, once-and-for-all collapse of neoliberalism represented (again, somewhat misleadingly) as a bracketable “era” of free-market governance. As if to affirm Thatcher’s premature dismissal that there was “no alternative” to market rule, what followed in the wake of the financial crisis was, far from a retreat of neoliberalism, more like an audacious exercise in doubling down. Longterm austerity measures were (re)imposed in nations rich and poor, including those countries once regarded as the tutelary “heartlands” of the project, and its proving grounds, the United States and the United Kingdom. A new generation of structural adjustment programs targeted not only populations across the global South but also Greece, Detroit, and elsewhere. There were sustained, if scattergun, assaults on many of the old targets—public services, public budgets, and public servants; social movements and labor unions; social security, socialized healthcare, and public-education systems; and undeserving classes, the poor, and racialized others. And all the while, financial and corporate elites got away with slaps on the wrist, if that, only to be compensated in due course with yet more deregulation and further rounds of tax cuts. This unapologetic mutation of late neoliberalism, back as it were from its own grave, may have been shorn of anything approaching credible claims to moral leadership and intellectual authority, but in this reconstituted form it would present a yet more brutal face in its dogged defenses of political power and institutional dominance, soon to be coupled with brazen reassertions of the manifestly dubious case for corporate liberty, financial freedom, and social-state retrenchment.

#### Both advantages impact turn the alt---they’re robust defenses of innovation, which the alt can’t solve

Kornai 13, \*János Kornai is a Hungarian economist and the Allie S. Freed Professor of Economics Emeritus at Harvard and Professor Emeritus at Corvinus University of Budapest; (János, November 6th, 2013, “Dynamism, Rivalry, and the Surplus Economy”, DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199334766.001.0001, Google Books)

C. There is no competition between producers and sellers. Production is strongly concentrated. Many companies enjoy monopolist positions, or at least a (regional) monopoly in producing an entire group of products. The chronic shortage of products creates monopolistic behavior even when many producers operate in parallel. The shortage economy, one of the strongest system-specific properties of socialism, ~~paralyzes~~ impedes the forceful engine of innovation, the incentive to fight for the favors of the customer ( Kornai 1971 ; 1980; 1992, chapters 11 – 12 ). The producer/seller is not compelled to attract the buyer by offering him a new and better product, since the latter is happy to get anything in the shop, even an obsolete and poor-quality product. There are examples of inventive activities motivated by chronic shortages: ingeniously created substitutes for missing materials or machinery parts (Laki 1984 –1985). These results of the inventors’ creative mind, however, do not become widespread, commercially successful innovations in the Schumpeterian sense. 25 Table 2.1 features only one revolutionary innovation that did not appear first in a capitalist country but, rather, in the Soviet Union: synthetic rubber. Its inventor had been doing research on the subject for decades; the employment of it in industry was rendered necessary by the shortage of natural rubber. D. The tight limits of experimenting. Capitalism allows for hundreds or thousands of barren or barely fruitful attempts, so that, afterward, one out of the hundreds or thousands would succeed and bring immense success. In the socialist planned economy, actors are inclined to avoid risks. As a result, the application of revolutionarily significant innovations are more or less excluded, since those always mean a leap into the dark, as success is necessarily unpredictable. As far as followers are concerned, some economies follow up quickly, others slowly. The socialist economies belong to the group characterized by the slowest pace. They prefer to maintain the already known, old production procedures, and produce the old well-tried products; new technologies and new products have too many uncertain characteristics making the planning of the directives difficult. E. There is no capital waiting to be utilized; investment allocation is rigid. Central planning is not miserly with the resources devoted to capital formation. The share of investment carved out from the total output is typically higher than in the capitalist economies. However, this enormous volume is appropriated ahead of time to the last penny. Moreover, most of the time over-allocation takes place; in other words, the ensemble of all project plans prescribes the requisition of more resources than the required amount to execute the plan. It never happens that unallocated capital is waiting for someone with a good idea. The allocators do not search for an entrepreneur waiting to step forward with a proposal for innovation. Flexible capital markets are unknown. Instead, the rigid and bureaucratic regulation of project activities takes place, and to devote capital resources to activities with possibly uncertain outcomes is unconceivable. No foolish minister of industry or factory manager could be found who would demand money for ventures admitting in advance that the money may be wasted and the innovation may not succeed. 26

### 2AC---Socialism Bad---Environment

#### Socialism is magnitudes times worse for the environment.

Regan 19, vice president of research at the[PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH CENTER](https://www.perc.org/) (PERC) in Bozeman, Mont, (Shawn, May 16th, 2019, “Socialism Is Bad for the Environment”, https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/03/socialism-is-bad-for-the-environment/)

One explanation for the disparity is that central planners, unlike markets, grossly misallocate resources, as a matter of routine. Energy prices, for example, were highly subsidized in the socialist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As a result, industrial production was far more energy-intensive throughout the socialist world than in Western European economies — five to ten times higher, according to one estimate — leading to more pollution. A 1992 World Bank study found that more than half of the air pollution in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe could be attributed to subsidized energy pricing during this period. A related problem was the fixation of socialist planners on heavy industry at the expense of the environment. “The singular dominant fact of the Soviet economic strategy,” Jeffrey Sachs has noted, “was the subordination of all human and economic goals to the development of heavy industry.” Industrial pollution from factories in Eastern Europe was so bad that Time described it as the region “where the sky stays dark.” Acid rain in Krakow severely damaged the city’s historic structures and buildings, some of which required renovations, and even corroded the faces of many centuries-old statues. Of course, industry behind the Iron Curtain was anything but efficient, and central planning caused excessive use of natural resources. A 1991 study by Mikhail Bernstam found that market economies used about one-third as much energy and steel per unit of GDP as did socialist countries. Likewise, Polish economist Tomasz Zylicz found that the non-market economies of Central and Eastern Europe required two to three times more inputs to produce a given output than did Western European economies. (The former Soviet world, as well as China, also emitted several times more carbon per unit of GDP than the United States did — a trend that continues today.) Simply put, market economies make more with less and are therefore better for the environment. Socialist planners, on the other hand, lack the knowledge necessary to rationally coordinate economic activity. Moreover, bureaucratic constraints make accurate price-setting impossible. In their 1989 book The Turning Point, Soviet economists Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov offered an illustrative example. To bolster the production of gloves, the Soviet government more than doubled the price it paid for moleskin. Warehouses soon filled with mole pelts, but glovemakers were unable to use them all, so many rotted. As the economists explained: The Ministry of Light Industry has already requested Goskomtsen [the State Committee on Prices] twice to lower the purchasing prices, but “the question has not been decided” yet. And this is not surprising. Its members are too busy to decide. They have no time: besides setting prices on these pelts, they have to keep track of another 24 million prices. And how can they possibly know how much to lower the price today, so they won’t have to raise it tomorrow? Therein lies a crucial flaw in socialist economic logic, and one that has real environmental consequences: Whereas a capitalist firm has ample incentive to act on such information to economize on the use of natural resources, socialist planners have no such motivation — Soviet bureaucracies, Shmelev and Popov noted, were “able only to correct the most obvious price disproportions several years after” they appeared — nor do they have the knowledge needed to accurately set millions of prices at once. And if there are no market prices to convey accurate information about the value of scarce natural resources, there is little chance of conserving them. Finally, there is the issue of property rights. In a socialist society without them, it is impossible to hold individuals or governments accountable for environmental damages: Planners can increase industrial output without compensating those who bear its costs in the form of pollution. In a capitalist society, property rights offer protection against environmental harms and give resource owners incentives to conserve.

#### A plethora of indicators demonstrate that catastrophic climate change can be averted. The momentum exists, but capitalizing on it is key.

Wallace-Wells 21, \*David Wallace-Wells is deputy editor of New York magazine, where he also writes frequently about climate change and the near future of science and technology; (January 18th, 2021, “After Alarmism”, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/climate-change-after-pandemic.html)

The change is much bigger than the turnover of American leadership. By the time the Biden presidency finds its footing in a vaccinated world, the bounds of climate possibility will have been remade. Just a half-decade ago, it was widely believed that a “business as usual” emissions path would bring the planet four or five degrees of warming — enough to make large parts of Earth effectively uninhabitable. Now, thanks to the rapid death of coal, the revolution in the price of renewable energy, and a global climate politics forged by a generational awakening, the [expectation](https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/) is for about three degrees. Recent pledges [could bring us closer to two](https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/global-update-paris-agreement-turning-point/). All of these projections sketch a hazardous and unequal future, and all are clouded with uncertainties — about the climate system, about technology, about the dexterity and intensity of human response, about how inequitably the most punishing impacts will be distributed. Yet if each half-degree of warming marks an entirely different level of suffering, we appear to have shaved a few of them off our likeliest end stage in not much time

at all.

The next half-degrees will be harder to shave off, and the most crucial increment — getting from two degrees to 1.5 — perhaps impossible, dashing the dream of avoiding what was long described as “catastrophic” change. But for a climate alarmist like me, seeing clearly the state of the planet’s future now requires a conspicuous kind of double vision, in which a guarded optimism seems perhaps as reasonable as panic. Given how long we’ve waited to move, what counts now as a best-case outcome remains grim. It also appears, miraculously, within reach.

In December, a month after Biden was elected promising to return the U.S. to the Paris agreement, the U.N. celebrated five years since the signing of those accords. They were five of the six hottest on record. (The sixth was 2015, the year the agreement was signed.) They were also the years with the highest levels of carbon output in the history of humanity — with emissions equivalent to what was produced by all human and industrial activity from the speciation of Homo sapiens to the start of World War II.

They have also been the five years in which the nations of the world — and cities and regions, individuals and institutions, corporations and central banks — have made the most ambitious pledges of future climate action. Most of them were made in the past 12 months, in the face of the pandemic. Or, perhaps, to some degree, because of it — because the pandemic demanded a full-body jolt to the global political economy, provoking much more aggressive government spending, a much more accommodating perspective on debt, and a much greater openness to large-scale actions and investments of the kind that might plausibly reshape the world. And because decarbonization has come to seem, even to those economists and policy-makers blinded for decades to the moral and humanitarian cases for reform, a rational investment. “When I think about climate change,” Biden is fond of saying, “the word I think of is jobs.”

There are two ways of looking at these seemingly contradictory sets of facts. The first is that the distance between what is being done and what needs to be done is only growing. This is the finding of, among others, the U.N.’s comprehensive [“Emissions Gap” report](https://www.unenvironment.org/emissions-gap-report-2020), issued in December, which found that staying below two degrees of warming would require a tripling of stated ambitions. To bring the planet in reach of the 1.5-degree target — favored by activists, most scientists, and really anyone reading their work with open eyes — would require a quintupling. It is also the perspective of Greta Thunberg, who has spent the pandemic year castigating global leaders for paying mere lip service to far-off decarbonization targets and who called the E.U.’s new net-zero emissions law “surrender.”

The second is that all of the relevant curves are bending — too slowly but nevertheless in the right direction. The International Energy Agency, a notoriously conservative forecaster, recently [called](https://www.carbonbrief.org/solar-is-now-cheapest-electricity-in-history-confirms-iea#:~:text=Source%3A%20IEA%20World%20Energy%20Outlook%202020.&text=Together%2C%20low%2Dcarbon%20sources%20would,up%20from%2019%25%20in%202019.) solar power “the cheapest electricity in history” and projected that India will build 86 percent less new coal power capacity than it thought just one year ago. Today, business as usual no longer means a fivefold increase of coal use this century, as was once expected. It means pretty rapid decarbonization, at least by the standards of history, in which hardly any has ever taken place before.

Both of these perspectives are true. The gap is real, and the world risks tumbling into it, subjecting much of the global South to unconscionable punishments all the way down. But in the months since the pandemic wiped climate strikers off the streets, their concerns have seeped into not just public-opinion surveys but parliaments and presidencies, trade deals and the advertising business, finance and insurance — in short, all the citadels presiding over the ancien régime of fossil capital.

This is not exactly a climate revolution; the strikers and their allies didn’t win in the way they wanted to, at least not yet. But they did win something. Environmental anxieties haven’t toppled neoliberalism. Instead, to an unprecedented degree, they infiltrated it. (Or perhaps they were appropriated by it. It’s an open question.) Climate change isn’t an issue just for die-hards anymore — it’s for normies, sellouts, and anyone with their finger in the wind. It will take time, of course, for voters to see empty rhetoric for what it is, and for consumers to learn to distinguish, say, between the claims of guiltless airline tickets, or between carbon-free foods in the supermarket aisle. Harder still will be sorting through the differences between real corporate commitments like Microsoft’s and more evasive ones, like BP’s. Already, there is considerable consternation among climate activists that the public doesn’t understand the tricky math of “net-zero” on which so many of these commitments have been made—it is not a promise of ending emissions, but of offsetting some amount of them, in the future, with “negative emissions,” sometimes called “carbon dioxide removal,” though no approach of that kind is ready to go at anything like the necessary scale. And while some amount of skepticism about those commitments is surely warranted, it is also the case that, according to [a recent Bloomberg review](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-company-emissions-pledges/), of 187 corporate climate pledges made for 2020 in 2015, 138 will be met. (Many of those promises were quite modest, but it is a much better performance than has been managed by the 189 parties to the Paris agreement, of which only two — Morocco and Gambia — are today [judged](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/) fully “compatible” with the 1.5-degree goal, and only six more with the 2-degree target).

In the political sphere, the uneasy alliance between activists and those in power will be tested, producing new conflicts, or new equilibria, or both. Consider, though, that Varshini Prakash, whose [Sunrise Movement](https://www.sunrisemovement.org/) gave Biden’s primary candidacy an F, later helped write his climate plan along with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Climate expertise has been distributed throughout the incoming administration, as was promised during a campaign that closed, remarkably, with a climate-focused advertising blitz. During the transition, Biden’s pick for director of the National Economic Council, Brian Deese, was targeted by the environmental left for his time with BlackRock, but even this purported stooge had been married by Bill McKibben, one of the godfathers of modern climate activism.

Elsewhere in the world, where 85 percent of global emissions are produced, the great infiltration of climate concerns represents what the British environmental [writer](https://www.businessgreen.com/blog-post/4025199/2020-crisis-crossroads-alternative-histories) James Murray has called “an alternative history to 2020” and what the scientist turned journalist Akshat Rathi [has declared](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-05/climate-action-is-embedding-into-how-the-world-works) “a strong sign that climate action is starting to be ‘institutionalized’ — that is, getting deeply embedded into how the world works.” This is not about coronavirus lockdowns producing emissions drops or “nature healing.” It is instead about long-standing trajectories passing obvious tipping points in coal use and political salience; promises and posturing by powerful if compromised institutions; and policy progress almost smuggled into place, all over the world, under cover of pandemic night. In the U.S., in the second coronavirus stimulus, [$35 billion in clean-energy spending](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/12/what-is-in-covid-stimulus-omnibus-climate-pell-grants-medical-billing.html) passed in the Senate 92-6 — an effective down payment, energy researcher Varun Sivaram has estimated, on the innovation spending needed for a full electrification of the country. Did you even notice?

Biden’s climate plan now faces the challenge of a filibuster, a skeptical Supreme Court, and the mood of Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, which means American climate action over the next four years is probably more likely to be delivered piecemeal — through appropriations and stimulus, executive action, and regulation — than through a landmark Green New Deal–style piece of legislation. That does limit what can be achieved, but it also means avoiding a protracted battle over climate as a referendum on the identity of the nation. And at least nominally, having been pressured by activists to do so, Biden is promising to multiply the green spending in that recent stimulus by a factor of 60.

The numbers are numbingly large — reminders that in the midst of pandemic turmoil, the rules of state spending have been dramatically revised and perhaps even suspended. Is this global free-spending binge the beginning of a new era or merely a crisis interregnum to be followed by a new new austerity? “We don’t know what the recovery packages of COVID are going to be,” Christiana Figueres, one of the central architects of the Paris accords, told me this summer. “And honestly, the depth of decarbonization is going to largely depend on the characteristics of those recovery packages more than on anything else, because of their scale. We’re already at $12 trillion; we could go up to $20 trillion over the next 18 months. We have never seen — the world has never seen — $20 trillion go into the economy over such a short period of time. That is going to determine the logic, the structures, and certainly the carbon intensity of the global economy at least for a decade, if not more.”

For those dreaming of a climate recovery, the first round of spending was not so encouraging. The E.U. was the gold standard, promising that 30 percent of its stimulus would be earmarked for climate. The U.S. and China each pledged only a fraction of that (and in each case, there was fossil stimulus, too). But in October, a team of researchers including Joeri Rogelj of the Imperial College of London [calculated](https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-stimulus/tenth-of-pandemic-stimulus-spend-could-help-world-reach-climate-goals-study-idUSKBN271098) that just one-tenth of the COVID-19 stimulus spending already committed around the world, directed toward decarbonization during each of the next five years, would be sufficient to deliver the goals of the Paris agreement and stop global warming well below two degrees. That analysis may be a touch optimistic, but the level of spending seems, now, doable.

When Donald Trump was elected, trashing Paris, climate hawks were left hoping that the world would hang on for the length of his administration — insisting that, in the long term, the crisis couldn’t be solved without America at the helm. But the past four years of missing leadership have produced astonishing gains.

The price of solar energy has fallen ninefold over the past decade, as has the price of lithium batteries, critical to the growth of electric cars. The costs of utility-scale batteries, which could solve the “intermittency” (i.e., cloudy day) problem of renewables and help power whole cities in relatively short order, have fallen 70 percent since just 2015. Wind power is 40 percent cheaper than it was a decade ago, with offshore wind experiencing an even steeper decline. Overall, renewable energy is less expensive than dirty energy almost everywhere on the planet, and in many places it is simply cheaper to build new renewable capacity than to continue running the old fossil-fuel infrastructure. Oil demand and carbon emissions may both have peaked this year. Eighty percent of coal plants planned in Asia’s developing countries have been shelved.

This summer, I heard the Australian scientist and entrepreneur Saul Griffith talk about what it would take to get the U.S. within range of a 1.5 degree world. He said it would mean that beginning in 2021, this year, every single person buying a new car would have to be buying an electric one. That seems unrealistic, I thought, making a note of it as a useful benchmark illustrating just how far we have to go.

Then, in the fall, the U.K. pledged to ban nonelectrics by 2030—a once-unthinkable law coming both too slow and much more quickly than seemed possible not very long ago. Similar plans are now in place in 16 other countries, plus Massachusetts and California. Canada recently raised its tax on carbon sixfold. Italy cut its power-sector emissions 65 percent between 2012 and 2019, and Denmark is now aiming to reduce its overall emissions 70 percent by 2030. “We set ourselves challenges that on paper looked almost impossible,” the country’s minister for the environment, Dan Jørgensen, told me recently. “And I think experts in many countries said, when looking at Denmark, ‘This is going to be too expensive, this is going to lower their living standards, this is going to hurt their ability to compete.’ But actually I’m proud to say that the opposite has happened. Now, of course, we have set even higher standards.”

In the midst of the pandemic, new net-zero pledges, far more ambitious than those offered at Paris, were independently made by Japan, South Korea, the E.U., and, most significant, China, the world’s biggest emitter, which promised to reach an emissions peak by 2030 and get all the way to zero by 2060. China’s promise is so ambitious it has inspired one wave of debate among experts about whether it is even feasible — given that it would require, for instance, roughly twice as much renewable power to be installed every year for the next decade as Germany has operating nationwide today — and another debate about whether it has revived the possibility of that 1.5-degree target, with economic historian Adam Tooze writing, just after Xi Jinping’s surprise announcement in September, that it single-handedly “redefined the future prospects for humanity.” Together, the new net-zero pledges may have subtracted a full half-degree from ultimate warming. Add Biden’s campaign pledge of net zero by 2050, and you’ve got about two-thirds of global emissions at least nominally committed to firm, aggressive timelines to zero.

These are all just paper promises, of course, and the history of climate action is littered with the receipts of similar ones uncashed. Plot the growth of carbon concentration in the atmosphere against the sequence of climate-action conferences and a distressing pattern emerges: the World Meteorological Conference of 1979, the U.N. framework of 1992, the Kyoto protocol of 1997, the Copenhagen accord of 2009, and the 2015 Paris accords, all tracking an uninterrupted trajectory upward for carbon from a “safe” level under 350 parts per million, past 400, to 414 today, and pointing upward from there. Before the industrial revolution, humans had never known an atmosphere with even 300 parts per million. Inevitably now, within a few years, the concentration will reach levels not seen since 3.3 million years ago, when sea levels were 60 feet higher. For all their momentum, renewables still only make up 10 percent of global electricity production.

But alarmists have to take the good news where they find it. And while mood affiliation is not always the best guide to the state of the world, in 2020, for me, there were three main sources of hope.

The first is the fact that the age of climate denial is over thanks to extreme weather and the march of science and the historic labor of activists — climate strikers, Sunrise, Extinction Rebellion — whose success in raising alarm may have been so sudden that they brought an end to the age of climate Jeremiahs as well. Their voices now echo in some unlikely places. Exxon was booted from the S&P 500 within months of Tesla making Elon Musk the world’s richest man. The cultural cachet of oil companies is quickly approaching that of tobacco companies. Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil aside, practically every leader of every country and every major figure in every corporate and industrial sector now feels obligated — because of protest and social pressure, economic realities, and cultural expectation — to at least make a show of support for climate action. It would be nice not to have to count that as progress, but it is. The questions are: How much does it matter? And what will follow? Disinformation and human disregard are not the only instruments of delay, and the age of climate denial is likely to yield first not to an age of straightforward climate deliverance but to one characterized by climate hypocrisy, greenwashing, and gaslighting. But those things, ugly and maddening and even criminal as they are, have always been with us. It is the other thing that is new.

The second source of good news is the arrival on the global stage of climate self-interest. By this I don’t mean the profiteering logic of BlackRock, which opportunistically announced some half-hearted climate commitments last year, but rather the growing consensus in almost every part of the globe, and at almost every level of society and governance, that the world will be made better through decarbonization. A decade ago, many of the more ruthless capitalists to analyze that project deemed it too expensive to undertake. Today, it suddenly appears almost too good a deal to pass up. (A recent McKinsey [report](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/our-insights/how-the-european-union-could-achieve-net-zero-emissions-at-net-zero-cost): “Net-Zero Emissions at Net-Zero Cost.”)

The logic may be clearest in considering the effects of air pollution, which kills an estimated 9 million people per year. In India, where more than 8 percent of GDP is lost to pollution, poor air quality is also responsible for 350,000 miscarriages and stillbirths every year. Globally, coal kills one person for every thousand people it provides power to, and even in the U.S., with its enviably clean air, total decarbonization would be entirely paid for, Duke’s Drew Shindell [recently testified](https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths) before Congress, just through the public-health benefits of cutting out fossil fuels. You don’t even have to calculate any of the other returns — more jobs, cheaper energy, new infrastructure. Of course, countries all around the world are incorporating those considerations too, turning the page on a generation of economic analysis that said decarbonization was too costly and its benefits too small to sell to the public as upside.

A decade ago, capitalists deemed decarbonization too expensive. Suddenly, it appears too good a deal to pass up.

What is perhaps most striking about all the new climate pledges is not just that they were made in the absence of American leadership but that they were made outside the boundaries of the Paris framework. They are not the result of geopolitical strong-arming or “Kumbaya” consensus. They are, instead, plans arrived at internally, in some cases secretly. This has been eye-opening for the many skeptics who worried for decades about climate’s collective-action problem — who warned that because the benefits of decarbonization were distributed globally while the costs were concentrated locally, nations would move only if all of their peers did too. But a [recent paper](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/glep_a_00578) by Matto Mildenberger and Michaël Alkin suggests this shouldn’t be a surprise. In their retrospective analysis, they found that, despite much consternation about designing climate policy to prevent countries from “cheating,” there was basically no evidence of any country ever pulling back from mitigation efforts to take a free ride on the good-faith efforts of others. There was, in other words, no collective-action problem on climate after all. For a generation, the argument for climate action was made on a moral basis. That case has only grown stronger. And now there are other powerful, more mercenary arguments to offer.

The third cause for optimism is that, while the timelines to tolerably disruptive climate outcomes have already evaporated, the timelines to the next set of benchmarks is much more forgiving. This is why Glen Peters, the research director at the Cicero Center for International Climate Research, often jokes that while keeping warming below two degrees is very hard, perhaps even impossible, keeping it below 2.5 degrees now looks like a walk in the park.

This isn’t to say we’re on a glide path to safety. At current emissions levels, the planet will entirely exhaust the carbon budget for 1.5 degrees in just seven years — stay merely level, in other words, and we’ll burn through the possibility of a relatively comfortable endgame within the decade. We could buy ourselves a little more time by starting to move quickly, but not that much more. To decarbonize fast enough to give the planet a decent chance of hitting that 1.5-degree target without any negative emissions would require getting all the way to net-zero emissions by around 2035. Simply running the cars and furnaces and fossil-fuel infrastructure that already exists to its expected retirement date would push the world past 1.5 degrees—without a single new gasoline SUV hitting the road, or a single new oil-heated home being built, or a single new coal plant opened.

A two-degree target, by contrast, yields a much longer timeline, requiring the world to achieve net-zero by 2070 or 2080 — without even the help of negative emissions. We’d have to cut carbon production in half in about three decades, rather than one. That pathway will almost certainly prove harder than it looks. The good news is that we seem to be beginning, at least, to try.

# 1AR

## AT: T---Antitrust

### C/I

Michigan Court of Appeals 10 (SAWYER, J. Opinion in DEQ. v. Worth Twp., 808 N.W.2d 260, 289 Mich. App. 414 (Ct. App. 2010). Google scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/23/21).

Second, we look to the meaning of the phrase "by the municipality." This phrase is key because it answers plaintiffs' contention that MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility for a discharge on a municipality without regard to the source of the discharge. That is, plaintiffs argue that any discharge of raw sewage within a municipality constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation by the municipality even if the municipality is not the source of the discharge. We disagree. The word "by" has many meanings. For its meaning as a nonlegal term, we look to a layman's dictionary rather than a legal one. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). We find these definitions from the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) to be particularly helpful: "10. through the agency of" and "12. as a result or on the basis of[.]" Thus, MCL 324.3109(2) imposes responsibility on the municipality not when the violation merely occurs within the boundaries 264\*264 of the municipality, but when the violation occurs "through the agency of" the municipality or "as a result" of the municipality, that is to say, when it is the actions of the municipality that lead to the discharge.

#### If we meet the second half—we’re topical; at least means nothing else is required

Bradford 14, JD (Case 2:13-cv-01581-AKK Document 24 Filed 09/11/14 , Lexis)

In addition, there is a distinct difference between the two phrases used. “At least” is defined as “not less than,” “at a minimum,” or “at the minimum.”2 The phrase is indefinite, and signifies only that a minimum unit of time (one year) is required.

### 1AR---AT: “The”

#### The is a member of a class

Merriam Webster N.D. “The.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the. Accessed 30 Sep. 2021](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/the.%20Accessed%2030%20Sep.%202021).

Full Definition of the (Entry 1 of 4) 1a—used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context or by circumstance put the cat out b—used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular member of its class

### 1AR---Overlimiting

#### No limits explosion, only six new affs

Carstensen 11, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. (Peter, 2011,Replacing Antitrust Exemptions for Transportation Industries: The Potential for a "Robust Business Review Clearance", 89 Or. L. Rev. 1059 , Lexis/Nexis)

There are six identifiable exemptions from antitrust law for various aspects of the transportation industries. The exemptions include The Shipping Act, railroad exemptions, collective agreements among motor carriers, intercity bus mergers and acquisitions, international air carrier agreement exemptions, and airport congestion.

## K---Capitalism

### 1AR---Cap Good

#### Finishing Wallace Wells

at all.

The next half-degrees will be harder to shave off, and the most crucial increment — getting from two degrees to 1.5 — perhaps impossible, dashing the dream of avoiding what was long described as “catastrophic” change. But for a climate alarmist like me, seeing clearly the state of the planet’s future now requires a conspicuous kind of double vision, in which a guarded optimism seems perhaps as reasonable as panic. Given how long we’ve waited to move, what counts now as a best-case outcome remains grim. It also appears, miraculously, within reach.

In December, a month after Biden was elected promising to return the U.S. to the Paris agreement, the U.N. celebrated five years since the signing of those accords. They were five of the six hottest on record. (The sixth was 2015, the year the agreement was signed.) They were also the years with the highest levels of carbon output in the history of humanity — with emissions equivalent to what was produced by all human and industrial activity from the speciation of Homo sapiens to the start of World War II.

They have also been the five years in which the nations of the world — and cities and regions, individuals and institutions, corporations and central banks — have made the most ambitious pledges of future climate action. Most of them were made in the past 12 months, in the face of the pandemic. Or, perhaps, to some degree, because of it — because the pandemic demanded a full-body jolt to the global political economy, provoking much more aggressive government spending, a much more accommodating perspective on debt, and a much greater openness to large-scale actions and investments of the kind that might plausibly reshape the world. And because decarbonization has come to seem, even to those economists and policy-makers blinded for decades to the moral and humanitarian cases for reform, a rational investment. “When I think about climate change,” Biden is fond of saying, “the word I think of is jobs.”

There are two ways of looking at these seemingly contradictory sets of facts. The first is that the distance between what is being done and what needs to be done is only growing. This is the finding of, among others, the U.N.’s comprehensive [“Emissions Gap” report](https://www.unenvironment.org/emissions-gap-report-2020), issued in December, which found that staying below two degrees of warming would require a tripling of stated ambitions. To bring the planet in reach of the 1.5-degree target — favored by activists, most scientists, and really anyone reading their work with open eyes — would require a quintupling. It is also the perspective of Greta Thunberg, who has spent the pandemic year castigating global leaders for paying mere lip service to far-off decarbonization targets and who called the E.U.’s new net-zero emissions law “surrender.”

The second is that all of the relevant curves are bending — too slowly but nevertheless in the right direction. The International Energy Agency, a notoriously conservative forecaster, recently [called](https://www.carbonbrief.org/solar-is-now-cheapest-electricity-in-history-confirms-iea#:~:text=Source%3A%20IEA%20World%20Energy%20Outlook%202020.&text=Together%2C%20low%2Dcarbon%20sources%20would,up%20from%2019%25%20in%202019.) solar power “the cheapest electricity in history” and projected that India will build 86 percent less new coal power capacity than it thought just one year ago. Today, business as usual no longer means a fivefold increase of coal use this century, as was once expected. It means pretty rapid decarbonization, at least by the standards of history, in which hardly any has ever taken place before.

Both of these perspectives are true. The gap is real, and the world risks tumbling into it, subjecting much of the global South to unconscionable punishments all the way down. But in the months since the pandemic wiped climate strikers off the streets, their concerns have seeped into not just public-opinion surveys but parliaments and presidencies, trade deals and the advertising business, finance and insurance — in short, all the citadels presiding over the ancien régime of fossil capital.

This is not exactly a climate revolution; the strikers and their allies didn’t win in the way they wanted to, at least not yet. But they did win something. Environmental anxieties haven’t toppled neoliberalism. Instead, to an unprecedented degree, they infiltrated it. (Or perhaps they were appropriated by it. It’s an open question.) Climate change isn’t an issue just for die-hards anymore — it’s for normies, sellouts, and anyone with their finger in the wind. It will take time, of course, for voters to see empty rhetoric for what it is, and for consumers to learn to distinguish, say, between the claims of guiltless airline tickets, or between carbon-free foods in the supermarket aisle. Harder still will be sorting through the differences between real corporate commitments like Microsoft’s and more evasive ones, like BP’s. Already, there is considerable consternation among climate activists that the public doesn’t understand the tricky math of “net-zero” on which so many of these commitments have been made—it is not a promise of ending emissions, but of offsetting some amount of them, in the future, with “negative emissions,” sometimes called “carbon dioxide removal,” though no approach of that kind is ready to go at anything like the necessary scale. And while some amount of skepticism about those commitments is surely warranted, it is also the case that, according to [a recent Bloomberg review](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-company-emissions-pledges/), of 187 corporate climate pledges made for 2020 in 2015, 138 will be met. (Many of those promises were quite modest, but it is a much better performance than has been managed by the 189 parties to the Paris agreement, of which only two — Morocco and Gambia — are today [judged](https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/) fully “compatible” with the 1.5-degree goal, and only six more with the 2-degree target).

In the political sphere, the uneasy alliance between activists and those in power will be tested, producing new conflicts, or new equilibria, or both. Consider, though, that Varshini Prakash, whose [Sunrise Movement](https://www.sunrisemovement.org/) gave Biden’s primary candidacy an F, later helped write his climate plan along with Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Climate expertise has been distributed throughout the incoming administration, as was promised during a campaign that closed, remarkably, with a climate-focused advertising blitz. During the transition, Biden’s pick for director of the National Economic Council, Brian Deese, was targeted by the environmental left for his time with BlackRock, but even this purported stooge had been married by Bill McKibben, one of the godfathers of modern climate activism.

Elsewhere in the world, where 85 percent of global emissions are produced, the great infiltration of climate concerns represents what the British environmental [writer](https://www.businessgreen.com/blog-post/4025199/2020-crisis-crossroads-alternative-histories) James Murray has called “an alternative history to 2020” and what the scientist turned journalist Akshat Rathi [has declared](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-05/climate-action-is-embedding-into-how-the-world-works) “a strong sign that climate action is starting to be ‘institutionalized’ — that is, getting deeply embedded into how the world works.” This is not about coronavirus lockdowns producing emissions drops or “nature healing.” It is instead about long-standing trajectories passing obvious tipping points in coal use and political salience; promises and posturing by powerful if compromised institutions; and policy progress almost smuggled into place, all over the world, under cover of pandemic night. In the U.S., in the second coronavirus stimulus, [$35 billion in clean-energy spending](https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/12/what-is-in-covid-stimulus-omnibus-climate-pell-grants-medical-billing.html) passed in the Senate 92-6 — an effective down payment, energy researcher Varun Sivaram has estimated, on the innovation spending needed for a full electrification of the country. Did you even notice?

Biden’s climate plan now faces the challenge of a filibuster, a skeptical Supreme Court, and the mood of Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, which means American climate action over the next four years is probably more likely to be delivered piecemeal — through appropriations and stimulus, executive action, and regulation — than through a landmark Green New Deal–style piece of legislation. That does limit what can be achieved, but it also means avoiding a protracted battle over climate as a referendum on the identity of the nation. And at least nominally, having been pressured by activists to do so, Biden is promising to multiply the green spending in that recent stimulus by a factor of 60.

The numbers are numbingly large — reminders that in the midst of pandemic turmoil, the rules of state spending have been dramatically revised and perhaps even suspended. Is this global free-spending binge the beginning of a new era or merely a crisis interregnum to be followed by a new new austerity? “We don’t know what the recovery packages of COVID are going to be,” Christiana Figueres, one of the central architects of the Paris accords, told me this summer. “And honestly, the depth of decarbonization is going to largely depend on the characteristics of those recovery packages more than on anything else, because of their scale. We’re already at $12 trillion; we could go up to $20 trillion over the next 18 months. We have never seen — the world has never seen — $20 trillion go into the economy over such a short period of time. That is going to determine the logic, the structures, and certainly the carbon intensity of the global economy at least for a decade, if not more.”

For those dreaming of a climate recovery, the first round of spending was not so encouraging. The E.U. was the gold standard, promising that 30 percent of its stimulus would be earmarked for climate. The U.S. and China each pledged only a fraction of that (and in each case, there was fossil stimulus, too). But in October, a team of researchers including Joeri Rogelj of the Imperial College of London [calculated](https://www.reuters.com/article/climate-change-stimulus/tenth-of-pandemic-stimulus-spend-could-help-world-reach-climate-goals-study-idUSKBN271098) that just one-tenth of the COVID-19 stimulus spending already committed around the world, directed toward decarbonization during each of the next five years, would be sufficient to deliver the goals of the Paris agreement and stop global warming well below two degrees. That analysis may be a touch optimistic, but the level of spending seems, now, doable.

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#### Capitalism net alleviates poverty.

Lazear 20, \*Edward P. Lazear was the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Davies Family Professor of Economics at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.;(May 26th, 2020, “Socialism, Capitalism, And Income”, https://www.hoover.org/research/socialism-capitalism-and-income-0)

First, there is no evidence that, as a general matter, high-income groups benefit more from a move toward capitalism than low-income groups. The effect of changing state ownership and economic freedom on income is not larger for the rich than for the poor. Second, income growth is positively correlated across deciles. The situation is closer to a rising tide lifting all boats than to the fat man becoming fat by making the thin man thin. Finally, there is no consistent evidence across the large number of countries and time periods examined of any strong and widespread link between income growth and inequality. There are examples, like China, where income growth was coupled with large increases in inequality, but others like Chile, where strong income growth came about without much change in inequality, and South Korea, where inequality declined slightly as economic freedom and income grew over time.

Transfers and redistribution present the most complex picture of state involvement.

Transfers from rich to poor through the tax system are a luxury that only rich countries seem to be able to afford and are not a product of socialism per se. There is a very high correlation (-.67 in 2010) between contemporaneous median income and the low transfer index across countries.

High transfer countries like those in Scandinavia and other rich parts of Europe have primarily private ownership and economic freedom more like what prevails in the United States than in socialist countries. The poor definitely—and unsurprisingly—seem to benefit from higher transfers at a point in time. But the high taxes that generally go along with transfers do result in low income growth for median and high-income groups within a given country over time.

A similar pattern exists with respect to rule of law. The contemporaneous relation of rule of law to income is strong, but this seems to reflect the fact that countries that are wealthy demand rule of law rather than the reverse. Low state ownership at a point in time is a more consistent predictor of income growth within a country over the following decade than is rule of law at that same point in time.

Finally, not all transitions are alike. The Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union saw large transitory declines in incomes for all groups during their transition to the market and the poor were more adversely affected than the rich. In China, and to a lesser extent India, market reforms brought about almost uninterrupted income growth. Venezuela provides an opposite example, moving from a more market-oriented economy to a socialist one.

Inequality fell slightly, but income growth was low for all groups and the poor have not regained the income levels that they had at the peak during the 1990s. The evidence suggests that it is economic shocks rather than transitions that disproportionately affect the poor. Transition from a command structure to the market is but one example of such a shock.

In sum, most income groups benefit from moves away from socialist command structures to free-market capitalism, but transfers can at least in the short run improve the well-being of those worst off.

#### Capitalism solves climate change

Smith 19 – (Noah Smith, assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”; Bloomberg; D.A. August 25th 2020, [Published April 5th 2019]; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism>) //LFS—JCM

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes [are unlikely](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/a-carbon-tax-cant-solve-climate-change-but-we-should-do-it.html) to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards [have improved](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-22/bolivia-s-problem-is-macroeconomics-not-socialism) substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free [cement](https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/worlds-first-zero-emission-cement-plant-takes-shape-in-norway/) production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A [recent report](https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-powers-latest-plunge-costs-threatens-coal-gas/) by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam [underscores](http://rameznaam.com/2019/04/02/the-third-phase-of-clean-energy-will-be-the-most-disruptive-yet/) the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent [decrease](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/28/global-collapse-in-number-of-new-coal-fired-power-plants) in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and [Indiana](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/even-in-indiana-new-renewables-are-cheaper-than-existing-coal-plants/540242/) where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a [recent paper](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518305196?via%253Dihub) evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

#### Capitalism net alleviates poverty.

Lazear 20, \*Edward P. Lazear was the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Davies Family Professor of Economics at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.;(May 26th, 2020, “Socialism, Capitalism, And Income”, https://www.hoover.org/research/socialism-capitalism-and-income-0)

First, there is no evidence that, as a general matter, high-income groups benefit more from a move toward capitalism than low-income groups. The effect of changing state ownership and economic freedom on income is not larger for the rich than for the poor. Second, income growth is positively correlated across deciles. The situation is closer to a rising tide lifting all boats than to the fat man becoming fat by making the thin man thin. Finally, there is no consistent evidence across the large number of countries and time periods examined of any strong and widespread link between income growth and inequality. There are examples, like China, where income growth was coupled with large increases in inequality, but others like Chile, where strong income growth came about without much change in inequality, and South Korea, where inequality declined slightly as economic freedom and income grew over time.

Transfers and redistribution present the most complex picture of state involvement.

Transfers from rich to poor through the tax system are a luxury that only rich countries seem to be able to afford and are not a product of socialism per se. There is a very high correlation (-.67 in 2010) between contemporaneous median income and the low transfer index across countries.

High transfer countries like those in Scandinavia and other rich parts of Europe have primarily private ownership and economic freedom more like what prevails in the United States than in socialist countries. The poor definitely—and unsurprisingly—seem to benefit from higher transfers at a point in time. But the high taxes that generally go along with transfers do result in low income growth for median and high-income groups within a given country over time.

A similar pattern exists with respect to rule of law. The contemporaneous relation of rule of law to income is strong, but this seems to reflect the fact that countries that are wealthy demand rule of law rather than the reverse. Low state ownership at a point in time is a more consistent predictor of income growth within a country over the following decade than is rule of law at that same point in time.

Finally, not all transitions are alike. The Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union saw large transitory declines in incomes for all groups during their transition to the market and the poor were more adversely affected than the rich. In China, and to a lesser extent India, market reforms brought about almost uninterrupted income growth. Venezuela provides an opposite example, moving from a more market-oriented economy to a socialist one.

Inequality fell slightly, but income growth was low for all groups and the poor have not regained the income levels that they had at the peak during the 1990s. The evidence suggests that it is economic shocks rather than transitions that disproportionately affect the poor. Transition from a command structure to the market is but one example of such a shock.

In sum, most income groups benefit from moves away from socialist command structures to free-market capitalism, but transfers can at least in the short run improve the well-being of those worst off.